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AMERICA’S PAPER PRISONS:  
THE SECOND CHANCE GAP 
Colleen Chien* 
Over the last decade, all fifty states and the federal government have enacted 
“second chance” reforms that increase the eligibility of individuals arrested, 
charged, or convicted of crimes to shorten their sentences, clear their criminal 
records, and/or regain the right to vote. While much fanfare has accompa-
nied the increasing availability of “second chances,” little attention has been 
paid to their delivery. This study introduces the concept of the “second chance 
gap,” which it defines as the difference between eligibility and delivery of sec-
ond chance relief; explores its causes; and approximates the size of the gap in 
connection with several second chance laws and initiatives. Using adminis-
trative and other data, it finds that among a host of petition-based second 
chance opportunities, to shorten sentences, restore one’s vote, and clear one’s 
criminal convictions, only a small fraction (less than 10 percent) of those eli-
gible for relief actually received it. Extrapolating based on a novel analysis of 
around sixty thousand criminal histories of persons primarily seeking gig-
economy work and of the expungement laws governing nonconvictions of all 
fifty states, this study estimates that at least twenty to thirty million Ameri-
can adults, or 30–40 percent of those with criminal records, fall into the “sec-
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ond chance expungement gap,” living burdened with criminal records that 
persist despite appearing to be partially or fully clearable under existing law. 
These findings suggest that tens of millions of American are stuck in a paper 
prison, held back by deficiencies in the administration of second chances that 
have left them incarcerated, disenfranchised, or burdened by convictions be-
yond what the law requires. Some of the barriers to relief are structural and 
related to debt, overburdened bureaucracies, and the contested nature of sec-
ond chance rules that unwind past judgments and policies. But others are 
harder to see and stem from administrative failures like unworkable stand-
ards, missing and incomplete criminal justice information (“dirty data”), a 
lack of awareness of second chance opportunities, and costly and complex 
processes. Addressing them—by moving administrative burdens from the de-
fendant and onto the state and algorithms through automation, standardiza-
tion, and ruthless iteration—can narrow the second chance relief gap. 
Leveraging them, “Clean Slate” initiatives to automatically clear eligible 
criminal records can have the potential to help the millions of Americans in 
the second chance expungement gap. However, the ability of such second 
chance initiatives to improve outcomes depends on how they are implement-
ed. Debt-related barriers and dirty data can contribute to incomplete auto-
mation, leading to “second second chance gaps.” In the realm of 
expungement, application of the expungement criteria to minor but not ma-
jor offenses can also have the effect of exacerbating, not narrowing, existing 
racial disparities within the population of people with records, while improv-
ing them within the general population. Further research is needed to under-
stand the impact of automated clearance under different scenarios, such as 
when the defendant is not notified of the relief received or there is a risk of 
statistical discrimination making things worse, not better. Overall, however, 
though other hurdles may remain, automation can remove the unfair collat-
eral punishments, not steel bars, holding back tens of millions of Americans. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 17, 2019, the Louisiana Times-Picayune reported that the 
state of Louisiana routinely keeps people incarcerated, “[w]eeks, months, 
years after their release dates.”1 According to a state auditor’s report, the 
main culprit was inconsistencies in the application of credits for certified 
treatment and rehabilitation programs to the calculation of release dates.2 
Similar miscalculations have been reported in California, where taxpayers 
have paid tens of millions of dollars in overstays because some inmates were 
given 15 percent rather than 50 percent good-behavior credit. 3 Overincar-
ceration in Hawaii,4 D.C.,5 and the federal criminal justice system6 has also 
been documented. 
Also in February 2019, the New York Times reported the death of Steve 
Cheatham while he was in prison waiting for a court to rule on his compas-
sionate-release application.7 Created in the 1980s, compassionate-release 
programs allow federal inmates who no longer pose a threat to be sent home, 
usually when nearing death.8 But since 2014, scores of elderly and terminally 
 
 1. Richard A. Webster & Emily Lane, Louisiana Routinely Jails People Weeks, Months, 
Years After Their Release Dates, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Feb. 21, 2019, 9:24 PM), https://www
.nola.com/news/article_988818dd-2971-51c8-82d5-096eef5ffba5.html [https://perma.cc/L9YX-
XYQ9]. 
 2. LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR, DEP’T OF CORR., MANAGEMENT OF OFFENDER DATA: 
PROCESSES FOR ENSURING ACCURACY 9 (2017), https://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf
/1284612EDBDB25E5862581C40056189F/$FILE/0001674C.pdf [https://perma.cc/428L-4RJC] 
(describing the need to factor into release-date calculations credit for time served, good time-
release ratio, credit earned for certified treatment or rehabilitation programs, good-time credit 
lost due to behavior, and parole-revocation recalculations). 
 3. Michael Rothfeld, Inmates Serve Overtime, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2008, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2008-feb-17-me-prisons17-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/6QCS-CFBJ]. 
 4. Manolo Morales, Inmates Forced to Stay in Prison Past Their Release Date Cost Tax-
payers, KHON2 (Jan. 5, 2019, 3:35 AM), https://www.khon2.com/local-news/inmates-forced-to-
stay-in-prison-past-their-release-date-cost-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/ENT8-GGS9]. 
 5. Spencer S. Hsu, D.C. Jail Held Man for 77 Days After His Case Was Dropped Until 
Another Inmate Flagged an Attorney, WASH. POST (Oct. 1, 2017, 6:38 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/dc-jail-held-man-for-77-days-after-his-
case-was-dropped-until-another-inmate-flagged-an-attorney/2017/10/01/61235af2-9f0a-11e7-
8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html [https://perma.cc/W8GE-UAUE] (describing the payment by 
Washington beginning in 2017 of $6 million in connection with a detention settlement). 
 6. See infra Sections II.A.1, II.A.2 (discussing the shortcomings of the federal Clemen-
cy Initiative and compassionate-release policy). 
 7. Mitch Smith, A New Law Made Him a ‘Free Man on Paper,’ but He Died Behind 
Bars, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/criminal-justice-
reform-steve-cheatham.html [https://perma.cc/49PZ-Z9DL]. 
 8. See HUM. RTS. WATCH & FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, THE ANSWER IS 
NO: TOO LITTLE COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN US FEDERAL PRISONS 2, 26–27 (2012), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1112ForUploadSm.pdf [https://perma.cc
/48F2-4QJG]. 
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ill federal prisoners have died while waiting for the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) 
to rule on their applications.9 A Department of Justice Office of the Inspector 
General report found that less than 4 percent of federal inmates who submit-
ted compassionate-release requests were released, in part because of eligibil-
ity provisions that were unclear and difficult to apply.10 The same report 
estimated that 19 percent of the federal-prison budget was spent to incarcer-
ate aging inmates.11 
Over the summer of 2020, tens of millions of Americans joined demon-
strations to protest the killings of George Floyd and Breonna Taylor by po-
lice officers.12 Over ten thousand people were arrested,13 including eighty-
seven unarmed demonstrators who were each charged with a felony and two 
misdemeanors for sitting on the lawn of the Kentucky attorney general to 
protest the lack of charges following Breonna Taylor’s death.14 Even if ulti-
mately dismissed without prejudice,15 the charges will remain on each per-
son’s record unless and until the person, after a waiting period of one to 
three years, petitions for expungement and the court grants the petition.16 
 
 9. New Data Reveals BOP Still Neglecting Compassionate Release, FAMS. AGAINST 
MANDATORY MINIMUMS (Feb. 8, 2018), https://famm.org/new-data-reveals-bop-still-
neglecting-compassionate-release/ [https://perma.cc/45HG-4AFV] (describing Bureau of Pris-
ons letter indicating that eighty-one prisoners died while awaiting review of their petitions be-
tween 2014 and 2018). 
 10. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS 
DIV. 15-05, THE IMPACT OF AN AGING INMATE POPULATION ON THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 
PRISONS 45 (2016), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/e1505.pdf [https://perma.cc/P5CB-
RW9G]. 
 11. Id. at 48 (“Based on BOP cost data, we estimate that the BOP spent approximately 
$881 million, or 19 percent of its total budget, to incarcerate aging inmates in FY 2013.”). 
 12. Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the 
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/RR2Q-
RZQZ] (reviewing estimates of how many Americans participated in the protests, proposing 
an aggregate range from fifteen to twenty-six million). 
 13. Anita Snow, Arrests at Widespread U.S. Protests Hit 10,000, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(June 4, 2020, 7:16 AM), https://www.dailyherald.com/news/20200604/arrests-at-widespread-
us-protests-hit-10000 [https://perma.cc/EBG9-ZLK4]. 
 14. Jacey Fortin & Allyson Waller, 87 Face Felony Charges After Protesting Breonna Tay-
lor’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/15/us/protesters-
arrested-breonna-taylor-kentucky.html [https://perma.cc/SV37-92TG]. 
 15. This is typical; however, if the charges are dismissed with prejudice, the charges will 
be automatically removed following a law change in 2020. Kentucky Restoration of Rights & 
Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Aug. 12, 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-
restoration-profiles/kentucky-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/ 
[https://perma.cc/5Y8E-NLMB] (“For cases disposed after March 27, 2020, expungement of 
misdemeanor or felony charges resulting in acquittal or dismissal with prejudice (‘and not in 
exchange for a guilty plea to another offense’) is automatic upon disposition (‘The order ex-
punging the records shall not require any action by the person.’).”). 
 16. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.076(1)(a) (2020). 
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Many people do not take advantage of this option. As reported in this Arti-
cle, I find, applying the records-clearance policies of fifty states to criminal 
histories from each state, that an estimated 30–40 percent of people with 
records, or twenty to thirty million of the eighty million adult Americans 
with records,17 are eligible to clear their criminal records partially or fully on 
the basis of nonconvictions expungement policies but have not done so. 
For individuals that are convicted, formal sentences are only part of the 
punishment. According to the National Institute of Justice, forty-four thou-
sand private- and civil-sector limitations on employment, housing, civic par-
ticipation, and many other realms continue to burden those with criminal 
records long after they have served their time.18 But while every state offers 
ways to “expunge” or otherwise improve one’s record of criminal convic-
tions to avoid such “collateral consequences,”19 only a small fraction of those 
eligible for relief get it. Among the dozen or so states analyzed or reported in 
this study, uptake rates of convictions relief below 10–20 percent were the 
norm.20 
 
 17. STAT. TRENDING, ANALYSIS, & REPORTING GRP., FBI, SEPTEMBER 2020 NEXT 
GENERATION IDENTIFICATION (NGI) SYSTEM FACT SHEET 1 (2020), https://www.fbi.gov/file-
repository/ngi-monthly-fact-sheet/view [https://perma.cc/4G9V-V4H7] (reporting 78.3 mil-
lion records pertaining to unique individuals based on fingerprints); QuickFacts United States, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US
/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/2QBN-Z3Y6] (reporting that as of July 2019, there were 328 
million people living in the US, 77.5 percent of whom were 18 years or older, or 254 million 
adults); see also BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL 
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2012, at 14 tbl.1, 83 tbl.25 (2014), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/244563.pdf [https://perma.cc/CD6S-DG8P] (re-
porting 100 million criminal records based on a summation of the amount of records each 
state keeps, which does not account for those with multiple records in multiple states, and sev-
enty-nine million unique criminal records based on the Interstate Identification Index). 
 18. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES: THE CROSSROADS OF 
PUNISHMENT, REDEMPTION, AND THE EFFECTS ON COMMUNITIES 1–2 (2019), https://www
.usccr.gov/pubs/2019/06-13-Collateral-Consequences.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA8H-92CZ] 
(“[I]ndividuals with criminal histories can face barriers to voting, serving on a jury, holding 
public office, securing employment, obtaining housing, receiving public assistance, owning a 
firearm, getting a driver’s license, qualifying for financial aid and college admission, qualifying 
for military service, and deportation (for noncitizens).” (footnotes omitted)). 
 19. Through expungement, sealing, vacatur, set-aside, or related records-rehabilitation 
remedy, interchangeably referred to in this Article as “expungement” or records “clearing.” See 
Margaret Colgate Love, 50-State Comparison: Expungement, Sealing & Other Record Relief, 
RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Dec. 2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-
profiles/50-state-comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside/ [https://perma.cc
/6XR3-RRZR] (showing that while relief varies considerably by state, all states offer pathways 
to some type of records rehabilitation, but also showing that at the federal level there remains, 
as of December 2019, no general statutory authority to seal or expunge even nonconviction 
records). 
 20. See infra Table 4-1 
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“Second chance” laws, passed by nearly every state over the last decade,21 
are an important pillar of what the late Joan Petersilia has called the current 
“transformative moment in criminal justice reform . . . away from . . . harsh 
punishment policies” and toward rehabilitation.22 These laws allow individu-
als charged with or convicted of crimes to have their sentences shortened, 
crimes downgraded (e.g., from a felony to a misdemeanor), criminal records 
cleared, licenses restored, and/or voting rights reinstated, but often only on 
petition. They reflect the sentiment—behind Kim Kardashian West’s suc-
cessful bid for presidential clemency for Alice Johnson (a sixty-three-year-
old grandma given a life sentence for a drug-related crime),23 the 2018 mid-
term passage of Florida’s “Amendment 4” to restore the vote to over a mil-
lion persons with felony convictions, 24 and the surprise enactment of the 
bipartisan First Step Act in 2019, which grants early release to qualifying fed-
eral prisoners25—that everyone deserves a second chance, and many pun-
ishments deserve a second look. 
But while much fanfare has accompanied the increasing availability of 
second chances, little attention has been paid to their delivery. 26 For exam-
ple, in the fall of 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, to allow indi-
 
 21. See infra Section I.A. 
 22. Joan Petersilia, Preface, Realigning Corrections, California Style, ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI., March 2016, at 8, 8. See also, for example, the formation of the Law Enforce-
ment Leaders to Reduce Crime and Incarceration group, comprised of nearly 200 police chiefs, 
prosecutors, sheriffs, and attorneys general committed to “changes to laws and practices that 
more effectively fight crime while reducing unnecessary imprisonment.” LAW ENF’T LEADERS, 
http://lawenforcementleaders.org/ [https://perma.cc/7KBV-NVWZ]. 
 23. Peter Baker, Alice Marie Johnson Is Granted Clemency by Trump After Push by Kim 
Kardashian West, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/06/us
/politics/trump-alice-johnson-sentence-commuted-kim-kardashian-west.html 
[https://perma.cc/W4M7-A8TF]. 
 24. Though whether it will remains to be seen. See Lori Rozsa, ‘A Joyous Day’ Ahead as 
1.4 Million Florida Ex-Felons Have Voting Rights Restored, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2019, 6:40 
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/a-joyous-day-ahead-as-14-million-florida-ex-
felons-have-voting-rights-restored/2019/01/05/58650ee2-106f-11e9-8938-5898adc28fa2
_story.html [https://perma.cc/9LRK-E8F2] (citing as one of the barriers to restoration the re-
quirement that all fines first be paid, including that of one individual who owed $52 million in 
restitution). 
 25. Through, for example, the retroactive application of good time credits and the Fair 
Sentencing Act. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 101(a), §§ 3631–3635, sec. 404, 
132 Stat. 5194, 5195–208, 5222. 
 26. But see Tony Calero, Open Juvenile Records in Washington State: Process, Effects, 
and Costs of Protective Mechanisms (2013) (unpublished M.P.A. thesis, University of Wash-
ington), http://www.juvjustice.org/sites/default/files/ckfinder/files/Examining%20Open
%20Juvenile%20Records%20in%20Washington%20State.pdf [https://perma.cc/H7JY-RFTZ] 
(considering the uptake of clearance remedies among eligible juveniles in Washington State). 
See also J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical 
Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2467 (2020). 
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viduals with felony records to regain their vote without a petition.27 But con-
fusion about who had outstanding fines and fees, which the Florida legisla-
ture ruled would disqualify potential voters, created an “administrative 
nightmare” that added “confusion and anxiety to people . . . trying to exer-
cise their first amendment right.”28 Estimates of the number of people regis-
tering and voting pursuant to the measure were “well below what was 
anticipated when Amendment 4 passed.”29 This Article discusses how, in 
“second chance” contexts like the ones described—resentencing, compas-
sionate release, reenfranchisement, and expungement—millions of Ameri-
can are stuck in a paper prison, held back by deficiencies in the 
administration of second chances that have left them unable to vote, drive, 
serve on a jury, or do one of the tens of thousands of other activities restrict-
ed for those with criminal records.30 Some of the barriers to relief are struc-
tural, and related to debt and overburdened bureaucracies. But others are 
harder to see and stem from administrative factors like unworkable stand-
ards, missing and incomplete criminal justice information (“dirty data”), a 
lack of awareness of second chance opportunities, and the nature of second 
chance rules that unwind past judgments and policies and reflect contested 
renegotiations about how to best strike the balance between public safety and 
equity. 
This Article introduces the concept of the “second chance gap”—the dif-
ference between eligibility and delivery of second chances—to draw atten-
tion to and quantify the impact of these largely invisible and 
underappreciated structural and red-tape barriers, not steel bars, holding 
Americans back. As states continue to pass and administer second chance 
laws, it is worth taking stock of the gaps between eligibility and delivery, the 
reasons they exist, various options for narrowing them, and the open re-
search questions that surround the administration of effective and impactful 
second chance relief. This Article is an initial effort to do so, drawing upon 
and extending several literatures. 
First, in its focus on the administrative, rather than substantive, aspects 
of second chance relief, such as who carries the information burden, it builds 
upon the awareness in law and policy circles that, as Richard Thaler and Cass 
Sunstein have observed, “small and apparently insignificant details can have 
 
 27. Lawrence Mower & Langston Taylor, Florida Ruled Felons Must Pay to Vote. Now, It 
Doesn’t Know How Many Can, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.tampabay.com
/news/florida-politics/elections/2020/10/07/florida-ruled-felons-must-pay-to-vote-now-it-
doesnt-know-how-many-can/ [https://perma.cc/T83E-NBUR] (describing the requirement 
that fines and fees be repaid, in combination with a lack of a central database of court fees or 
fines, as causing an “administrative nightmare,” in the words of U.S. District Judge Robert 
Hinkle). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 18, at 1–2 
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major impacts . . . . ‘[E]verything matters.’ ” 31 Joining other studies that con-
sider mechanisms for influencing the impact of the law other than by chang-
ing its substance,32 it finds small design choices—for example, those 
regarding how eligibility criteria are articulated33—to have outsized impacts 
when laws are applied at scale. 
Next, by discussing and modeling uptake gaps in second chances across 
a number of domains and ways for narrowing them, this Article makes theo-
retical and empirical contributions to the existing literature on what has 
been called the “nonparticipation problem,” or the failure or inability of in-
dividuals eligible for government benefits to access them.34 Although “second 
chances” that remove government punishments are analytically distinct 
from programs that provide government benefits (like food stamps), cum-
bersome administrative processes are common to both. By considering the 
use of government-initiated automation, not applicant-based petitions, to 
award second chance relief, this Article confronts some of the novel issues 
being raised by automated and algorithmic decisionmaking systems (ADS), 
like notification, (the lack of an) explanation, and the reliance on incomplete 
and imperfect data.35 
Finally, this Article contributes to the ongoing discourse about the use of 
data and high-tech tools to sort individuals in a number of contexts, includ-
ing pretrial detention,36 loan qualification,37 and recruitment,38 and the at-
 
 31. RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 3 (2008) (describing how using defaults, prompts, and oth-
er “nudges” can change public policy outcomes). 
 32. For a brief overview of the related literatures of behavioral economics, regulatory 
design, and administrative mechanisms, see Ryan Calo, Code, Nudge, or Notice?, 99 IOWA L. 
REV. 773 (2014). 
 33. For an explanation of why, for example, it is far easier to automate eligibility meas-
ured from “disposition date” plus a waiting period, instead of “sentence completion” and other 
examples, see infra Table 5 and associated discussion. 
 34. See, e.g., Francisca Alba, The Nonparticipation Problem: Behavioral Economics and 
the Take-Up of Social Benefits, POL’Y PERSPS., Spring 2018, at 1 (discussing uptake issues in the 
context of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Pro-
gram (SNAP) programs). For a review of the long literature on take-up, see Janet Currie, The 
Take Up of Social Benefits, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION 80 (Alan J. Au-
erbach, David Card & John M. Quigley eds., 2006). 
 35. As discussed in RASHIDA RICHARDSON, JASON M. SCHULTZ & VINCENT M. 
SOUTHERLAND, AI NOW INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS 2019 US REPORT: NEW CHALLENGES 
TO GOVERNMENT USE OF ALGORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS (2019), https://ainowinstitute
.org/litigatingalgorithms-2019-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/47TV-EDLF]. 
 36. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, 
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-
assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/BM4E-AEXE] (finding that pretrial 
risk-assessment tools are biased against Black people). 
 37. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. 
L. REV. 671, 679 (2016). 
 38. See, e.g., id. at 685. 
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tendant risk that existing biases against the poor and disenfranchised will be 
reinforced or amplified through the use of algorithmic processes. Though 
second chances automation presents the potential for algorithms to reduce, 
rather than exacerbate, existing disparities for at least the reasons described 
in this Article, much depends on how it is implemented. 
Part I introduces the concept of a “second chance gap” (the difference 
between eligibility for and receipt of a given second chance), theorizes why it 
exists, and describes empirical approaches to estimating the gap. After trac-
ing the remarkable growth in second chance eligibility and its potential to 
break the cycle of mass criminalization and mass incarceration by reducing 
recidivism, it considers the substantive, administrative, and structural barri-
ers to second chance delivery. Distinguishing between them is important be-
cause it highlights the importance of transsubstantive administrative and 
design considerations in the development and implementation of second 
chance law. This Part describes two analytically distinct types of gaps: “the 
uptake gap,” or share or number of those eligible for relief over time who 
have not applied for or received it; and the “current gap,” or share or number 
of impacted individuals who, at a given point in time, appear eligible for but 
have not received relief. While the “uptake gap” measures take-up over time, 
and therefore requires comprehensive data, the “current gap” uses available 
data to estimate the share and number of people that appear to be currently 
in the gap. 
Part II applies the concepts and methods outlined in Part I to several 
novel data sources to roughly size several second chance gaps. In the first 
Section, drawing upon administrative data, it reports on novel analyses of 
the “second chance gaps” associated with several resentencing and ex-
pungement contexts, including the Obama Clemency Initiative, California’s 
Propositions 47 and 64 (Prop 47 and Prop 64), and the laws governing the 
expungement of criminal convictions in several states. It also reviews the 
track record of “compassionate release” laws that allow prisoners to serve 
shorter sentences for humanitarian or medical reasons. Part II also uses data 
collected by the Sentencing Project to offer estimates of the “felony reenfran-
chisement gap”—the estimated share and number of people with felony rec-
ords that remain disenfranchised—in thirteen states. Finally, Part II reports 
on the analyses of convictions-clearance laws, both juvenile and adult, of 
about ten states and their uptake. Among the majority of these programs, 
chosen due to the availability of administrative or primary data, uptake rates 
by eligible individuals are low, in most cases less than 10 percent, leaving 90 
percent or more of those eligible for relief in the second chance gap. 
The second Section of Part II uses the “current gap” methodology laid 
out in Part I to estimate the number of American adults with criminal rec-
ords that could clear them under the laws governing the expungement of 
nonconviction records. Applying the laws of all fifty states to around sixty 
thousand criminal histories from across the country and balancing the re-
sults nationally, it estimates that around 30–40 percent of adults with rec-
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ords, or twenty to thirty million individuals, could clear their criminal rec-
ords, partially or fully, but have not done so. 
Do second chance gaps hurt or advance social welfare? Part III addresses 
this question and the case for allowing second chance gaps to persist before 
ultimately arguing in favor of narrowing second chance gaps on moral, poli-
cy, and economic grounds. Based on comparing programs with relatively 
larger and relatively smaller gaps, it identifies three ways to do so, taking into 
account the high informational and evaluation costs and high volume of eli-
gible individuals implicated by second chances. Currently, in the majority of 
cases, second chance rights (to a cleaned record, to vote) are provided only 
after individuals petitions are filed, evaluated case by case, and approved—
processes that cannot readily scale to meet the enormous volume of eligible 
individuals. Ruthless iteration and, where possible, simplification are needed 
to develop workable standards that can be applied and administered in im-
perfect data environments. Burden shifting, from the individual to the state, 
and from decentralized to coordinated processes for identifying and admin-
istering relief, can also dramatically reduce the gap. Finally, using automa-
tion (as in Clean Slate), rather than petitions, can avoid the need for 
applicant awareness and wherewithal to determine eligibility and apply for 
relief—however, what is lost when processes become automatic deserves 
greater study. 
Part IV concludes by discussing open research and policy questions in 
the broader context of second chance relief, with a focus on expungement. It 
starts by acknowledging that automating existing laws, without more, is no 
panacea, as many statutory criteria were not written to be implemented at 
scale, and certain policies themselves embed biases against those who may 
most need a second chance—for example, poor people whose outstanding 
fines and fees make them ineligible, or individuals whose more severe rec-
ords disqualify them from relief. First, even when persons are likely eligible, 
missing or “dirty” (incomplete or ambiguous) data on grades, sentence com-
pletion, or dispositions, for example, may make it impossible to confirm 
their eligibility, leaving them in the “second second chance gap,” unreacha-
ble through automation. Second, even when official versions of criminal rec-
ords are expunged, the risk of outdated records remains, due to the 
persistence of digital criminal records (the “Google problem”) and growth of 
the largely unregulated “people search” industry.39 Finally, even when effec-
tive clearance is accomplished through automation, there is a risk that other, 
non-red-tape factors including statistical discrimination and within-group 
disparities stemming from the selective application of the law will result in 
mixed or even negative outcomes. All of these factors underscore the need 
for studies about the impact of second chance policies. While automated de-
livery of second chances can remove the bureaucratic hurdles, not steel bars, 
 
 39. SARAH ESTHER LAGESON, DIGITAL PUNISHMENT: PRIVACY, STIGMA, AND THE 
HARMS OF DATA-DRIVEN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 74, 149–55 (2020). 
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that prevent individuals from getting their second chance, other hurdles may 
remain. 
I. DEFINING THE SECOND CHANCE GAP 
A staggering number of Americans live with curtailed freedoms due to 
contact with the criminal justice system: 2.3 million Americans are currently 
incarcerated,40 5.2 million Americans are barred from voting due to felony 
disenfranchisement,41 and close to 80 million people—or one in three 
adults—live with criminal records.42 An additional 11 million Americans are 
estimated to have had their license suspended for reasons unrelated to driv-
ing.43 The burdens of mass incarceration and criminalization are not evenly 
distributed: African Americans, for example, are 5 times more likely to be 
incarcerated than whites;44 a substantial share of the variance, studies have 
 
 40. Peter Wagner & Wendy Sawyer, How Many People Are Locked Up in the United 
States?, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (2020), www.prisonpolicy.org/graphs/pie2020.html [https://
perma.cc/2V6J-ZXKM]. 
 41. CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON, SARAH SHANNON & ARLETH PULIDO-NAVA, 
SENT’G PROJECT, LOCKED OUT 2020: ESTIMATES OF PEOPLE DENIED VOTING RIGHTS DUE TO A 
FELONY CONVICTION (2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/locked-out-
2020-estimates-of-people-denied-voting-rights-due-to-a-felony-conviction/ [https://perma.cc
/7KLC-ZJLB]; see also CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, RYAN LARSON & SARAH SHANNON, SENT’G 
PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS: STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3 (2016) [hereinafter UGGEN 2016], https://www.sentencing
project.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/6-Million-Lost-Voters.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7D3-
MG52] (providing 2016 estimates).  
 42. STAT. TRENDING, ANALYSIS, & REPORTING GRP., FBI, supra note 17. 
 43. Meghan Keneally, ‘It’s Not America’: 11 Million Go Without a License Because of 
Unpaid Fines, ABC NEWS (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:11 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/vicious-cycle-
11-million-live-driverslicense-unpaid/story?id=66504966 [https://perma.cc/DT6G-JYRV]. 
Other research supports the proposition that at least ten million licenses have been suspended 
for debt nationwide. See CARSON WHITELEMONS, ASHLEY THOMAS & SARAH COUTURE, FINES 
& FEES JUST. CTR., DRIVING ON EMPTY: FLORIDA’S COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND COSTLY 
DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION PRACTICES 4 (2019), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org
/content/uploads/2019/11/florida-fines-fees-drivers-license-suspension-driving-on-empty.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5F5J-YQMQ] (finding two million Floridian licenses suspended for debts); 
Andrea M. Marsh, Rethinking Driver’s License Suspensions for Nonpayment of Fines and Fees, 
in NAT’L CTR. ON STATE CTS., TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 20, 21 (Deborah W. Smith, Charles F. 
Campbell & Blake P. Campbell eds., 2017) (finding over four million Californians’ licenses 
suspended for debts); MARIO SALAS & ANGELA CIOLFI, LEGAL AID JUSTICE CTR., DRIVEN BY 
DOLLARS: A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSION LAWS FOR FAILURE 
TO PAY COURT DEBT 1 (2017), https://www.justice4all.org/wp-content/uploads
/2017/09/Driven-by-Dollars.pdf [https://perma.cc/JN92-QEG6] (stating that over 4.2 million 
licenses have been suspended for debts between Texas, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee, 
and Michigan); see also Peter Edelman, The Criminalization of Poverty and the People Who 
Fight Back, 26 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 213, 218 (2019) (stating at least ten million indi-
viduals owe fines and fees debts nationwide, with at least seven million licenses suspended). 
 44. See ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC 
DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/color-of-
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independently found, cannot be explained by differences in levels of criminal 
offending,45 which itself can reflect biased decisionmaking.46 Hispanic Amer-
icans are 1.4 times more likely to be incarcerated than whites.47 As a result, 
not only do the collateral consequences of contact with the criminal justice 
system disproportionately fall on Black and brown people, but because of 
historically determined levels of poverty and imprisonment in particular ju-
risdictions, “it is now the case that entire communities experience these neg-
ative effects.”48 
Over the last few decades, states and the federal government have passed 
“second chance” laws that—by allowing for sentences to be shortened, voting 
rights to be restored, and records to be cleared—have the potential to allevi-
ate some of the excesses and disparities of the American criminal justice sys-
tem. In theory, second chance laws restore human dignity and personal 
liberty, save incarceration costs, lower recidivism rates, and lead to the more 
efficient allocation of talent through society. But only to the extent they are 
successfully implemented. 
This Article defines the “second chance gap” for any particular second 
chance initiative or law as the difference between eligibility and delivery of a 
given second chance and describes and applies ways of measuring the gap 
over a variety of second chance initiatives. It offers two measures of the sec-
ond chance gap: “the uptake gap,” or share or number of those eligible for 
relief over time who have not applied for or received it; and the “current 
gap,” or share or number of impacted individuals who, at a given point in 
time, are presently apparently eligible for but have not received relief. While 
the “uptake gap” measures take-up over time, and therefore requires com-
prehensive data that includes, for example, counts of people whose expunged 
records are no longer available to the public, the “current gap” can be calcu-
lated using available data to estimate the second chance gap at a particular 
point in time and the policy opportunity presented by it. 
A. The Expansion and Promise of Second Chances 
Since 2007, at least twenty-seven states have made it easier to qualify for 
early release or parole,49 at least thirty states have passed laws to reclassify or 
 
justice-racial-and-ethnic-disparity-in-state-prisons/ [https://perma.cc/J564-PAM4] (providing 
data about state prisons). 
 45. See id. at 9 (literature review). 
 46. See infra Section I.A (discussing the Black-white drug sentencing disparities that led 
to the Fair Sentencing Act). 
 47. NELLIS, supra note 44. 
 48. Id. 
 49. 35 States Reform Criminal Justice Policies Through Justice Reinvestment, PEW 
CHARITABLE TRS. (July 2018) [hereinafter 35 States], https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets
/2018/07/pspp_reform_matrix.pdf [https://perma.cc/9XA2-HEKS]. According to the Collat-
eral Consequences Research Center, in 2018 alone, thirty-one states enacted “restoration” laws 
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downgrade charges associated with nonviolent property or drug crimes,50 
and all fifty states and the District of Columbia have passed laws to reduce 
the collateral consequences of criminal records and convictions.51 Since 
2013, over forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws that 
increase the scope of expungement and sealing remedies.52 During this peri-
od, several federal initiatives including the Fair Sentencing Act Guideline 
Amendment (Amendment 750),53 “Drugs Minus 2” (Amendment 782),54 the 
Obama Administration Clemency Initiative,55 the Johnson v. United States 
case,56 and the First Step Act of 201957 have offered resentencing options for 
 
aimed at reducing barriers faced by people with criminal records. MARGARET LOVE & DAVID 
SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION 
21–47 (2019), https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and-
expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/U99B-9DRK]. 
 50. 35 States, supra note 49. As described below, California has also passed Propositions 
47 and 64 to downgrade crimes. See MARGARET LOVE & DAVID SCHLUSSEL, COLLATERAL 
CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., PATHWAYS TO REINTEGRATION 45–63 (2020), 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Pathways-to-Reintegration_Crim
inal-Record-Reforms-in-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/22Y6-F264]; LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra 
note 49, at 21–47. 
 51. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., FOUR YEARS OF SECOND CHANCE 
REFORMS, 2013–2016, at 2 (2017), https://ccresourcecenter.org/2017/02/08/round-up-of-
recent-second-chance-legislation-2013-2016/ [https://perma.cc/GV2V-FA6J] (noting that all 
states but eight—Arizona, Florida, Hawaii, North Dakota, South Carolina, Utah, Kansas, and 
Nevada—and Washington, D.C. made changes from 2013–2016); LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra 
note 50, at 44 (noting that of these eight states, all but one made changes in 2019); LOVE & 
SCHLUSSEL, supra note 49, at 31 (noting that the last one, Kansas, made changes in 2018). 
 52. RAM SUBRAMANIAN, REBECKA MORENO & SOPHIA GEBRESELASSIE, VERA INST. OF 
JUST., RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL 
CONVICTION, 2009–2014, at 13 (2014), https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/relief-
in-sight-states-rethink-the-collateral-consequences-of-criminal-conviction-2009-2014/legacy
_downloads/states-rethink-collateral-consequences-report-v4.pdf [https://perma.cc/MCE7-
7R47]; Margaret Love, Marijuana Decriminalization Drives Expungement Reform, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2018), http://ccresourcecenter.org
/2018/10/29/marijuana-decriminalization-drives-expungement-reform/ [https://perma.cc
/YV7T-WNUB] (reporting that thirty-one states have broadened existing second chance laws 
or enacted entirely new ones); see also LOVE & SCHLUSSEL, supra note 50, at 45–63; LOVE & 
SCHLUSSEL, supra note 49, at 2–47. 
 53. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, sec. 101(a), §§ 3631–3635, sec. 404, 
132 Stat. 5194, 5195–208, 5222 (2018). 
 54. See Caryn Devins, Lessons Learned from Retroactive Resentencing After Johnson and 
Amendment 782, 10 FED. CTS. L. REV. 39, 42–50 (2018). 
 55. See infra Section II.A.1. 
 56. Devins, supra note 54, at 42–50. 
 57. An Overview of the First Step Act, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov
/inmates/fsa/overview.jsp [https://perma.cc/H426-WC7G]. 
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federal inmates. From 1997 to mid-2019, at least twenty-five states expanded 
voter eligibility for people with felony records.58 
The potential scope and reach of second chance reforms is extensive. For 
example, in the context of expungement, nationwide, tens of thousands of 
collateral consequences prevent individuals with records from full participa-
tion and reintegration into society.59 These consequences are both cumula-
tive—as more people are added each year to the list of persons with criminal 
records60—and enduring, as a person’s criminal record, if not cleared, con-
tinues to follow them throughout their lives and constrain their options and 
liberties. While the number of people incarcerated per year in the United 
States is in decline,61 the number of people with criminal records continues 
to grow. 
Even before release, there are opportunities for second chance relief. As 
people get older, they present less of a criminal risk: the 3-year rearrest rate 
among aging inmates is 15 percent, versus 41 percent in general.62 Older in-
mates are more expensive to care for, due in particular to their need for cata-
strophic medical services to treat, for example, heart and lung conditions.63 
While the number of inmates in general is going down, the number of aging 
inmates continues to grow. As Casey Ferri has documented, 
Elderly prisoners represent the fastest growing segment of both federal and 
state prisons, and the number of prisoners over fifty-five is growing at a 
rate that is six times that of the normal prison population. Between 1995 
and 2010, the number of state and federal prisoners who were fifty-five 
years old and older nearly quadrupled (282% increase), while the overall 
prison population grew by less than half (42% increase).64 
 
 
 58. JEAN CHUNG, SENT’G PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER (2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/felony-disenfranchisement-a-primer/ [https:// 
perma.cc/5785-UBSP] (tracking changes from 1997 to mid-2019). The most famous recent 
example is Florida’s Amendment 4. See Rozsa, supra note 24. 
 59. U.S. COMM’N ON CIV. RTS., supra note 18, at 1–2 (“[I]ndividuals with criminal his-
tories can face barriers to voting, serving on a jury, holding public office, securing employ-
ment, obtaining housing, receiving public assistance, owning a firearm, getting a driver’s 
license, qualifying for financial aid and college admission, qualifying for military service, and 
deportation (for noncitizens).” (footnotes omitted)). 
 60. See sources cited supra note 17 (tracking the accumulation of yearly criminal history 
records at the state and federal level). 
 61. SENT’G PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2020), 
https://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6FDW-4UZ4]. 
 62. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 10, at 38–39; see also 
id. at 6 (documenting a recidivism rate of 3.5 percent among compassionate-release inmates). 
 63. See id. at 16. 
 64. Casey N. Ferri, A Stuck Safety Valve: The Inadequacy of Compassionate Release for 
Elderly Inmates, 43 STETSON L. REV. 197, 200 (2013) (footnotes omitted). 
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FIGURE 1: U.S. STATE PRISONERS, ARRESTS, AND CRIMINAL HISTORY FILE 
SUBJECTS (1998–2014)65 
 
As such, second chance reforms seek not only to restore what the car-
ceral state takes away—personal liberties, equity, dignity—but to do so in a 
way consistent with public safety and fiscal goals. Confinement only furthers 
public safety (as compared to, for example, furthering deterrence goals) 
when the detainee poses an above-baseline risk. Incarceration is expensive,66 
and so is downstream rearrest, reprosecution, and reincarceration. To the 
extent that clearing one’s criminal record increases their ability to find ap-
propriate work and housing and decreases the risk of reoffending, second 
chance reforms save money. 
Second chance reforms are part of the broader “smart on crime”67 and 
“justice reinvestment”68 movements that include front-end reforms in areas 
 
 65. See E. Ann Carson & Joseph Mulako-Wangota, Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool 
(CSAT) - Prisoners, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps (state prisoner 
data); Ten-Year Arrest Trends, FBI: UCR, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/crime-in-
the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-33 [https://perma.cc/7TSH-RDUX] (state arrests); BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 
2016: A CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT (2018), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf [https://perma.cc/S83P-DGB8] (crimi-
nal history file subjects). 
 66. Annual Determination of Average Cost of Incarceration Fee (COIF), 84 Fed. Reg. 
63,891 (Nov. 19, 2019) (determining that the average cost of incarceration for federal inmates 
was $37,449.00 ($102.60 per day) for fiscal year 2018). 
 67. E.g., Barbara McQuade & Sally Q. Yates, Prosecutors and Voters Are Becoming Smart 
on Crime, LITIGATION, Fall 2019, at 22. 
 68. 35 States, supra note 49, at 1 (describing the Justice Reinvestment Initiative, a pub-
lic-private partnership that includes the U.S. Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, 
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like pretrial and drug-free school zones69 to keep people out of prison, as well 
as alternatives to incarceration that reduce the odds of recidivism.70 
Launched in 2007, justice reinvestment reforms in thirty-five states have 
been credited with an 11 percent decrease in state imprisonment rates with-
out an increase in crime rates, which are in the midst of a long-term de-
cline.71 As such, the momentum of “second chances” reforms sounds not 
only in dignity and morality but also in pragmatism and fiscal responsibility. 
1. Avoided Incarceration Costs 
It costs approximately $37,500 to incarcerate a person for a year in fed-
eral prison.72 State incarceration costs vary substantially, and in 2015 ranged 
from less than $15,000 per Alabama prisoner, on average, to close to $65,000 
per California prisoner yearly.73 When a person is released early from prison, 
the state saves money. Described in detail below, Obama’s Clemency Initia-
tive, for example, resulted in an average sentence reduction of 140 months 
per federal inmate that received a commutation.74 Avoiding 140 months of 
federal incarceration translates, mechanically, into about $437,000 per in-
mate in 2018 dollars.75 In July 2019, 1,691 prisoners were released early as 
part of the First Step Act’s retroactive application of the Fair Sentencing Act 
 
the Pew Charitable Trusts, the Council of State Governments Justice Center, the Crime and 
Justice Institute, and others and that has worked with thirty-five states “to improve public safe-
ty and control taxpayer costs by prioritizing prison space for people convicted of serious of-
fenses and investing some of the savings in alternatives to incarceration that are effective at 
reducing recidivism”). 
 69. Id. 
 70. NELLIS, supra note 44 (reviewing multiple criminal justice reforms: modifying sen-
tencing laws regarding drug-free school zones to restore judicial discretion to lessen racial dis-
parities; dismantling war-on-drugs laws and redirecting the funds to prevention and drug 
intervention programs; and instituting bias training to prevent discriminatory and undue po-
licing from the outset). 
 71. 35 States, supra note 49, at 1. 
 72. See supra note 66. 




 74. GLENN R. SCHMITT, TIMOTHY DRISKO & CHRISTINA D. STEWART, U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2014 CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 17 
(2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20170901_clemency.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8F4-4T6X]. 
 75. 140 months is equivalent to 11.67 years; 11.67 years at $37,500 per year equals 
$437,625. Actual savings would be lower if incremental costs per prisoner are lower. In addi-
tion, a total social welfare-cost calculation would also need to take into account the costs asso-
ciated with reentry (e.g., in terms of public-housing expenditures, offset by higher tax 
payments, etc.). 
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of 2010,76 which reduced the disparity between crack-cocaine and powder-
cocaine mandatory-minimum sentences. A report by the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission found the average reduction of time to be 73 months,77 which, 
again, at the average costs cited earlier, is associated with roughly $228,000 
per inmate. California’s Prop 47, which reduced the sentences of individuals 
convicted of nonviolent minor felonies, has led to the reallocation of $103 
million in prison expenditures to rehabilitative grant programs.78 
The costs of caring for aging inmates, who are at an elevated risk of cata-
strophic medical events, is higher. A surge in state incarceration levels be-
tween 1993 and 2013 and the Supreme Court’s decision in 1976 that 
prisoners must have access to diagnosis and treatment by a physician with-
out “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” have both contributed 
to an estimated tenfold increase in the cost of in-prison medical care from 
1993 to 2013.79 Early releases under “compassionate release” provisions at 
the federal and state levels are seen as not only humane and safe, providing a 
way for low-risk prisoners to spend their remaining days with their loved 
ones, but also fiscally responsible.80 
2. Public Safety Impact 
While harder to observe directly, the public safety impacts of second 
chance reforms are also relevant to their viability. Because many with crimi-
nal records eventually reenter the justice system, recidivism—the likelihood 
of rearrest, reconviction, and/or reincarceration of an individual, within a 
particular amount of time81—is correlated with public safety. While it is im-
 
 76. Department of Justice Announces the Release of 3,100 Inmates Under First Step Act, 
Publishes Risk and Needs Assessment System, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-announces-release-3100-inmates-under-
first-step-act-publishes-risk-and [https://perma.cc/C4VM-QFNF]. 
 77. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 RESENTENCING PROVISIONS: 
RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 3, 8 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default
/files/pdf/research-and-publications/retroactivity-analyses/first-step-act/201900607-First-Step-
Act-Retro.pdf [https://perma.cc/EB3L-SRNQ] (reporting this average reduction of time in 
connection with the first one thousand or so sentence reductions granted under the retroactive 
provision). 
 78. Board Awards $103m in Prop 47 Funds to Innovative Rehabilitative Programs, BSCC 
CAL. (June 8, 2017), http://www.bscc.ca.gov/news/board-awards-103m-in-prop-47-funds-to-
innovative-rehabilitative-programs/ [https://perma.cc/TC7S-TGPS]. 
 79. MARY PRICE, FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, EVERYWHERE AND 
NOWHERE: COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN THE STATES 9 (2018), https://famm.org/wp-
content/uploads/Exec-Summary-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MBV-E5VF]; Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 80. PRICE, supra note 79. 
 81. KIM STEVEN HUNT & ROBERT DUMVILLE, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RECIDIVISM 
AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS: A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW 7 (2016), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications
/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZT8Z-XYK9]. 
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possible to generalize about the recidivism impacts of second chances—in 
part because each recidivism measure, observed over a distinct period of 
time82 and population, is unique—studies considering the individual second 
chance programs studied in this report cite promising findings. 
For example, studies of California’s Prop 47, which defelonized a num-
ber of crimes and reduced the prison population by thirteen thousand peo-
ple,83 have found that there was no statistically significant increase in crime 
overall with the rule change,84 but that larceny and motor vehicle thefts in-
creased moderately.85 A 2018 U.S. Sentencing Commission study of early re-
leases associated with the 2011 Fair Sentencing Guideline Amendment 
found no difference in recidivism rates or times between individuals that re-
ceived reduced and nonreduced sentences.86 In the context of expungement, 
a study by Sonja Starr and J.J. Prescott found that recipients of expungement 
posed a lower crime risk than the general population of Michigan as a 
whole.87 
On the other hand, critics continue to claim that the defelonization of 
certain crimes under Prop 47 has emboldened criminals and removed the 
deterrent effect of being charged with and convicted of a felony.88 In the con-
text of the restoration of drivers’ licenses, a realm adjacent to second chanc-
es, studies have suggested that those who have their licenses revoked pose 
 
 82. See Measuring Recidivism at the Local Level: A Quick Guide, URB. INST., https://www
.urban.org/sites/default/files/2015/02/11/recidivism-measures_final-for-website.pdf [https://
perma.cc/T6DX-C9D7] (describing recidivism studies on time frames ranging from six 
months to three years to be typical). 
 83. Bradley J. Bartos & Charis E. Kubrin, Can We Downsize Our Prisons and Jails With-
out Compromising Public Safety? Findings from California’s Prop 47, 17 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. 
POL’Y 693, 693–94 (2018). 
 84. Id. at 711; accord MIA BIRD, MAGNUS LOFSTROM, BRANDON MARTIN, STEVEN 
RAPHAEL & VIET NGUYEN, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 47 ON 
CRIME AND RECIDIVISM 3 (2018), https://www.ppic.org/wp-content/uploads/r_0618mbr.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T3KU-4A7L] (finding no increase in violent crime but finding an increase in 
larceny, particularly motor vehicle crimes). Bird et al. also found a reduction in recidivism 
among Prop 47 offenders, driven, predictably, by reductions in Prop 47 crime rates. Id. 
 85. Though not enough to rule out alternative explanations. Bartos & Kubrin, supra 
note 83, at 711. 
 86. KIM STEVEN HUNT, KEVIN MAASS & TODD KOSTYSHAK, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
RECIDIVISM AMONG FEDERAL OFFENDERS RECEIVING RETROACTIVE SENTENCE REDUCTIONS: 
THE 2011 FAIR SENTENCING ACT GUIDELINE AMENDMENT 1 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov
/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/20180328
_Recidivism_FSA-Retroactivity.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6NQ-BYX6] (comparing outcomes of 
offenders who were released early through retroactive application and offenders who had 
served their full sentences before the FSA guideline reduction retroactively took effect). 
 87. Prescott & Starr, supra note 26, at 2514. 
 88. Bill Melugin, Mayor Garcetti Criticizes Prop 47, Laments ‘Broken System’ in Reaction 
to FOX 11 Meth Addiction Investigation, FOX 11 L.A. (Feb. 5, 2020), https://www.foxla.com
/news/mayor-garcetti-criticizes-prop-47-laments-broken-system-in-reaction-to-fox-11-meth-
addiction-investigation [https://perma.cc/6HV5-CQ25]. 
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higher than average driving risks, but they have been criticized for failing to 
take into account other factors that may explain the difference. 89 On balance, 
the available public safety evidence seems generally to support—or at least 
not justify slowing—the positive momentum for second chances. 
3. Economic, Dignitary, and Civic Impact 
In contrast to administrative-cost savings, which show up in the state 
ledger, the broader economic impacts of second chance laws have not been 
comprehensively studied. The policies are young, have varying uptake rates, 
and are implemented differently in different contexts, making it hard to 
make comparisons across settings. But in expungement- and driver’s li-
cense–reinstatement contexts, fairness and economic rehabilitation interests 
may be compelling enough themselves to spur legislative change.90 
Early studies of the economic impact of one type of second chance, rec-
ords clearing, are encouraging.91 Clearing one’s record appears to set in mo-
 
 89. See John B. Mitchell & Kelly Kunsch, Of Driver’s Licenses and Debtor’s Prison, 4 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 439, 456–58 (2005) (stating that nearly all studies of road safety for 
drivers with suspended licenses don’t take into account the lack of safety features in older cars 
that drivers with suspended licenses are more likely to be utilizing and the effect thereof on 
accidents leading to fatalities); see also SUKHVIR S. BRAR, CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, 
ESTIMATION OF FATAL CRASH RATES FOR SUSPENDED/REVOKED AND UNLICENSED DRIVERS IN 
CALIFORNIA 17 (2012), https://www.dol.wa.gov/about/docs/UnlicensedDriverStudy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S3WW-97Q9] (concluding that a cohort of drivers including drivers using 
suspended/revoked (S/R) licenses and unlicensed drivers were more likely to be involved in a 
fatal crash, not accounting for confounding variables like age of vehicles in crashes or safety 
features of involved vehicles). 
 90. Take for example the case of drivers unlicensing. Many jobs require having a valid 
driver’s license. 30 Percent of Civilian Jobs Require Some Driving in 2016, U.S. BUREAU LAB. 
STAT. (June 27, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/30-percent-of-civilian-jobs-require-
some-driving-in-2016.htm [https://perma.cc/S4UQ-XWQ6] (indicating that 30 percent of jobs 
require driving). A New Jersey study documented, for example, that 42 percent of the time, 
license suspension resulted in job loss. JON A. CARNEGIE, DRIVER’S LICENSE SUSPENSIONS, 
IMPACTS AND FAIRNESS STUDY 56 (2007), https://www.nj.gov/transportation
/business/research/reports/FHWA-NJ-2007-020-V1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y58A-Y7LX]. 
Among replacement jobs, 88 percent paid less. Id. That license-reinstatement initiatives can 
reverse the tide or, at least, stem the stress on vulnerable populations and strain on public ser-
vices associated with a lost license is plausible, though not proven. See, e.g., L. WILLIAM 
SEIDMAN RSCH. INST., THE CITY OF PHOENIX MUNICIPAL COURT’S COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM, 2016: AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT 7 (2017), https://finesandfeesjusticecenter.org
/content/uploads/2018/11/Phoenix-license-restoration-pilot-THE-CITY-OF-PHOENIX-
MUNICIPAL-COURT%E2%80%99S-COMPLIANCE-ASSISTANCE-PROGRAM.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D63A-TGWT] (“[T]he long-term effects of continued economic and finan-
cial distress because of a suspended license and accumulated debt could have a detrimental 
downward spiral effect on an already economically distressed portion of the population. The 
economic downturn of the affected communities may also result in increased demand for pub-
lic services.”). 
 91. How these individual gains, at scale, could translate into lasting gains for society in 
terms of increased tax revenue and decreased recidivism is hinted at in the following studies: 
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tion an internal redemptive process for the formerly “marked,” enhancing 
their confidence and social status.92 Small-scale studies of records-clearing 
programs in California93 and Michigan94 have documented gains in employ-
ability and earnings following records clearing.95 These promising findings 
have given impetus to Clean Slate campaigns across the country, although, as 
explored in Part IV, whether or not the positive effects will replicate at scale 
remains unknown. 
Another potential benefit to society of removing collateral consequences 
like the disenfranchisement of persons with felony convictions is greater civ-
ic participation.96 However, studies have shown that among people with fel-
 
Jacob Wascalus, Development Programs Help Ex-Offenders Join the Workforce, FED. RSRV. 
BANK MINNEAPOLIS (Oct. 1, 2013), https://www.minneapolisfed.org/article/2013/development
-programs-help-exoffenders-join-the-workforce [https://perma.cc/326F-952J] (referring to a 
program designed to get ex-offenders ‘gainful employment’ and finding that “[o]ver the past 15 
years, for every $1 the state has invested in the program, the return to Minnesota taxpayers 
from reduced state subsidies, increased state tax receipts, and lowered recidivism has been 
$7.72. That represents a 672 percent ROI over the time period”); Prescott & Starr, supra note 
26, at 2512–14 (showing that the crime rate among Michigan residents with expunged records 
is lower than the rate in the general population, suggesting there’s at least a strong correlation 
between expungement and lower recidivism). 
 92. Ericka B. Adams, Elsa Y. Chen & Rosella Chapman, Erasing the Mark of a Criminal 
Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance, 19 PUNISHMENT & 
SOC’Y 23, 30–33 (2017) (reporting, based on semistructured interviews with forty persons with 
past criminal records, that clearance facilitates “cognitive transformation and the affirmation 
of a new identity”); Jeffrey Selbin, Justin McCrary & Joshua Epstein, Unmarked? Criminal Rec-
ord Clearing and Employment Outcomes, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 57 (2018) (describ-
ing ongoing study that suggests the importance of dignity interests to those seeking records 
clearance). 
 93. Selbin et al., supra note 92, at 8 (documenting an increase in employment rates from 
about 75 percent to 80–85 percent and average earnings by about one-third, or $6,000 in yearly 
salary, following expungement). 
 94. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 26 (finding the receipt of a set-aside to be associated 
with an increase in the probability of employment from employment by a factor of 1.13, and 
reported quarterly wages increased by a factor of 1.23). 
 95. A term that encompasses a variety of remedies to rehabilitate one’s criminal record 
including sealing, set-aside, reclassification, expungement, and destruction, terms which, in 
turn, can mean different things in different contexts. See, e.g., BRIAN ELDERBROOM & JULIA 
DURNAN, URB. INST., RECLASSIFIED: STATE DRUG LAW REFORMS TO REDUCE FELONY 
CONVICTIONS AND INCREASE SECOND CHANCES 3–4 (2018), https://www.urban.org/sites
/default/files/publication/99077/reclassified_state_drug_law_reforms_to_reduce_felony_convi
ctions_and_increase_second_chances.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4AZ-59GQ]; JAMES B. JACOBS, 
THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 113–32 (2015); What is “Expungement?,” A.B.A. (Nov. 20, 
2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/publications/teaching-legal-
docs/what-is-_expungement-/ [https://perma.cc/H7EZ-VW44]. 
 96. See, e.g., MORGAN MCLEOD, SENT’G PROJECT, EXPANDING THE VOTE: TWO 
DECADES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT REFORM (2018), https://www.sentencingproject
.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Expanding-the-Vote-1997-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc
/HK8X-LJ2C] (documenting the success of reenfranchisement initiatives in bringing over 1.4 
million ex-felons back into civic participation). 
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ony convictions whose right to vote has been automatically restored, turnout 
is low, in part because of misinformation about their ability to vote.97 
B. The Second Chance Gap and Its Causes 
But no matter how significant the promised benefits of a given second 
chance are, its impact depends on its delivery. The “second chance gap” is 
the difference between the apparent eligibility and delivery of a particular 
second chance in accordance with the law. Although the conditions prece-
dent to a person not receiving a particular second chance vary widely, three 
contributors—each with a distinct pathology, set of underlying causes, and 
features—stand out: structural barriers (like the requirement that court debt 
be repaid) that prevent otherwise eligible individuals from getting their sec-
ond chances, administrative barriers stemming from high information and 
transactional costs, and substantive gaps, due, for example, to the perceived 
benefits of a given second chance not outweighing the perceived costs (in-
cluding retraumatization costs)98 or not in fact being eligible. 
When a person who has served their time and satisfied all the conditions 
precedent to applying for records clearance is barred from doing so because 
of unpaid fines and fees, structural barriers are standing in their way. High 
informational and transactional costs, on the other hand, are likely the cul-
prit behind, for example, the miscalculations of good-time credits described 
at the beginning of this Article and, as later detailed in Section III.A, in many 
cases, nonapplication for the expungement of criminal records. Eligible indi-
viduals may also refuse relief because, in certain limited contexts, there are 
status benefits, not only harms, associated with a reputation for crime and 
toughness.99 
As detailed in the next Part, the informational and bureaucratic hoops 
that one must jump through to get their second chances are often extensive 
and costly. While much of the remainder of this Article is devoted to dis-
cussing these costs and how they may be reduced, it is worth considering 
why second chance regimes are so complex in the first place. In the same 
way that the accused remain innocent until proven guilty in the U.S. crimi-
 
 97. David Scott McCahon, A Legacy of Exclusion: How Felon Disenfranchisement Af-
fects Patterns of Civic Engagement in Ex-Felony Offenders (June 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Riverside) (eScholarship) (documenting lower-than-average turnout 
rates among ex-felons but hypothesizing that misinformation about the right to vote is partly 
to blame). 
 98. Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, ATLANTIC (May 1994), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1994/05/the-code-of-the-streets/306601/ 
[https://perma.cc/4PBG-4NKC]; Saurabh Bhargava & Dayanand Manoli, Psychological Fric-
tions and the Incomplete Take-Up of Social Benefits: Evidence from an IRS Field Experiment, 
105 AM. ECON. REV. 3489 (2015). 
 99. Anderson, supra note 95; see also Bhargava & Manoli, supra note 98 (the social-
benefits literature discusses the analogous and real psychological “stigma” costs associated with 
applying for social benefits). 
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nal justice system,100 many second chance programs require defendants to 
“prove” that they deserve second chances before awarding them. As such, 
getting one’s second chance through petition-based processes may include 
enduring a bureaucratic process, amassing information through a variety of 
sources, and being evaluated by an adjudicative or administrative body. The 
high cost of doing so in many cases may be insurmountable. 
Administrative deficits and low uptake rates, the focus of this Article, are 
by no means unique to second chances laws. However, a few characteristics 
set the second chance programs discussed in this Article apart from other 
application-based social-benefit programs. First, the underlying decisions 
that create the need for second chances in the first place—to incarcerate a 
person, strip their rights (like driving or voting), or retain a criminal rec-
ord—are fundamentally state based, unlike the market conditions that lead 
to, for example, a lack of money and the need for food stamps. Relatedly, 
while welfare programs redistribute, second chance initiatives correct—they 
change the state’s initial punishment because it is no longer serving its pur-
pose, rather than, for example, helping those in need. When a person has 
served their time and no longer poses an elevated risk, their record of past 
crimes becomes irrelevant from a public safety perspective. When, two years 
after a license has been revoked for debt purposes, it has still not been rein-
stated, the punishment has not served its intended purposes of compelling 
repayment.101 Another way in which “second chances” differ from govern-
ment benefits is that, by their nature, they also implicate personal and civic 
liberties, whether compromised by incarceration or the inability to vote, 
drive legally, or access the opportunities available to people with clean crim-
inal records. Finally, as described above, second chances that shorten peo-
ple’s sentences can translate into immediate cost savings, in contrast to 
social-benefit programs that may generate short-term costs for the state. 
C. Measuring the Second Chance Gap 
The empirical focus of this Article is on the second chance gaps that are 
related to applicant uptake. The uptake or participation rate in government 
benefit programs has long been of interest to economists and policymak-
ers.102 This literature recognizes that there are costs to receiving social bene-
fits, including the costs of learning about and applying for a given benefit, 
 
 100. E.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (stating “[t]he principle that 
there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic 
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our crimi-
nal law”). 
 101. Cf. WHITELEMONS, supra note 43, at 4 (finding, based on study of licenses suspend-
ed in Florida for failure to pay fines, that over 75 percent of licenses suspended in 2016 remain 
so two years later). 
 102. For a review, see Currie, supra note 34. 
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and that the costs may outweigh the benefits. 103 A newer behavioral-
economics literature acknowledges that factors like incomplete information 
about benefits, “present bias,” and program complexity can also contribute 
to lower-than-expected uptake rates.104 But while the case for studying up-
take may be easy, actually doing so, in imperfect data environments, is hard. 
To address these challenges, I describe two ways of approximating the gap in 
eligibility and application for second chances: the “uptake gap,” measured 
cumulatively over time, and the “current gap,” measured at a single point in 
time. 
1. The Uptake Gap 
The “uptake gap” can simply be understood as the share of individuals 
(or other criminal justice units, such as charges or incidents) eligible for re-
lief over time that has not applied for or received a given second chance. The 
nature of the inquiry, and its computation intensity, are best illustrated 
through an example. 
Consider the fictitious state of Kent, which has a population that in-
cludes 10,000 people, 1,000 of whom have criminal records. On Day 1, Kent 
passes a law that decriminalizes adult marijuana use and also states that “any 
person convicted of a decriminalized act shall be eligible to clear their record 
of that crime.” A look at the records of all 1,000 people on Day 1 reveals that 
100 are eligible to clear now-decriminalized marijuana charges. If, by Day 
100, 20 people have cleared their records, the number of remaining people 
that are eligible but have not yet cleared is 80, making for an 80 percent up-
take gap. Simple enough. But what happens if calculation of the uptake gap is 
attempted on Day 101?105 Because we can’t see the 20 cleared records, we are 
unable to calculate the “true” number of people over time that are eligible for 
clearance, unless we have access to the number of records cleared or “com-
plete” data. The calculation becomes even more complex when there is a 
contingent criterion—for example, that the “applicant not been convicted of 
a new crime for 3 years”—growing the number of people eligible for clear-
ance over time. 
2. The Current Gap 
The second chance gap can still be approximated in the absence of com-
plete data if one considers the “current gap”: the share of impacted individu-
als who, as of the time of measurement, appear to be eligible for relief but 
 
 103. As well as, in the case of social-welfare programs, stigma costs. Id. at 82–83 (explain-
ing the costs of learning about and applying to social programs, as well as the potential role of 
stigma in deterring uptake). 
 104. For an overview, see Alba, supra note 34, at 3–4. 
 105. This never happens. 
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haven’t received it. In the scenario above, on Day 1, 100 out of 1,000 people 
are eligible for the remedy, leading to a 10 percent current gap. But on Day 
101, with the 20 people that have cleared their records no longer visible as 
eligible, only 80 people appear to be eligible for the gap among the number 
of people who have records, which, let’s say, is still 1,000. The current gap, as 
of Day 101, is 8 percent. The uptake gap reflects the effectiveness of the de-
livery of a given second chance and shrinks as more people take the remedy 
(assuming that the number of people eligible doesn’t grow, as in this exam-
ple). The current gap, in contrast, is the product of not only a second chance 
law’s administration but also its generosity (with respect to how many peo-
ple within the impacted population are eligible), as well as factors contrib-
uting to the number of people within the target population. Both can be 
useful for evaluation and decisionmaking. 
3. Sizing the Gap(s) 
Ascertaining eligibility for a government benefit using administrative 
data is difficult, due in part to privacy safeguards and the lack of common 
identifiers or other links across administrative systems.106 In the case of sec-
ond chances, it bears emphasizing that being “eligible” for relief does not al-
ways mean being “entitled” to relief—for example, presidential 
commutations and gubernatorial pardons described below often depend on 
the exercise of discretion107 or satisfaction of other criteria that cannot be as-
certained with available data. In this Article, “eligible” individuals or charges 
are those that substantially meet objective, published criteria. Such factors 
may encompass, for example, being charged of a qualifying (usually not too 
severe) offense, having one’s case dismissed, or enduring a waiting period—
all of which are generally ascertainable based on public records. But as dis-
cussed later, other eligibility criteria, like the person’s character, are much 
harder to observe based on the criminal record. 
4. Top-Down, Bottom-Up Approach 
There are a few ways of approximating a particular second chance gap. 
The most accurate but most labor-intensive way is through a “top-down, 
 
 106. See, e.g., Alan Berube, Earned Income Credit Participation—What We (Don’t) Know, 
BROOKINGS (2005), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/eitcparticipation
.pdf [https://perma.cc/369X-NK5Y] (discussing the obstacles that complicate providing accu-
rate estimates of eligibility and the geographical distribution of eligible nonparticipants); cf. 
Maggie R. Jones, Changes in EITC Eligibility and Participation, 2005–2009 (Ctr. for Admin. 
Records Rsch. & Applications, Working Paper No. 2014-04, 2014), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/2014/adrm/carra-wp-
2014-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/BD6D-ZDP9] (describing the challenge posed by the lack of 
certain data elements in administrative data for determining EITC eligibility). 
 107. See infra Section II.A.1 (describing the eligibility criteria for Obama’s Clemency Ini-
tiative). 
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bottom-up” approach. First, the statutes and rules that provide relief must be 
ascertained and the eligibility criteria determined by experts in the jurisdic-
tion. Second, the criteria must be applied to the relevant records, typically 
corrections, court, or police records, to identify the eligible (or potentially 
eligible) population at an individual charge, incident, and person level. 
When calculating the uptake gap, the third step requires determining the 
complete universe of individuals, charges, or incidents eligible for relief over 
time and whether or not they have been awarded. When the uptake gap can’t 
be ascertained for the reasons described above, then the current gap can be 
calculated, based on the same step of determining eligibility as well as meas-
uring, at a given moment in time, the relevant population. Individuals that 
qualify for relief fall into, and their prevalence in the relevant population 
comprise, the current gap. 
5. Observing the Leaky Relief Pipeline 
Another way to approximate the gap is by directly observing leaks along 
the relief pipeline. For an individual to receive relief through a petitions-
based process requires the prerequisites to relief to be fulfilled, including in 
many cases the payment of outstanding fines and fees; an application for re-
lief to be completed and filed; and relief to be awarded through an adminis-
trative procedure. As a result, the share of eligible individuals that fails to 
apply for relief (for example, because they never start, or because they start 
but do not complete the process) provides a lower bound measure of the 
gap—for example, one that is due to a lack of awareness or a lack of a com-
pleted application despite awareness. Court or administrative backlogs that 
delay approval of meritorious cases present another directly observable 
component of the gap. 
Each of the approaches outlined above presents challenges in the ab-
sence of clean data from which eligibility criteria can be applied and evaluat-
ed, actual uptake can be estimated, and the two can be compared. As 
described in detail in Appendix M, care was taken to select initiatives for 
which the sizing steps described above had already been or could to some 
degree reliably be carried out. As a result, this Article relies heavily on and 
owes a large debt to administrative estimates provided by government agen-
cies or others with specialized access to primary data, by virtue of position or 
substantial effort. But it also incorporates the assumptions, missing data, and 
other data defects and vulnerabilities of these sources and, therefore, should 
be read as supplying estimates conditional upon them. 
II. SIZING SECOND CHANCE GAPS 
This Part identifies and calculates the “second chance gap”—the differ-
ence between eligibility and delivery—associated with several of the second 
chances offered under the law. The first Section estimates resentencing gaps 
left behind by the Obama Clemency Initiative and California’s Propositions 
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64 and 47, each of which allows prisoners to qualify for early releases, and 
describes available data on compassionate-release second chance gaps. The 
second Section estimates felony reenfranchisement gaps in twelve states us-
ing published data. The third Section reports on second chance gaps in the 
expungement of convictions in about ten states and estimate second chance 
gaps with respect to the clearance of nonconvicted charges in all fifty states 
using background check data. 
A. Second Chance Gaps in Resentencing and Reclassification 
Between 2007 and 2017, at least eighteen states passed laws to reclassify 
and/or reduce charges related to nonviolent crimes, several of them with ret-
roactive effect.108 A related set of developments at the federal level, by the 
courts, the executive branch, and Congress, has provided federal drug-
trafficking inmates opportunities to reduce their sentences.109 Compassion-
ate-release laws, which allow persons to shorten their sentences, have been 
on the books for a long time but have been used rarely. This Section esti-
mates the second chance gaps associated with the Obama Clemency Initia-
tive and California’s Propositions 64 and 47 and discusses the 
compassionate-release second chance gap. 
1. The Clemency Initiative Second Chance Gap 
The Constitution specifies that, “[t]he President . . . shall have Power to 
Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except 
in Cases of Impeachment.”110 In 2014, the Department of Justice launched 
the Clemency Initiative to encourage nonviolent federal drug offenders to 
petition President Obama for commutations.111 Applications would be prior-
itized if the applicant would likely have received a shorter sentence under the 
current law and met other eligibility criteria, including serving at least ten 
years of their sentence.112 The U.S. Sentencing Commission performed a 
comprehensive review of the Clemency Initiative, using a top-down, bottom-
up approach to determine estimates of the number of offenders eligible for 
relief and, among them, how many received it as reported in Table 1. 
 
 108. 35 States, supra note 46. 
 109. See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. § 3632. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 111. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 74, at 1–4. 
 112. Under the Initiative, clemency petitions would be prioritized if the individual was 
serving a federal sentence in prison and (1) would have received a “substantially lower sen-
tence” if convicted of same offense today; (2) represented a nonviolent offender without ties to 
criminal organizations; (3) had served at least 10 years of their sentence; (4) did not have a sig-
nificant criminal history; (5) had displayed good behavior; and (6) lacked a record of violent 
behavior. However, the decision was within the discretion of the president, who could priori-
tize among or deviate from the published criteria. Id. at 7–9. 
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According to the Commission, 1,025 to 2,687 individuals (the spread 
representing inmates that met the time-served criteria at the beginning and 
end of the program) “appear[ed] to have met all the factors for clemency un-
der the Initiative.”114 The Initiative resulted in the largest numbers of com-
mutations awarded by a president.115 Still, of the 1,025 to 2,687 individuals 
that were deemed by the Commission to have met all of the factors for clem-
ency under the Initiative by its conclusion, only 54 to 92, or 3%–5%, received 
relief, for a second chance gap of 95%–97%.116 In addition, by the conclusion 
of the program in January 2017, 7,881 petitions for clemency were still pend-
ing.117 Those who received a commutation experienced an average sentence 
reduction of 140 months, which, as described above, translates mechanically 
into about $437,000 (2018 dollars) per commutation.118 If the 2,595 individ-
uals that the Commission identified as eligible that did not have their sen-
tences commuted had received comparable sentence reductions, the total 
average sum associated with these reductions based on a mechanical calcula-
tion would have been more than $1.1 billion. As discussed later, experts 
blamed the noncentralized administration of the program, uneven applica-
tion of the criteria, and backlog for the gap between expected and delivered 
commutations.119 
 
 113. Id. at 11, 34 fig.19. 
 114. Id. at 33–34. 
 115. Over 1,700 individuals. Id. at 2. 
 116. Id. at 34. 
 117. Id. at 10–11. Of the commutations that were granted, the Commission estimates that 
only 5.1 percent met all the published standards, id. at 18, leading some to comment that in-
mates were “inexplicably” being provided with relief, and in some ways leading to a “misappli-
cation,” not just a “second chance” gap. See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, Obama’s Clemency 
Legacy: An Assessment, 29 FED. SENT’G REP. 271 (2017). 
 118. See notes 74–75 and accompanying text (140 months = 11.67 years; at about $37,500 
per year = ~$437). 
 119. See infra Sections III.B–D. 
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2. The Compassionate-Release Second Chance Gap 
In almost every state, courts have the right to reduce the sentences of 
prisoners, upon application, on the basis of “compassionate release.”120 The 
1984 Sentencing Act created a similar authority in the federal system, speci-
fying that releases should take place only under “extraordinary and compel-
ling reasons”121 as designated by the U.S. Sentencing Commission.122 
Defendants’ medical conditions (i.e., serious illness), age, family circum-
stances, or other reasons may all qualify. But while the case for compassion-
ate release of elderly, aging, or sick prisoners or prisoners who face family 
emergencies is easy, almost intuitive, to understand, it has proven hard to 
administer.123 
It is impossible to ascertain with certainty how many people are eligible 
for compassionate release in part because of the vagueness or plain absence 
of the criteria, as described in Part III. However, at the federal level, the el-
derly are the fastest growing population in federal prison and are estimated 
to represent close to 30 percent of the federal prison population,124 which, 
assuming a federal prison population of 175,000, is about 50,000.125 But in 
the thirteen months before an inspector-general hearing before the Sentenc-
ing Commission in 2016 on compassionate release, only 296 elderly inmates, 
or less than 0.1 percent of 175,000, applied for release, and of those, only 2 
people, or less than 1 percent of applicants, were released.126 While an esti-
mated 21,000 people from Kansas,127 96,000 people from Pennsylvania,128 
 
 120. See PRICE, supra note 79 (documenting the compassionate-release laws of forty-nine 
states and the District of Columbia); see also supra note 8 (describing the federal compassion-
ate-release authority). 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). 
 123. Id.; see also FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NO. 5050.50, 
COMPASSIONATE RELEASE/REDUCTION IN SENTENCE: PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3582 AND 4205(G), at 4–12 (2019), https://www.bop.gov/policy
/progstat/5050_050_EN.pdf [https:// perma.cc/3D99-DX46]. 
 124. Letter from Senator Brian Schatz et al. to Thomas R. Kane, Acting Dir. of Fed. Bu-
reau of Prisons, and Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (Aug. 3, 2017), 
https://www.schatz.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2017.08.03%20Letter%20to%20BOP%20and%
20DAG%20re.%20Compassionate%20Release%20FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/ED66-YLC8]. 
 125. See Statistics, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics
/population_statistics.jsp [https://perma.cc/PW3Z-X5JU] (providing fiscal year 2019 statistics 
on federal prison population). 
 126. Letter from Senator Brian Schatz et al. to Thomas R. Kane, supra note 124. 
 127. Kansas Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles
/KS.html [https://perma.cc/N66Y-UGDR]. 
 128. Pennsylvania Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org
/profiles/PA.html [https://perma.cc/6JA4-QSZS]. 
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and 39,000 people from New Jersey are behind bars,129 just 7 individuals re-
ceived compassionate releases from 2009 to 2016, and in Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey, the comparable numbers were 9 and 2, according to data collect-
ed by Families Against Mandatory Minimums.130 
3. California’s Propositions 47 and 64 Second Chance Gaps 
Prior to 2014, the offenses of shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writ-
ing bad checks, and forging checks could be charged as felonies in Califor-
nia.131 That changed when voters passed Prop 47, reducing the charges 
associated with qualifying crimes from felonies to misdemeanors.132 It ap-
plied retroactively, creating a way for offenders still serving time for Prop 47 
crimes to reduce their sentences, and for those that had completed their sen-
tences already to reclassify those convictions to misdemeanors,133 but only 
upon successful petition. Official statewide estimates for the number of peo-
ple eligible for and receiving relief are not available. However, in California’s 
largest county, Los Angeles, the Public Defender’s Prop 47 Task Force de-
termined that, as of 2016, 513,229 county residents had convictions “poten-
tially eligible” for reduction.134 The Judicial Council of California has 
reported, based on self-reported numbers by each county, that by March 
2020, Los Angeles had received 36,300 Prop 47 applications for reclassifica-
tion.135 A single individual can file multiple applications.136 Thus, to approx-
 
 129. New Jersey Profile, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, https://www.prisonpolicy.org
/profiles/NJ.html [https://perma.cc/7QFA-ZYBK]. 
 130. PRICE, supra note 79, at 123 (“Pennsylvania, for example, is not required to report 
statistics, but a 2015 news article stated that only nine prisoners were granted compassionate 
release between 2009 and 2015. In Kansas, which has detailed eligibility criteria and process 
rules, just seven individuals received compassionate release between 2009 and 2016. In New 
Jersey, medical parole has been granted no more than two times a year since 2010.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 131. DEBRA BOWEN, SEC’Y OF STATE OF CALIF., OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 
34–37 (2014), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/7FLK-ZHQP]. 
 132. Including grand theft, shoplifting, receiving stolen property, writing bad checks, and 
check forgery involving $950 or less and drug possession. Id. 
 133. Unless the person had a prior conviction for identity theft, rape, child molestation, 
or other violent crime, or was a sex-offender registrant. Jud. Council’s Crim. Just. Servs. & 
Richard Couzens, Frequently Asked Questions, CAL. CTS. (Nov. 2016), https://www.courts
.ca.gov/documents/Prop47FAQs.pdf [https://perma.cc/GY7K-UYU6]. 
 134. Prop 47: Los Angeles County, CNTY. L.A. (July 19, 2016), http://file.lacounty
.gov/SDSInter/bos/supdocs/105259.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7TZ-FS9Q]. It is important to 
acknowledge that this number may be inflated, because only cases that fall below a certain dol-
lar threshold are Prop 47 eligible and the criteria used by the public defender to determine its 
estimate are unclear (and the Task Force did not respond to my request for this information). 
 135. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., PROPOSITION 47 DATA SUMMARY 
REPORT (2020), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/for-publication_prop-47.pdf [https://
perma.cc/QRM9-2XAX]. 
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imate the number of individuals associated with the filed applications, I ap-
plied a multiplier derived from data collected from twenty-one counties137 to 
associate about 28,000 individuals with the 36,300 applications. This esti-
mate of the number of individuals that have filed for relief (28,400) repre-
sents about 5 percent of the some 513,000 persons estimated in 2016 by the 
Los Angeles Public Defender’s office to be eligible for relief, resulting in a 
second chances uptake gap of at least 95 percent, or around 487,000 people, 
based on comparing the individuals who were “potentially eligible” for and 
applied for relief.138 Los Angeles County residents represent approximately 
one-quarter of California’s residents; if the estimated eligibility for Prop 47 
relief provided by the Public Defender’s Office of 513,000 people is scaled 
accordingly, approximately 2 million Californians are eligible for Prop 47 
relief. According to the California Department of Justice only about 381,000 
petitions, associated with around 249,000 people using the method above, 
have been filed across California,139 implying that as many as 1.8 million Cal-





 136. See How to Reclassify Your Felony Under Prop. 47, MYPROP47, 
https://myprop47.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Reclassification-8.5x11-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U9E4-XEM8]. 
 137. Brett Kelman & Cheri Carlson, Nearly 200,000 Felonies Erased by Prop 47, but Some 
Former Felons Don’t Know, DESERT SUN (Dec. 14, 2016, 8:29 AM), https://www.desertsun.com
/story/news/crime_courts/2016/12/14/prop-47-felony-convictions-erased/94636060/ [https://
perma.cc/ZNQ9-JU28] (describing the collection of data from counties based on official rec-
ords requests provided to public defenders and state courthouses, resulting in a total of ap-
proximately 198 thousand convictions and 155 thousand individuals). 
 138. Though this number represents the percentage difference between those potentially 
eligible and those who applied for relief, the number of both the records actually eligible for 
and actually awarded relief are likely smaller. One data point consistent with the latter asser-
tion is that the rate of approved to filed applications in twenty-one counties was 71 percent. Id. 
However, because this number does not account for abandonments or pendency, it understates 
the approval rate. 
 139. CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 135. 
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TABLE 2: ESTIMATES OF SELECT PROP 47 RECLASSIFICATION AND PROP 64 





Number of  
Applications for  
Relief 
Estimated Uptake 
Prop 47 Resentencing 
and Reclassification—
L.A. County 
513,229 L.A. county 
residents “potentially 
eligible” for relief 
60,517 applications, 
corresponding to  
approximately 47, 374 
applicants 
9% 
California Prop 64 
Resentencing and 
Reclassification 
218,094 6,251 3% 
  
A comparable gap exists in connection with the redesignation or clear-
ing of old marijuana convictions under California’s Prop 64. The measure 
legalized adult recreational use of marijuana, reduced or eliminated criminal 
penalties for most marijuana offenses, and created a way for persons with 
completed Prop 64 sentences to apply to downgrade or clear their convic-
tions.141 In the fall of 2018, a California Senate report, based on data provid-
ed by the California Department of Justice, estimated that 218,094 individu-
individuals were eligible for resentencing or reclassification. 142 But by March 
2018, only 6,251 petitions statewide had been filed, representing less than 3 
percent of that total, or a gap of 97 percent. Carrying out their own sizing 
exercises, the district attorneys of San Francisco (S.F.) and Alameda identi-
fied similar gaps,143 and the San Francisco D.A. estimated that more than 
 
 140. Emling, supra note 134; CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 135;  
S. APPROPRIATIONS COMM., APPROPRIATIONS FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, 2017–2018 REG. 
SESS., at 2 (Cal. 2018) [hereinafter FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793] (“According to DOJ, there 
are 218,094 convictions that may be eligible currently for recall or dismissal of sentence, dis-
missal and sealing, or redesignation as provided by Proposition 64.”); CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. 
COUNCIL OF CAL., PROPOSITION 64 DATA SUMMARY REPORT (2020), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop64-Filings.pdf [https://perma.cc/4XX9-DL9L]. 
 141. J. RICHARD COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, PROPOSITION 64: “ADULT USE OF 
MARIJUANA ACT” RESENTENCING PROCEDURES AND OTHER SELECTED PROVISIONS 6 (2017), 
https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/prop64-Memo-20170522.pdf [https://perma.cc/5K29-
MQSH]. 
 142. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140, at 2. 
 143. According to estimates published by the S.F. and Alameda District Attorneys, an 
estimated 7,978 and 5,900 convictions, respectively, were potentially eligible for relief. See Dis-
trict Attorney George Gascón Applies Proposition 64 Retroactively to Every Marijuana Case 
Since 1975, S.F. DIST. ATT’Y (Jan. 31, 2018) [hereinafter Gascón], https://sfdistrictattorney.org
/district-attorney-george-gasc%C3%B3n-applies-proposition-64-retroactively-every-marijuana
-case-1975 [https://perma.cc/82AH-JVXP]; DA O’Malley’s Ongoing Efforts & Policy Regarding 
Dismissal of Cannabis-Related Criminal Convictions, OFF. ALAMEDA CNTY. DIST. ATT’Y (Feb. 
20, 2018), https://www.alcoda.org/newsroom/2018/feb/cannabis_convictions_prop_64_policy 
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half (62 percent) of the San Francisco convictions eligible for relief were eli-
gible for resentencing relief.144 The majority of states provide similar, peti-
tion-based paths to reducing or clearing previous convictions.145 
B. Second Chance Gaps in Reenfranchisement 
Although most states deny felons the right to vote when they are incar-
cerated, eleven states do not automatically restore these rights following 
completion of their sentences but instead require ex-offenders to apply for 
relief through government pardon, judicial restoration, or other forms of 
administrative process.146 Generally, people with felonies that have complet-
ed their sentences, paid all outstanding fines or restitution, endured any re-
quired waiting period, and have not been disqualified due to the nature of 
their offenses can apply.147 
Over several decades, Christopher Uggen and his collaborators have 
worked to systematically define, measure, and track felony disenfranchise-
ment.148 By examining state prison records and reenfranchisement records, 
they have been able to track the number of individuals that have completed 
their sentences but have remained disenfranchised. In support of a 2016 re-
port, Uggen and his coauthors filed records requests with and received data 
from the appropriate agencies in the twelve states that disenfranchise beyond 
sentence completion in order to ascertain the number of restorations grant-
ed by each state over the same period.149 Because their numbers do not ex-
clude the small subset of offenses ineligible for reenfranchisement150 and do 
 
[https://perma.cc/6G6D-PXRM] (identifying 5,900 convictions, not broken out by felony and 
misdemeanor totals). By the end of 2017, 232 and 609 applications, respectively, had been re-
ceived. See CRIM. JUST. SERVS., JUD. COUNCIL OF CAL., supra note 140; O’Malley, supra. Taken 
together, this amounts to a gap of around 90–97 percent. 
 144. See Gascón, supra note 143. Including 4,940 felony marijuana resentencing candi-
dates and 3,038 misdemeanor candidates sentenced prior to the initiative’s passage. Id. 
 145. This includes states that allow petition-based relief for misdemeanor and lesser of-
fenses. See generally Compare States, CLEAN SLATE CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/compare-states/. 
 146. Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, Ten-
nessee, Virginia, Wyoming. UGGEN 2016, supra note 41, at 4; see also Frances Robles, 1.4 Mil-
lion Floridians with Felonies Win Long-Denied Right to Vote, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/florida-felon-voting-rights.html [https://perma.cc
/82LR-B66V]. 
 147. The raw data comes from UGGEN 2016, supra note 41, at 13, 15. 
 148. E.g., id. at 3 (finding that as of the 2016 election, approximately 6.1 million people, 
or 2.5 percent of the voting age population, were disenfranchised due to a current or previous 
felony conviction, and that 7.4 percent of African Americans were disenfranchised, as com-
pared to 1.8 percent of non-African Americans). 
 149. Id. at 13. 
 150. Based on my analysis of each of the twelve states’ felony-disenfranchisement laws, 
the subset of individuals “permanently disenfranchised” in each state is narrow and circum-
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not take into account felony-reenfranchisement waiting times, their esti-
mates represent upper-bounds estimates of the number of individuals poten-
tially eligible for reenfranchisement during this period. Based on both the 
number of postsentence disenfranchised individuals and the rate of restora-
tion, the state-estimated share of ex-felons that have served their time but 
have not regained the franchise appears to range, with the exception of Iowa  
TABLE 3: RESTORATION OF VOTING RIGHTS IN STATES THAT DISENFRANCHISE 















Alabama 16,022 2004–2015 1,457 231,896 6% 
Arizona 31 2010–2015 6 116,717 0% 
Delaware 2,285 1988–2015 85 4,067 36% 
Florida152 271,982 1990–2015 10,879 1,487,847 15% 
Iowa 115,325 2005–2015 11,533 23,976 83% 
Kentucky 10,479 2008–2015 1,497 242,987 4% 
Mississippi 335 2000–2015 22 166,494 0% 
Nevada 281 1990–2011 13 62,080 0% 
Tennessee 11,581 1990–2015 772 323,354 3% 
Virginia 21,664 2002–2016 1,547 408,570 5% 




2,529 3,205,121 12% 
 
scribed, because, for example, in the state of Delaware, they were convicted of murder, bribery, 
or a sexual offense. DEL. CONST. art. V, § 2. 
 151. UGGEN 2016, supra note 41, at 13, 15. 
 152. These numbers do not reflect developments after the passage of Amendment 4 in 
Florida in November 2018, which, though it purported to make felony reenfranchisement au-
tomatic, largely failed to do so due to a rule that required outstanding legal financial obliga-
tions to be repaid prior to voter restoration. Though challenged and overturned by a lower 
court on the grounds of its constitutionality, the requirement remained in effect during the 
2020 presidential election. See Mower & Taylor, supra note 27. 
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and Delaware, from 85 to 100 percent.153 
C. Second Chance Gaps in Records Clearance 
When an individual is booked or arrested, a police record is created.154 
Formal charges generate court records.155 A charge can be disposed as a con-
viction (typically the result of a plea);156 a nonconviction;157 some sort of di-
verted or deferred judgment that, if completed successfully, terminates in a 
dismissal; or through another administrative resolution like a transfer. Out 
of the nearly 80 million people with criminal records,158 an estimated 19 mil-
lion have a felony conviction record.159 The remaining majority have mis-
demeanor convictions and unconvicted charges on their records.160 
Due in part to the uniquely American tradition of broad access by citi-
zens to government records, records of both convictions and nonconvictions 
are more widely available to background check providers and their custom-
ers, including prospective employers, licensing bodies, and other entities, in 
the United States than anywhere else in the world.161 Though generated pri-
marily to aid law enforcement, since 2014, background checks have been 
processed primarily for non-criminal justice purposes.162 Between 2006 and 
2016, “the number of fingerprints processed for noncriminal justice purpos-
es increased by 89.6 percent . . . while the number processed for criminal jus-
 
 153. This finding is consistent with earlier estimates of reenfranchisement rates ranging 
from one-tenth of 1 percent in Wyoming and Mississippi to 17 percent in Delaware. JEFF 
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 89 (2006). 
 154. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 36. 
 155. Id. at 54–59. 
 156. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.4(c) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 157. For example, due to the charge being dismissed, withdrawn, nolle prossed, or aban-
doned. 
 158. See sources cited supra note 17. 
 159. Sarah K.S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara 
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and Spatial Distribution of People with 
Felony Records in the United States, 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806 (2017). 
 160. Within the sample of criminal histories studied for this Article, felony conviction 
charges comprised around 9 percent of the total, while misdemeanor, minor, and unknown 
conviction charges comprised around 50 percent of the total, and the remainder were noncon-
victed. See Table A-3. 
 161. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 58–74, 159–223 (discussing the digitization of and market 
for criminal records and U.S. criminal-record exceptionalism). 
 162. Becki Goggins, New Blog Series Takes Closer Look at Findings of SEARCH/BJS Sur-
vey of State Criminal History Information Systems, 2016, SEARCH (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www
.search.org/new-blog-series-takes-closer-look-at-findings-of-search-bjs-survey-of-state-
criminal-history-information-systems-2016/ [https://perma.cc/ZN4G-AF2F]. Gun and em-
ployment background checks are two of the largest categories of civilian checks. See id. 
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tice purposes actually decreased by 6.6 percent.”163 Concerns about employer 
liability and advances in information technology have contributed to making 
background checks commonplace.164 That only a small minority of criminal 
records are “serious” (reflecting felony convictions) supports the view that 
“mass criminalization” is as urgent a problem as “mass incarceration.”165 Be-
cause a criminal record can substantially limit a person’s opportunity to ob-
tain employment, housing, public benefits, and student loans; to qualify for 
certain professions; and to gain entrance into higher education, having a 
record has been called “a civil death.”166 Available research suggests that fel-
ony convictions carry the most serious collateral consequences, including 
being barred from jobs, housing, and social reintegration opportunities.167 
However, even nonconvicted records have led to negative employment,168 
immigration, housing, and educational outcomes.169 
 
 163. Id. (reporting that noncriminal checks grew from 7.7 million to 14.6 million, while 
the number processed for criminal justice purposes shrank from 12.1 million to 11.3 million). 
 164. Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of Widespread 
Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 327 (2009). 
 165. Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. 
REV. 321, 326. 
 166. Adams et al., supra note 92, at 24. 
 167. For an overview of the literature see, for example, Prescott & Starr, supra note 26, at 
2468–71, 2500. 
 168. For an overview of the literature see, for example, Peter Leasure, Misdemeanor Rec-
ords and Employment Outcomes: An Experimental Study, 65 CRIME & DELINQ. 1850, 1852–54 
(2018). 
 169. E.g., Eisha Jain, Arrests as Regulation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810, 821–44 (2015) 
[hereinafter Jain, Arrests as Regulation] (describing the use of arrest information by immigra-
tion-enforcement officials to screen individuals who may fall within a removal priority (about 
20 percent of those deported had no criminal conviction); by employers to monitor off-duty 
workers, leading to their suspension or termination; by public-housing officials to identify ten-
ants who may be in breach of their lease and thereby subject to eviction; by social services after 
a child’s parent or guardian’s arrest leading to custody disruptions; and by schools to protect 
other students or identify those with counseling needs but also leading to stigmatization of 
these students); Eisha Jain, Prosecuting Collateral Consequences, 104 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1207 
(2016) (describing, for example, the suspension of a professional license, eviction from public 
housing, and ineligibility for public benefits as collateral consequences associated with arrests); 
Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment 
Discrimination in the Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 896 (2014) (finding that mere ar-
rests can be bars to hiring); Christopher Uggen, Mike Vuolo, Sarah Lageson, Ebony Ruhland & 
Hilary K. Whitham, The Edge of Stigma: An Experimental Audit of the Effects of Low-Level 
Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 637 (2014) (finding a 4 percent dif-
ference in callback rates associated with people with arrest records versus people without rec-
ords); see also Ryan A. Hancock, The Double Bind: Obstacles to Employment and Resources for 
Survivors of the Criminal Justice System, 15 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 515, 516 (2012) (finding 
that, while in places like Pennsylvania, it is illegal to use nonconviction data to screen out indi-
vidual job applicants, employers nevertheless adopt blanket policies that reject individuals with 
any record, including a nonconviction record). 
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These consequences can be avoided by taking advantage of records 
clearing, as implemented by states through sealing, vacaturs, expungements, 
expunctions, set-asides, and destruction. 170 As described earlier, these efforts 
are part of a broader set of policies aimed at reducing the harms associated 
with having a criminal record.171 But these policies will only succeed at doing 
so to the extent they are taken up. Complexity is a hallmark of many states’ 
clearance laws, which vary widely regarding the criteria they include, who 
they cover, and the type of relief they provide.172 The paragraphs below de-
scribe analyses to estimate second chance expungement gaps based on apply-
ing state-level rules to criminal histories. 
1. State-Level Second Chance Gaps in the Expungement of Convictions 
In the majority of states, qualifying individuals may apply to clear their 
criminal convictions by methods other than pardoning.173 The rules vary by 
state, and generally provide one or more “general categories” of relief, typi-
cally conditioned upon the crime being of lesser severity and the expiration 
of a waiting period that depends on the severity of the crime. 174 Many states 
also offer limited special eligibility, based, for example, on the decriminaliza-
tion of the underlying crime, a sexual offender’s status as a human traffick-
ing victim, or the conviction being someone’s first offense.175 In Washington 
state, individuals can get general relief, for example, under the rule that mis-
demeanors and gross-misdemeanor convictions can be vacated three years 
after completion of sentence requirements,176 while Class C (less serious) fel-
 
 170. See, e.g., San Jose State Univ. Record Clearance Project, Criminal Record Clearing in 
a Nutshell, GOOGLE SLIDES (Jan. 2018), https://docs.google.com/presentation/d/1IevvpNpNd4J
GYLgRUY1ADjBgSitH4YVygG1jI-Lie4g/ [https://perma.cc/A8AF-PP3Q]. 
 171. See generally BETH AVERY, MAURICE EMSELLEM & PHIL HERNANDEZ, NAT’L EMP. L. 
PROJECT, FAIR CHANCE LICENSING REFORM: OPENING PATHWAYS FOR PEOPLE WITH RECORDS 
TO JOIN LICENSED PROFESSIONS (2017), https://www.nelp.org/wp-content/uploads/Toolkit-
Fair-Chance-Licensing-Reform.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9HT-HNC3]. 
 172. See infra Section III.B, Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges. 
 173. Compare States, supra note 145 (analysis based on selection of expungements of 
conviction records on any basis besides “pardon”). But see Virginia: Restoration of Rights & 
Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (Aug. 28, 2020), https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-
restoration-profiles/virginia-restoration-of-rights-pardon-expungement-sealing/ [https://
perma.cc/8N6C-YEG2] (“Virginia law makes no provision for expunging adult conviction rec-
ords, except those that have been vacated pursuant to a writ of actual innocence . . . or those 
which were the subject of an absolute pardon (for innocence).” (citations omitted)). 
 174. Id.; Margaret Colgate Love, supra note 19. For a sample of conviction-clearance eli-
gibility criteria, see also Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges. 
 175. Compare States, supra note 145. 
 176. Except in the case of domestic violence convictions, which have a five-year waiting 
period. Washington: Adult Record Clearance Overview, CLEAN SLATE CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/states/washington/ [https://perma.cc/J7M6-P2JQ]; WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.96.060 (2020). 
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onies are clearable five years after sentence completion, and Class B (more 
serious) felonies after ten years. Colorado’s rule that courts must seal records 
of “misdemeanor offense[s] for the use or possession of marijuana that 
would not have been a criminal offense if the act occurred on or after De-
cember 10, 2012”177 is an example of a special eligibility criteria. 
Table 4-1 presents uptake-gap estimates sourced from several sources, 
several based on applying the eligibility criteria to samples of criminal histo-
ries using the basic approach described in the previous Part. While each es-
timate has its weaknesses, requiring compensation for missing data and not 
modeling unascertainable criteria,178 collectively the data show that, across 
states, the uptake rates are low, generally on the order of less than 20 percent. 
These low uptake rates persist across juvenile and adult clearance criteria 
and populations. 
TABLE 4-1: ESTIMATES OF SECOND CHANCE GAPS IN THE EXPUNGEMENT OF 
CONVICTION RECORDS 
State Population 





of People in the 
Convictions  
Clearance Gap180 
Washington181 Adult 1999–2019 <3% 
At least ~1 million 
people182 
California  
(Prop 64 and 
Prop 47)183 





 177. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-710(1) (2017), repealed by Act of May 28, ch. 295, 2019 
Colo. Sess. Laws 2732. 
 178. E.g., Colleen V. Chien, Zuyan Huang, Jacob Kuykendall & Katie Rabago, The Wash-
ington State Second Chance Expungement Gap, SSRN 3 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3529777 [https://perma.cc/NAU8-P7X9]. 
 179. Based on twenty years of actual expungements data unless otherwise noted. When a 
range was presented, we reproduced the conservative (larger) uptake value. 
 180 When a range was presented, we reproduced the conservative (smaller) estimate of 
people in the gap. 
 181. Chien et al., supra note 178. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See supra Section II.A.3. 
 184. This number represents the actual statewide Prop 64 gap and the statewide Prop 47 
gap estimated based on data from Los Angeles county as described in Section II.A.3, supra. 
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New York185 Adult 1992–2018 ~<1% 
~1.3 million 
people 
Connecticut186 Adult ~1960–2019 ~<4%187 
~300 thousand 
people 
Rhode Island188 Adult 1993–2019 ~30% 
~380 thousand 
people 
Iowa189 Adult 1993–2019 ~26%190 
~360 thousand 
people 
North Carolina191 Adult 1992–2018 ~6% 
~190 thousand 
people 
South Carolina192 Adult ~1980–2019 N/A 
~340 thousand 
people 
Oregon193 Adult 2003–2019 ~25%194 
~300 thousand 
people 




 185. The New York Second Chance Sealing Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/NY.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 186. The Connecticut Second Chance Pardon Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/CT.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review) 
 187. Includes convictions and nonconvictions. 
 188. The Rhode Island Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/RI.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 189. The Iowa Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/IA.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 190. Includes convictions and nonconvictions. 
 191. The North Carolina Second Chance Expunction Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/NC.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 192. The South Carolina Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/SC.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 193. The Oregon Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/OR.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 194. Includes convictions and nonconvictions. 
 195. The Missouri Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/MO.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 196. Includes convictions and nonconvictions. 
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Minnesota197 Adult 2009–2019 ~9%198 
~360 thousand 
people 




Washington201 Juvenile 1997–2013 0.2% N/A 
Colorado202 Juvenile 2003–2013 2% N/A 
Michigan203 Juvenile 2009–2013 11% N/A 
 
2. Estimates of the Nonconvictions-Expungement Second Chance Gap 
While the previous Section reports estimates of the share and number of 
Americans with convictions eligible for clearance, a sizeable percentage of 
charges are not convicted because the charges are dropped or dismissed, the 
accused is acquitted, or the accused agrees to a plea bargain that includes 
some convicted and other unconvicted charges. 
Every state allows for the clearance of unconvicted charges as a general 
matter,204 and, as described below, some even take steps to automatically—
meaning, without any action by the defendant—restrict access by the general 
public to such records. This consensus is consistent with the criminal justice 
 
 197. The Minnesota Second Chance Expungement Gap, PAPER PRISONS (2020), 
https://paperprisons.org/states/MN.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 198. Includes convictions and nonconvictions. 
 199. Prescott & Starr, supra note 26, at 1, 14. 
 200. Id. at 19 (calculating a five-year uptake rate). 
 201. Daniel Litwok, Essays on the Economics of Juvenile Crime and Education (2015) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University) (manuscript at 78), 
https://d.lib.msu.edu/etd/3615/datastream/OBJ/View/ [https://perma.cc/V6ZM-XD58]; accord 
Calero, supra note 26, at 37 (documenting an uptake rate of juvenile sealing in Washington of 
less than 10 percent). 
 202. Litwok, supra note 201. 
 203. Id. 
 204. See Appendix B-3, on file with the author, for a summary of the laws of the states. 
See also Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 169, at 826, 854. Purging nonconvictions is also 
consistent with the presumption of innocence and in theory could prevent the racial skew in 
arrests—49 percent and 44 percent of African American and Latino men are arrested by age 
twenty-three, as compared to one-third of adults in general—from causing a skew in the wide-
ranging “collateral consequences” associated with having a criminal record. But again, only to 
the extent that there is proportional uptake of clearance remedies. Id. at 817. 
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system’s foundational presumption of innocence and, arguably, the nature of 
nonconviction records as a greater reflection of the arresting or charging of-
ficer’s discretionary decisions than of the defendant’s culpability. 
Calculating the “uptake gap”—the share of people eligible over time to 
receive relief that have actually received it—associated with nonconvicted-
records relief is difficult to do because of the “disappearance” of records 
from public view upon expungement. However, using the methods de-
scribed in the previous Part, one can obtain at any point an estimate of the 
“current gap”—the share and number of people currently with a record who 
could receive relief. This Part marshals a novel national dataset of criminal 
histories to provide a rough estimate of the current gap of expungable non-
conviction records in all fifty states, which it then uses as the basis of a na-
tional estimate of people in the current gap based on laws governing 
nonconvictions. 
Doing so required proceeding in several steps, working with law and da-
ta-science research assistants at Santa Clara and Columbia Universities as 
well as experts in criminal law and criminal procedure to (1) develop crimi-
nal history data samples through a partnership with a background check 
company and also from states, (2) process and label the data, (3) ascertain 
the law of each state, (4) develop a script to apply the law to the data sample 
to ascertain each state’s second chance current expungement gap, (5) com-
pare these gap estimates based on the background check-company sample 
with gap estimates based on representative data to estimate the direction of 
any bias, and (6) based on these comparisons, develop a rough, national es-
timate of the size of the current nonconvictions records-clearing gap. Each 
of these steps is outlined briefly below and in detail in Appendix M. 
First, I worked with the background check company Checkr to develop a 
novel dataset comprising the anonymized criminal histories of around sixty 
thousand people with criminal records, generally more than one thousand 
per state,205 chosen randomly at the state level, from across the fifty states.206 
The individuals were seekers of primarily on-demand jobs whose back-
ground checks took place between January 2017 and October 2018.207 The 
team then cleaned, labeled, and grouped the data into criminal incidents. 
 
 205. The number of checks in the studied sample per state averaged around 1,400 and, 
with the exception of Vermont (N=473) and Kansas (N=754), numbered over 1,000 (Table A-
2); each sample size should be kept in mind for the purpose of developing point estimates. See 
Appendix M for an overview of the data and the methods used to analyze them. 
 206. There is currently no process for expunging federal charges and convictions, but the 
majority of states implement various programs for expungement. See Love, supra note 19. 
 207. These were carried out by commercial background check company Checkr. While 
Checkr performs more than ten million background checks per year for more than ten thou-
sand customers, Carolyn Said, Checkr Adds Ongoing Screening for Gig Economy Workers, S.F. 
CHRON. (Aug. 5, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Checkr-adds-
ongoingscreening-for-gig-economy-13131037.php [https://perma.cc/SX45-27M9], it has been 
reported that approximately 80 percent of its checks are for on-demand companies. Checkr 
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Doing so was a nontrivial task. Table 4-2 provides a sample of data con-
structed based on actual criminal history records. Although some of the dis-
positions are straightforward (e.g., “dismissed” and “guilty”) and appear in 
“plain English,” others (like “NOLLE PROSEQUI”) take legal knowledge to 
decipher and yet others, like “transferred,” “remanded,” and “revoked,” 
could not be resolved as a disposition of guilt or nonguilt. The steps we took 
to reduce the “unknown” disposition rate, in consultation with experts, are 
detailed in Appendix M. 
TABLE 4-2: SAMPLE CRIMINAL HISTORY DATA 
Court Charge Charge Type Disposition Sentence 
MAGISTERIAL 
DISTRICT COURT 


















THEFT OF SERVICES - 
ACQUISITION OF SERVICE 
 OTHER  











Next we ascertained the nonconviction-clearance laws of all fifty states. 
As described in Appendix M, we relied heavily on summaries of the law pro-
vided by the Collateral Consequences Resource Center’s Restoration of 
 
powers the gig economy. The firm’s on-demand clients include Uber, Lyft, GrubHub, Insta-
cart, Postmates, and DoorDash. Kyle Wiggers, Checkr and Uber Built a Service to Monitor 
Workers’ Background Records, VENTUREBEAT (July 13, 2018, 7:09 AM), 
https://venturebeat.com/2018/07/13/checkr-and-uber-built-a-service-to-monitor-workers-
background-records/ [https://perma.cc/R3BF-YCTU]; Connie Loizos, Background Checks Pay 
for Checkr, Which Just Rang Up $100 Million in New Funding, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 12, 2018, 
9:24 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/12/background-checks-pay-for-checkr-which-just-
rang-up-100-million-in-new-funding/ [https://perma.cc/EH3P-LS7T]; TrueBridge Cap., The 
Gig Is Up: The Real Value of Gig Economy Startups Isn’t the Model—It’s the Supply, FORBES 
(Aug. 10, 2016, 11:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/truebridge/2016/08/10/the-real-
value-of-gig-economy-startups/ [https://perma.cc/J9MF-6LLB]. The sample covered records 
randomly selected over the time period (except in the case of Vermont, whose records were 
sampled over an extended period of time in order to achieve a sufficient sample size). 
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Rights Project 50-State Comparison as well as the Council for State Gov-
ernments Clean Slate Clearinghouse. We also consulted the text of statutes in 
effect in 2018 (the period of the records we obtained) to determine the scope 
of available relief. To complement our research, we consulted with practicing 
attorneys on particularly challenging aspects of interpretation. One aspect of 
relief, often unascertainable based on reading the statute, was the extent to 
which the state allowed for clearance of unconvicted charges even if other 
charges in the incident were convicted.208 To make this determination in 
ambiguous cases, we consulted with experts and state attorneys knowledgea-
ble of each state’s laws during the relevant period. When in doubt, we de-
faulted to the more conservative version of the rule (superstrict over strict 
over lenient). 
After cleaning the data and ascertaining the rules, we developed a script 
to apply the state rules to the cleaned state records in order to approximate 
the share of people in the second chance nonconvictions current expunge-
ment gap with records eligible for but not receiving clearance. The final steps 
were to carry out a robustness check, on a handful of states where we had 
“representative” data, in order to quantify the extent of the bias introduced 
by relying on our data sample and then to use this information to develop 
state-level estimates to develop a national estimate of the number of people 
in the second chance expungement gap. 
3. Estimates of State-Level Nonconvictions-Expungement Second Chance 
Current Gaps 
 The aggregate results of our analysis of the nonconvictions-
expungement second chance gap are reported in Table 4-3, discussed below. 
However, the state shares, as reported in Table B-1, show considerable varia-
tion. Less than 1 percent of Vermont gig workers studied, for example, had a 
clearable record, while 76 percent of the gig workers with records in North 
Carolina did. 
 These differences, in turn, flow from the several factors that contribute 
to a state’s second chance gap, including the breadth or “generosity” of the 
relief offered (with a higher share of individuals eligible for relief in states 
with more lenient policies), rates of conviction,209 and clearance mecha-
nisms. A state might have a small gap because its policy is “superstrict” and 
stingy, not allowing any nonconvictions records to be cleared, or conversely, 
 
 208. For example, within a given criminal incident, a person can be susceptible to multi-
ple charges (e.g., charged with trespassing, public display of intoxication, and loitering) but 
convicted of less than all of them (e.g., just loitering). 
 209. In the gig-jobseeker sample, the ratio of nonconvictions to all charges visible in the 
data varied among states between less than 10% and more than 70%. Cf. Data Portal, 
MEASURES FOR JUST., https://measuresforjustice.org/portal (determining “case dismissal” and 
“case not prosecuted” rates for seven states and finding a range between 13.7% (in Pennsylva-
nia) and 46% (in North Carolina)). 
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as in the case of Vermont, because their methods for clearing out nonconvic-
tions is efficient. As explored below, these factors undercut mechanical com-
parisons between states based on the size of their gaps. But they are still 
important because they illustrate the extent to which individuals in each 
state that are ready and willing to contribute to the workforce210 have im-
provable records. 
4. Toward a National Estimate of the Nonconvictions-Expungement 
Second Chance Current Gap 
Just how many people nationally fall into the second chance expunge-
ment current gap due to nonconvictions alone? Of the multiple challenges 
that are associated with coming up with a rough estimate based on gig-
jobseeker records, perhaps the largest is that gig jobseekers with records 
cannot be presumed to be representative of the population of people with 
records in general. To estimate the size and direction of the bias, we carried 
out the robustness checks described in Appendix M. As detailed there,211 we 
found that gig jobseekers have eligibility rates that are roughly comparable to 
the eligibility rates among people with records in general. These findings 
suggested that the gig-jobseeker shares reported in this study can be used to 
provide rough estimates of the national population of people with clearable 
records. 
Besides this source of imprecision in the analysis, two other “unknowns” 
should be kept in mind, one tending to inflate and another tending to both 
deflate and inflate the nonconvictions second chance gaps reported in this 
Article. First, because the estimates are largely based on court and adminis-
trative records, they do not reflect mortality, mobility, and related demo-
graphic factors that might reduce one’s motivation or ability to seek relief in 
the state of one’s previous criminal activity.212 While taking these factors into 
account would reduce the number of “motivated” as well as eligible individ-
uals, perhaps the simpler approach is just to assume that some amount of the 
gap is natural and due to the factors cited above and related demographic 
shifts. Second, as described in Appendix M, the determination of eligibility 
in many cases involved unobservable factors that we could not model in da-
ta.213 These factors cut both ways: a prosecutor’s objection or the nonrepay-
ment of debt, in jurisdictions where it matters, could make a charge that we 
treated as eligible in fact not eligible. However, good-time credits or the suc-
cessful completion of diversion programs, which we did not account for, 
could have led to undercounting. This Article acknowledges these “unmod-
 
 210. As inferred from a job application leading to their background check. 
 211. See infra Appendix M, Section 2: Robustness Checks. 
 212. See Shannon et al., supra note 159, at 1800. 
 213. As described in Appendix M, Section 1 and Table 5: Clearance Criteria Example and 
Challenges. 
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eled” limits in data, provides examples of them in Appendix M, and includes 
a laundry list in Table 5 of some of the particularly challenging eligibility cri-
teria to implement at scale embedded in expungement laws. 
Applying each state’s estimated share in rough proportion to the nation-
al population of individuals with criminal records of around 80 million214 
yielded a cumulative, lower-bounds national second chance gap among indi-
viduals with criminal records of roughly 35 percent, or 28 million individu-
als,215 a stunning total. Twenty-two percent had fully clearable records. 
TABLE 4-3: ESTIMATES OF THE NATIONAL SECOND CHANCE 





(Partially or Fully) 






















39% 22% 35% 20–30 million 
5. Explaining Differences in State-Level Nonconvictions-Expungement 
Second Chance Current Gaps 
What explains the variance among states with respect to the share of 
people in the second chance expungement gap? I worked with a research as-
sistant to implement a hierarchical multiple linear regression to assess the 
contribution of state and local policies as well as the demographic character-
istics of the target population to the current gap (the percentage of cases eli-
gible for clearance) of a given county.216 Three policy factors were initially 
considered: the generosity of the state nonconvictions clearance law (wheth-
er lenient or strict), the presence of automatic clearing processes as provided 
 
 214. Based on each state’s share of arrests from 1995 to the present. For details, see Ap-
pendix M. 
 215. Thirty-five percent of eighty million is twenty-eight million. For reasons elaborated 
in Appendix M, this total may understate the number of people with clearable unconvicted 
charges, because people with only uncharged arrests are more likely to be eligible for clearance. 
 216. This analysis was carried out on a prefinal version of the data, and thus is provided 
for discussion purposes. 
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for in state law,217 and each county’s conviction rate (percentage of charges 
that led to convictions). A second model also included three county-level 
demographic variables: the average age of people charged, the rural/urban 
classification,218 and the population of the county. 
The model results, reported in Appendix C, suggested that a large share 
of the variance in the second chance gap could be explained based on policy 
factors including not only the presence of “automatic” clearing but also the 
convictions rate (what share of charges became convictions) and state clear-
ability policy (strict, lenient, superstrict).219 Beyond state policy factors, geo-
graphic and demographic factors also appear to be correlated to some degree 
with the probability of clearance. The most rural counties (RUC=9) had 
about a 5 percent larger gap than the least rural (RUC=1) ones, and younger 
people were associated with slightly larger gaps (with a 10-year change in av-
erage county age at time of conviction corresponding with a 2.3 percent in-
crease in the gap). Both of these correlations were significant at the 99 
percent confidence level,220 indicating that uptake is not equal across all 
groups. 
III. NARROWING THE SECOND CHANCE GAP 
So far, this Article has introduced the concept of “second chance gap”—
the difference between the number of individuals eligible for and receiving 
second chance relief—and provided some rough estimates of the gap associ-
ated with several second chance provisions. It documents uptake rates of less 
than 10 percent among many of the initiatives studied and, for the first time, 
provides an estimate in the tens of millions of individuals with records that 
could clear them partially or fully based on nonconvictions-clearance poli-
cies. These findings are important for understanding the high cost, high vol-
ume, and high impact potential of second chance policies. This Part draws 
from contrasts in the implementation of second chances programs with rela-
tively larger and smaller gaps to identify the practices associated with nar-
rower gaps. 
 
 217. The range in provisions was considerable. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-
142a(c)(1) (West 2019) (“Whenever any charge in a criminal case has been nolled . . . if at least 
thirteen months have elapsed since such nolle, all police and court records and records of the 
state’s or prosecuting attorney or the prosecuting grand juror pertaining to such charge shall 
be erased . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 703(2)(A) (2020) (“Unless the person remains a 
fugitive from justice, summons and arrest information without disposition if an interval of 
more than one year has elapsed . . . and no active prosecution of a criminal charge stemming 
from the summons or arrest is pending [will be confidential.]”). 
 218. 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/geography/guidance/geo-areas/urban-
rural/2010-urban-rural.html [https://perma.cc/SGN6-9S8B]. 
 219. See text accompanying notes 350–351 (r2 = 0.753, all ps < 0.001). 
 220. See text accompanying notes 350–351 (r2 = 0.757). 
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It is important to acknowledge that the foregoing discussion is not com-
prehensive and neglects many factors and details that may prove to be criti-
cal in the administration of a particular program. Little attention has been 
paid in this Article, for example, to what can prove to be big obstacles, like 
the fines and fees that must be paid in some cases to qualify for relief.221 
However, recognizing that “issues of judicial administration affect substan-
tive case outcomes,”222 the following discussion focuses on solving the parts 
of the gap that are attributable to administrative, “red tape” factors, as dis-
tinct from substantive or structural denials, through ruthless iteration, bur-
den shifting, and automation. 
A. Defending, Not Damning, Second Chance Gaps? 
Before doing so, it is important to acknowledge and address a few of the 
arguments that might be raised in favor of accepting, rather than trying to 
narrow, second chance gaps and their complex rules and administration. 
First, some of the gap may simply be due to the fact that the relief offered 
may simply not be desired by or “worth it” to the eligible recipient. Second, 
one might argue that the gaps between eligibility and delivery signal that 
second chance policies are performing valuable screening functions between 
those that do and don’t merit second chances and, further, permitting a wid-
er and more generous range of forgiveness policies. Relatedly, it could be 
that the procedural and substantive requirements of second chance laws, as 
well as the individualized nature of their application—for example, when a 
hearing and or private petitions are required—encourage and reward rule 
following and other socially productive behaviors, and so reducing these 
burdens will likewise reduce these incentives. A third argument, based on 
equity, could be that in certain contexts, making the delivery of one’s second 
chance easier will degrade the benefits of second chances restoration for 
those who have made the effort relative to others. I briefly explore and ad-
dress the first two defenses of second chance gaps below and take up the 
third in Part IV’s discussion of impact and disparities. 
One explanation for the low uptake of a given second chance is that the 
second chance is simply not valued by the eligible party. Restoring a person’s 
right to vote isn’t going to matter much if the person isn’t interested in regis-
tering or turning out to vote. Other second chances may not seem worth the 
 
 221. See, e.g., Joy Radice, Access-to-Justice Challenges for Expungement in Tennessee, 30 
FED. SENT’G REP. 277 (2018). Because individuals with criminal pasts often have depressed 
earnings, the application and legal fees required to complete records clearance can be prohibi-
tive. JENNY MONTOYA TANSEY & KATHERINE CARLIN, CODE FOR AM., CLOSING THE DELIVERY 
GAP 23 (2018), http://s3-us-west-1.amazonaws.com/codeforamerica-cms1/documents/Closing
-the-Delivery-Gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/QGG9-C59T] (reporting based on a survey of 569 
expungement seekers that almost 40 percent of respondents owing fines reported they were 
unable to pay). 
 222. Devins, supra note 54, at 112. 
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candle: the benefit of restoring one’s second chance—for example, in the 
case of a person who is able to erase an unconvicted charge only to have re-
maining on one’s record much more serious convictions—may in fact be 
minimal. As the broader nonparticipation literature has found, concrete and 
immediate informational and transactional costs can appear to outweigh the 
downstream benefits of a social benefit.223  
But just as with social-benefit programs, privately rational nondelivery 
of second chances may be socially suboptimal. Lower uptake in such pro-
grams by vulnerable or at-risk communities (such as, in the case of welfare, 
immigrants)224 means that the benefit is not reaching those who need it the 
most. The benefits of civic participation, as through voting or participating 
on a jury, inure to the community at large. And individuals may fail to ap-
preciate the economic and longer-term social benefits of reintegration. 
One might nevertheless defend large second chance gaps and the high 
costs that contribute to them on a few grounds: first, that high standards 
promote good behavior and rule following, and second, that they serve to 
separate the wheat from the chaff, providing a valuable filtering function to 
screen out those who don’t merit second chances. While appealing, these de-
fenses are misplaced, in large part because the second chance gap measures 
uptake conditional on qualification, such that any incentive for good behav-
ior comes from the substantive, not procedural, requirements associated 
with getting one’s second chance. As a result, the individuals that have the 
organization and wherewithal to endure second chance application proce-
dures are likely to be those with access to lawyers and resources, exacerbat-
ing existing disparities. In the case of invisible yet very real encumbrances 
like having a criminal record or having a suspended license, low uptake rates 
combined with high apparent eligibility seem to indicate that the administra-
tive and debt hurdles of clearance or restoration are not spurring learning 
but instead operating to put second chances out of reach. 
In addition, while no government program is expected to have complete 
uptake, the reported second chance uptake rates in convictions expunge-
ment of, in most cases, less than 20 percent225 described in Part II leave much 
room for improvement. The size and consequences of the second chance 
 
 223. See, e.g., Alba, supra note 34, at 3 (describing the “present bias” or hyperbolic dis-
counting that can impact the social benefit participation decision). 
 224. See Currie, supra note 34, at 16 (describing studies that document depressed rates of 
enrollment among immigrant children in Medicaid, conditional on their qualifying, and, con-
ditional on being poor, lower rates of enrollment in SSI among Hispanic children). 
 225. As a point of comparison, the uptake rates of a number of large means-tested social 
welfare programs is closer to 50%–80%. See Jacob Goldin, Tax Benefit Complexity and Take-
Up: Lessons from the Earned Income Tax Credit, 72 TAX L. REV. 59, 67 n.46 (2018) (describing 
an 83% uptake rate among SNAP programs and a similarly high participation level among 
Medicaid and CHIP programs but cautioning that differences in methodology complicate di-
rect comparisons; also describing 2014 Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, 
and Children (WIC) participation rates as at 55%). 
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gaps identified in this report support putting aside individualized, case-by-
case assessments in favor of a different, scalable approach to addressing mass 
criminalization. This means reducing the costs—on both the applicant and 
the criminal justice system—associated with restoring each second chance. 
Two types of code—legal code and computational code—can be leveraged to 
do this. As discussed below, legal code that burden shifts and lays out a cen-
tralized framework for relief and computer code for automating and imple-
menting these principles can work together to support second chances at 
scale. 
Finally, while low uptake rates could theoretically make second chance 
rules more politically palatable, it is equally plausible that low awareness of 
the second chance gap to date has prevented this mechanism from operating 
thus far. On the contrary, for the reasons described in Part I, second chance 
laws to date have enjoyed a warm bipartisan embrace because they are hoped 
to be effective, not because they aren’t delivered. 
The third defense of the second chance gap, in the context of records 
clearing, is more worrisome—that by automatically clearing everyone’s rec-
ord, discrimination will increase as factual, individualized information is re-
placed with group assumptions. I leave a more robust discussion of how the 
void left by expunged data may be replaced with statistical discrimination or 
other improper inferences to Part IV. 
Before turning to the following discussion of ways to narrow the second 
chance gap, it is important to acknowledge that it neglects other, perhaps 
more important, questions—for example, about the scope of relief provided 
and the legitimacy of the underlying deprivation of rights. However, recog-
nizing that “issues of judicial administration affect substantive case out-
comes,”226 the following discussion focuses on addressing the parts of the gap 
that are attributable to administrative, “red-tape” factors to second-chance 
gaps, through ruthless iteration, burden shifting, and automation. 
B. Ruthless Iteration 
One finding that emerges from reviewing relatively more and less suc-
cessful second chance initiatives is that implementing them at scale requires 
clear, ascertainable, consistently applied criteria. But in context after context, 
untested rules that do not take into account the wide variety of scenarios that 
may arise or explicitly consider capacity to implement have stymied the de-
livery of second chances. Given the complexity of the criteria and the data 
required to implement them, perfection should not be expected on the first 
try, but rather, ruthless iteration, to fulfill the intent and promise of second 
chances. 
 
 226. Devins, supra note 54, at 112. 
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Attempting to apply records-clearance criteria in an automated way 
demonstrates the challenges.227 Data-hygiene issues all too familiar to data 
practitioners, including data silos, missing data, and dirty data,228 make it 
difficult to apply widely used criteria that are specific to the person, charge, 
or disposition status. To know whether or not a conviction is the person’s 
“first offense,” she has “stayed clean” for the requisite period of time, or she 
has satisfied other qualifying (or disqualifying) conditions229 requires a relia-
ble way to identify that person across statewide criminal records;230 for ex-
ample, through a unique state ID. But according to the Council for State 
Government’s Justice project, only eighteen states have and use a unique 
state identification (SID) number for each person consistently.231 Provisions 
that are “person specific” are both common and difficult to ascertain at scale 
without an authorized identification strategy.232 Table 5 includes a list of ex-
pungement provisions that, while operational in a petition-by-petition clear-
ance process, have proven difficult to implement at scale; the reason they are 
problematic; and drafting alternatives. 
There will still be important reasons to include hard-to-ascertain crite-
ria—individuals with more involved criminal histories or that have served 
longer sentences will require more vetting but also may receive more impact-
ful relief when they qualify. However, the extent to which data silos, missing 
data, and dirty data reduce the ability of candidates to be cleared efficiently 
should at least be taken into consideration and, where possible, minimized. 
This requires not a “one and done” approach but an agile, iterative approach 
that allows for refinement of the criteria to fit the existing informational in-
frastructure. Rules that don’t take into account capacity to implement are 
not limited to expungement.233 For example, errors in resentencing calcula-
tions have been blamed on the inability of “court clerks to record judges’ or-
ders correctly, prison and jail administrators to properly read those 
 
 227. Some of which are listed in Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges. 
 228. See, e.g., Anders Haug & Jan Stentoft Arlbjørn, Barriers to Master Data Quality, 24 J. 
ENTER. INFO. MGMT. 288, 292–97 (2011). 
 229. For examples, see Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges. 
 230. Rather than, for example, a statewide case-management system. 
 231. The Council of State Gov’ts Just. Ctr., Action Item 3: Use Measures That Permit 
More Timely Analysis in Addition to Cohort-Based Measures, 50-STATE REP. ON PUB. SAFETY, 
https://50statespublicsafety.us/part-2/strategy-1/action-item-3/#graphic-3 [https://perma.cc
/D2FH-RSLP]. 
 232. Rhode Island, for example, includes three record-specific criteria that require, re-
spectively, conviction records to be connected to a first misdemeanor or first felony and for the 
person to have no subsequent arrests or convictions. 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-1.3-2 to .3-
3(b)(1) (2002). However, as of 2017, it did not have or use a common ID across criminal justice 
data systems. The Council of State Gov’ts Just. Ctr., supra note 231. 
 233. See, e.g., Goldin, supra note 225 (discussing the role of complexity in the EITC con-
text, and distinguishing between informational and computational complexity). 
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instructions, and facility staff to accurately add and subtract good-time cred-
its.”234  
 Iteration and consultation with implementers can ensure that second 
chance criteria are developed in a way that supports not only their clarity but 
consistent application, as is underscored by considering the Clemency Initia-
tive, compassionate release, and “Drugs Minus Two” resentencing programs, 
all of which enable inmates to apply for shortened sentences. In her report 
Lessons Learned, a comprehensive analysis of several federal resentencing 
initiatives, Caryn Devins cites as one of the factors that led to the success of 
the Drugs Minus Two initiative—which had a relatively small second chance 
gap235—that in most cases eligibility for the program could readily be deter-
mined without a complex legal analysis.236 This enabled courts to grant relief 
regardless of whether an affected individual filed a motion. It also allowed 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission to generate preliminary lists of eligible de-
fendants to district courts upon request.237 
In contrast, the Obama Clemency Initiative, by all accounts, suffered 
from uneven and inconsistent application of the criteria for commutation. In 
its report, the U.S. Sentencing Commission noted the high rate of false nega-
tives and positives resulting from the mismatch between published criteria 
and outcomes.238 According to former U.S. Pardon Attorney Margaret Love, 
this meant that “[r]elief was granted in dozens of cases that evidently did not 
satisfy the eligibility criteria announced” while “many prisoners whose cases 







 234. Laura Sullivan, Without Reviews, Inmates Can Get Lost in U.S. Prison System, NPR 
(Apr. 5, 2013, 4:09 AM), https://www.npr.org/2013/04/05/176302378/without-reviews-
inmates-can-get-lost-in-u-s-prison-system [https://perma.cc/3APX-6JZ6]. 
 235. Of about 21 percent based on figures published by the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2014 DRUG GUIDELINES AMENDMENT RETROACTIVITY DATA REPORT 
tbls.1 & 3 (2015), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications
/retroactivity-analyses/drug-guidelines-amendment/20150624-Drug-Retro-Analysis.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H3NL-2G52]. 
 236. Devins, supra note 54, at 73–74. 
 237. Id. at 91, 117. 
 238. SCHMITT ET AL., supra note 74, at 2 (only 5.1 percent of the offenders who received a 
commuted sentence met all the factors, while only 3.4 percent of the sentences of drug-
trafficking offenders that met all the factors did). 
 239. Love, supra note 117, at 271–72 (emphasis added). 
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Example Drafting Alternative 
Sentence  
completion 
Not tracked in court data 
and hard to infer as clean 
sentencing data is often 
not available; it also is 
often unclear whether or 
not outstanding fines and 
fees must be paid and 
whether they have been. 
Records relating to a first conviction 
voided upon the petitioner’s successful 
completion of the sentence will be 
sealed by the court. KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 218A.275(1), (8), (9) (West 
2012). 
 
Record can be sealed by the court one 
year after sentence completion if the 
petitioner has no subsequent convic-
tions. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-
706(1)(a), (1)(b)(i), 1(f). 













 demographic trait 
such as age, mili-
tary status, or 
other condition 
Information may not be 
easily ascertaina-
ble/available on the rec-
ord or charge category 
condition 
Records relating to an offense commit-
ted by current and former military per-
sonnel can be dismissed.” CAL. PEN. 
CODE § 1170.9 (West 2015). A record 
may be destroyed when the person who 
is the subject of the record reaches 
thirty-eight years of age. CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 781(d) (West 2020). 
Specify an identifica-
tion strategy that can 
be  
implemented at scale 
or do not include  
demographic traits 
Class or grade 
condition 
Missing class, grade, or 
category information 
Records relating to a charge or convic-
tion for a petty offense, municipal ordi-
nance violation, or a Class 2 
misdemeanor as the highest charge can 
be removed from the public record after 
10 years, if all court-ordered conditions 
are satisfied. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 23A-3-34 (2016). 





view/check for any “court-
ordered” conditions and 
compliance 




Vulnerable to changes to 
definitions, requires de-
tailed clean data 
Records of arrest are destroyed within 
60 days after detention without arrest, 
acquittal, dismissal, no true bill, no in-
formation, or other exoneration. R.I. 
GEN. LAWS § 12-1-12(a), (b). 
Simple description, 
e.g., “All records that 
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Prison staff, corrections officials, and final decisionmakers have little 
guidance in many cases.240 This results in confusing eligibility criteria that 
take so long to evaluate that applicants die in the interim.241 For states like 
Illinois and Michigan that have programs in place but “provide no detailed 
rules or guidance on implementing them,”242 the present situation is even 
more dire. 
In the case of federal compassionate release, ruthless iteration and over-
sight provided by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department 
of Justice, watchdog groups, and Congress have helped to, over time, im-
prove implementation of the law. After a 2013 OIG report detailed “signifi-
cant problems with the management” of the compassionate-release program, 
the BOP implemented new provisions meant to increase and clarify the 
law.243 But a 2015 report, revised again in 2016, found that the new provi-
sions did not address the problem and reiterated that the BOP’s guidelines 
were still inadequate and recommended “revising the requirements that limit 
the availability of compassionate release for these inmates.”244 In 2016, the 
Sentencing Commission stepped in to provide broader, stronger and more 
ascertainable criteria.245 For example, for elderly prisoners with medical con-
ditions, it eliminated the requirements that prisoners over sixty-five years 
old be “experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health that substantial-
ly diminishes their ability to function in prison” and that “[c]onventional 
treatment promise[] no substantial improvement,” as previously required by 
the BOP.246 
 
 240. Id. at 14. 
 241. Id. at 7. 
 242. Id. at 12. 
 243. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 62, at 46. 
 244. Id. at i–iii. 
 245. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) 
(stating that the standard of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” can be met on four 
grounds: Medical, Age, Family Circumstances, and Other, and defining each); see also S. REP. 
NO. 115-139, at 80 (2017) (“In 2016, the U.S. Sentencing Commission [USSC] amended the 
criteria for compassionate release and encouraged BOP to file a motion for those prisoners 
who meet the criteria the Commission identified.”); id. at 80–81 (where the Senate gave BOP 
sixty days to respond to its inquiry with answers as to how it had complied with the new crite-
ria, which criteria it had not implemented, an explanation of why not and a plan to comply, the 
number of prisoners granted and denied compassionate release in the five years preceding 
along with the number of applicants, the reasons for each denial or grant of release, the dura-
tion of time between application submission and determination, and the number of prisoners 
who died waiting for determination with the duration of time they had waited); see also Letter 
from Senator Brian Schatz et al. to Thomas R. Kane, supra note 124 (directing BOP to file all 
motions for compassionate release that may meet one of the criteria thereof and demanding 
that data on reform implementation be transmitted directly to the Senate). 
 246. See FAMS. AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, COMPASSIONATE RELEASE AND THE 
FIRST STEP ACT: THEN AND NOW 2–3, https://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/Compassionate-
Release-in-the-First-Step-Act-Explained-FAMM.pdf [https://perma.cc/DPX3-QXM9]. 
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In 2017, the Senate Appropriations Committee, under pressure from 
outside groups, directed the BOP to report on its efforts to increase its use of 
compassionate release, and to essentially report on the second chance gap 
and its root causes, by providing data on the number of requests, their re-
sults, the reasons for denials, and the number of people who died waiting for 
an answer.247 In the spirit of continual improvement, the First Step Act of 
2018 further streamlined eligibility248 and introduced a right of appeal, build-
ing oversight on discretion. It also added a notification provision to families 
of prisoners that fall into eligibility.249 
C. Centralization and Burden Shifting 
Centralizing and shifting the burden for delivering second chances to 
the state is another strategy for narrowing the second chance gap. For exam-
ple, one of the major criticisms of the Clemency Initiative was that decisions 
were made by a decentralized staff given wide latitude to grant, deny, and 
even refashion sentences.250 The lack of a unified approach to reviewing ap-
plications introduced inconsistencies and inefficiencies in administration.251 
The Drugs Minus Two program (like certain previous presidential pardon 
programs252), in contrast, benefited from a uniform and “proactive, relatively 
centralized and efficient process.”253 
The experiences of California and Pennsylvania with records clearing 
are also illustrative. California has fifty-eight counties, each responsible for 
 
 247. S. REP. NO. 115-139, at 80 (where the Senate gave BOP a list of categories on which 
it must produce data, concluding with “(8) for each year, the number of prisoners who died 
while their compassionate release requests were pending and, for each, the amount of time that 
had elapsed between the date the request was received by the warden”). 
 248. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (supplemented by the First Step Act of 2018, giving 
prisoners the opportunity to appeal BOP’s decision not to file a motion for compassionate re-
lease). 
 249. That includes notification to a prisoner’s loved ones seventy-two hours after a ter-
minal diagnosis of the right to submit a compassionate-release request, and requirements that 
the BOP must process requests within fourteen days, in addition to providing assistance to 
prisons unable to submit release requests on their own. Id. § 3582(d)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 250. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Designed to Fail: The President’s Deference 
to the Department of Justice in Advancing Criminal Justice Reform, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
387, 429–32 (2017). The need to decentralize came, in part, from the program’s well-publicized 
resource constraints, but drawing upon former prosecutors as reviewing staff introduced an-
other problem: “structural bias.” Id. at 434; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presiden-
tial Administration of Criminal Law, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 824 (2015). 
 251. Barkow & Osler, supra note 250, at 429–32. 
 252. See, e.g., Love, supra note 117, at 275 n.5 (Clemency Legacy) (describing President 
Ford’s Clemency Board, which “reviewed approximately 21,500 applications over a period of 
12 months, and submitted a total of 14,514 recommendations for clemency to the President, 
most of which were granted”). 
 253. Devins, supra note 54, at 74. 
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deciding how to implement key parts of Propositions 47 and 64.254 A review 
of county websites undertaken for this Article yielded no information about 
how to clear one’s record under these provisions for twenty-two and twenty-
eight counties, respectively.255 Putting in place a default centralized, 
statewide process would relieve the burden on individual counties to devise 
their own programs. During the writing of this Article, California passed 
AB-1793, largely implementing this idea by requiring the identification and 
automatic clearance of Prop 64 eligible offenses unless objected to by a pros-
ecutor.256 Pennsylvania’s recently enacted Clean Slate Act assigns responsi-
bility for sealing nonconvictions and minor convictions from criminal 
records to the state police and statewide Administrative Office of Pennsylva-
nia Courts.257 Burden shifting in these ways not only supports more efficient, 
centralized administration, but also automation and cost-savings, addressed 
in the next Subsection.258 
But even when the burden is on the state, small differences in how the 
law is drafted or implemented can contribute to big differences in the conse-
quences of a criminal record. Two states that have similar rules on paper but 
divergent outcomes with respect to what employers see are Alaska and Ver-
mont. Under Alaskan law, records relating to a case where all charges result 
in acquittal or dismissal cannot be published on a publicly available website 
sixty days after the date of acquittal or dismissal.259 In Vermont, the waiting 
time until recently was longer, twelve months, but the court will seal the rec-
 
 254. Including the scope of form of petition and admissible evidence. J. RICHARD 
COUZENS & TRICIA A. BIGELOW, PROPOSITION 47: “THE SAFE NEIGHBORHOODS AND SCHOOLS 
ACT” 43, 54 (2017), https://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/Prop-47-Information.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8YHE-DYJ5] (“The statute does not define the scope of evidence admissible to prove 
or disprove the petitioner’s eligibility for resentencing” and “[n]o particular form of petition is 
specified by the initiative”); accord COUZENS & BIGELOW, supra note 141, at 19, 40. 
 255. Many of these included the twenty-two counties that lack a formal public defender’s 
office. CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUST., SECOND CHANCES AND SYSTEMS CHANGE: HOW 
PROPOSITION 47 IS CHANGING CALIFORNIA 56 (2017), https://safeandjust.org/wp-
content/uploads/P47_Report_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7ML-7ZNQ]. 
 256. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.9 (West 2020) (outlining a process under 
which the Department of Justice, before July 1, 2019, will “review the records in the state sum-
mary criminal history information database and shall identify past convictions” and courts 
shall automatically “reduce or dismiss the conviction” if there is no prosecutorial challenge by 
July 1, 2020). 
 257. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2(a)–(b) (2018). In those situations where the courts miss 
a case or are missing grading information, a petitioner may still proactively file a sealing peti-
tion. § 9122.3(c). 
 258. State-based identification can support clearance across disparate counties—a survey 
of clearance seekers in California found that 43 percent had charges in multiple counties. Clear 
My Record, CODE FOR AM., https://www.codeforamerica.org/what/clear-my-record [https://
perma.cc/28KK-EWXJ]. It also can support economies of scale by enabling clearance on mul-
tiple bases using a “human-centered” rather the more typical “case-centered” approach. 
 259. ALASKA STAT. § 22.35.030 (2018). 
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ord after dismissal or a finding of no probable cause.260 But while Vermont’s 
second chance current gap was close to 0 percent for the studied years, based 
on data available to employers, the second chance gap among gig jobseekers 
in Alaska did not decline in 2017,261 despite its enactment of its “no website 
access” policy in 2016.262 This could be because background check compa-
nies can nonetheless access criminal justice data through, for example, a 
state data feed or court runner and disseminate this information electroni-
cally even in the absence of a state website.263 
In Vermont, until 2019, a person’s criminal history record was sealed by 
the court twelve months after a finding of no probable cause, dismissal at ar-
raignment, or dismissal without prejudice before trial, unless the prosecuting 
attorney objected.264 But arguably just as, if not more, important than this 
law is the decision of the Vermont agency that provides information to em-
ployers, the Vermont Criminal Information Center (VCIC), to only “re-
port[] information on someone who has been convicted of a crime.”265 This 
provides a seal around criminal information that is not present in Alaska. 
D. Automating Delivery of Second Chances 
Though every second chance program is unique, each petition-based 
system requires the same basic steps to be carried out: the applicant must as-
certain the criteria, gather court and other records, and work with a lawyer 
to apply the criteria to existing records to determine eligibility and apply; 
and the state must evaluate the application and grant relief.266 Student re-
 
 260. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7603(a) (Supp. 2019). 
 261. In fact, it increased from approximately 30 percent to 37 percent, based on my anal-
ysis on sample sizes of 86 and 115 cases, respectively (limiting the precision of point estimates). 
 262. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., supra note 51, at 4. 
 263. See, e.g., Kasey Schroer, Background Check FAQs – Criminal and Offense History 
Searches, HIRERIGHT: BLOG (Dec. 13, 2008), https://www.hireright.com/blog/background-
checks/criminal-background-checks/background-check-faqs-criminal-and-offense-history-
searches [https://perma.cc/5RPY-YPVF] (saying companies like HireRight “maintain a net-
work of court runners to facilitate in-person courthouse record searches” where records are 
not available online). 
 264. Tit. 13, § 7603(a) (2018). Note that the timeline was changed to sixty days in the 
2019 statutory supplement. 
 265. Information for Court Diversion Participants About Criminal Records, VT. CT. 
DIVERSION, http://vtcourtdiversion.org/court-diversion/information-on-criminal-records/ 
[https://perma.cc/4Z2H-6L2E] (“If an employer runs a check on a person against whom charg-
es were filed and subsequently dismissed . . . VCIC staff will inform the employer that there is 
‘no record.’ ”). 
 266. For example, for a person to reclassify her felony under California’s Prop 47 requires 
determining eligibility based on conviction records; obtaining a copy of her criminal record (or 
records); completing the forms of the Superior Court in which she was convicted for each felo-
ny; making copies of the form, one each for the Superior Court and district attorney where she 
was convicted; and filing these forms. The D.A., Superior Court, and, in some cases, the public 
defender in that district must then verify all the information provided, coordinate among bu-
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searchers at Stanford have estimated the public and private costs of carrying 
out petition-based records clearing in California, including the court’s cost, 
the cost of preparing the application, and related costs, at $3,757.267 
Automation can reduce the costs of clearing first, by implementing steps 
in the process to scale. The California Senate Appropriations Committee has 
estimated the costs of identification of Prop 64-eligible convictions through 
the DOJ’s centralized repository and the cost of the court processing peti-
tions to be about $7.87–$27.87 million per 218,094 convictions, at an average 
cost of about $36–$128 per cleared conviction.268 
Far more efficient is the “total automation” option that does not require 
any action by the second chance recipient or court. Many states automatical-
ly restore voting rights,269 for example, and a handful of states specify that 
nonconviction records “shall” be expunged.270 Several counties in California, 
working with Code for America, have also worked to proactively provide re-
lief without a petition under Propositions 47 and 64.271 Under the terms of 
Pennsylvania’s Clean Slate Act, the state automatically sealed nonconviction 
and older conviction records,272 at an estimated “one-time” cost to the courts 
of $3.4 million.273 An estimated 1.15 million Pennsylvanians received relief 
under the bill in the first year.274 This translates into a cost per person receiv-
ing relief, based on just the nonconvictions backlog, of approximately $2.96. 
 
reaucracies, and evaluate the claim. Change My Record, MY PROP 47, http://myprop47
.org/change-my-record/ [https://perma.cc/FB2C-A4W3]. 
 267. MEYLI CHAPIN, ALON ELHANAN, MATTHEW RILLERA, AUDREY K. SOLOMON & 
TYLER L. WOODS, A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL RECORD EXPUNGEMENT IN SANTA 
CLARA COUNTY 6 (2014). The process of applying for reenfranchisement is generally even 
more involved, requiring, for example, an individual to determine and then pay outstanding 
fines and fees; wait the mandatory waiting period, if any; determine his criminal history; use 
legal analysis to apply the criteria for restoration; fill out the forms and apply to the relevant 
tribunal; prepare to answer questions about home life, job status, employment history, and 
child support; prepare a record of any encounters with law enforcement; get certified copies of 
document relating to criminal offenses; get references; and then proceed to a hearing, followed 
by a board recommendation, and then a gubernatorial decision. See MANZA & UGGEN, supra 
note 153, at 84–89. 
 268. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140. 
 269. See, e.g., N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 8.181 (2018). 
 270. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 692.17(1) (West 2016). 
 271. See, e.g., supra note 143 (noting the proactive initiatives of San Francisco and Ala-
meda). 
 272. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9121(b), 9122 (2018). 
 273. Email from Ami Levin, Data Exch. Project Manager, Admin. Off. of Pa. Cts., to au-
thor (July 24, 2020, 11:17 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 274. Sharon Dietrich, As COVID-19 Continues, Expanding Clean Slate Legislation Will 
Help People in Need, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 1, 2020 9:30 AM), https://www.inquirer.com
/opinion/commentary/clean-slate-legislation-records-sealed-pennsylvania-covid-19-recovery-
20200701.html [https://perma.cc/E6Q4-EY6C]. 
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TABLE 6: RECORDS CLEARING COST ESTIMATES 





$3,757 per person 
$59 (probation office costs), $242 (court 
costs), $3,412 (legal assistance provided 
by the Records Clearance Project), $44 





$36–$128 per charge 
$5–$26 million (court costs), $2.9 million 
(DOJ identification costs) (does not in-
clude prosecution/PD costs) 
“Clean Slate”  
Total Automation277 
Approximately $2.96 per 
person ($3.4 million to 
support an initial tranche 
of around 1.15 million 
people eligible for relief) 
$195 thousand (for changes to police 
computerized criminal history systems), 
$50 thousand (for implementation by the 
Administrative Office of PA Courts) 
IV. OPEN POLICY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This Article has described and documented the gaps that exist between 
available and delivered second chances and highlighted approaches for nar-
rowing these gaps at scale. Yet while the case studies of the previous Section 
describing the advantages of automated and automatic methods over peti-
tion-based ones counsel their embrace, an appreciation of the broader con-
texts and dynamics point in the opposite direction, away from a too-narrow 
focus on closing the second chance gap through better-written laws and ad-
ministrative fixes alone. Chief among them is that the very frame of “second 
chances” risks legitimizing the underlying criminalization, incarceration, 
and deprivation of the right to vote, get a good job and housing, and to be 
free in the first place. This Part, at its conclusion, discusses the existence of a 
“first chance gap” when the rules of the United States and other countries are 
compared. 
This Part also identifies open policy and research questions that address 
other aspects of the administration and delivery of second chances and, 
 
 275. CHAPIN ET AL., supra note 267, at 6. 
 276. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140. 
 277. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9121(b), 9122 (2018). 
December 2020] The Second Chance Gap 577 
 
more importantly, their impact. These include the important role of debt 
and data in contributing to “second second chance gaps”; the futility of fully 
clearing one’s record in a digital age; our current lack of understanding of 
the public and private impacts of second chance relief at scale, particularly in 
the absence of notification and in the shadow of statistical discrimination; 
and the second chance gap among women and juveniles. 
A. Second Second Chance Gaps 
Even when automation is embraced, debt-related barriers and dirty data 
can lead to incomplete delivery, creating “second second chance gaps” and 
the risk of exacerbating, rather than reducing and ultimately eliminating, 
“unwarranted racial disparities across the criminal justice system” as called 
for by the civil rights community.278 Both are discussed below. 
Limits on available administrative data make it difficult to determine the 
extent to which debt is deterring applications for second chances. But debt 
obligations pose distinct barriers to the delivery of second chances and cur-
rently stand in the way of records expungement,279 license reinstatement,280 
and enfranchisement281 second chances. The inability to fulfill these prereq-
uisites creates wealth-based barriers to second chances, creating a real risk of 
their regressive impact. While automation holds the ability to “level the play-
ing field” as to awareness and application burden, in the absence of debt re-
lief it can further exacerbate, rather than narrow, existing disparities.282 The 
debt can include fines, fees, and restitution, each with a distinct purpose and 
 
 278. LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS., THE USE OF PRETRIAL “RISK ASSESSMENT” 
INSTRUMENTS: A SHARED STATEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS CONCERNS 2–3 (2018) (Principle 1). 
 279. E.g., Mackenzie J. Yee, Expungement Law: An Extraordinary Remedy for an Extraor-
dinary Harm, 25 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 169, 186 (2017) (citing IND. CODE § 35-38-9-
2(e)(2), (3) (2017) (specifying that only if the court finds that the defendant has “paid all fines, 
fees, and court costs, and satisfied any restitution obligation placed on the person as part of the 
sentence” and met other requirements, it “shall” expunge the conviction record)); see also 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.637(1) (2019) (requiring satisfaction of all sentence elements, in-
cluding “any and all legal financial obligations,” as part of sentence completion prerequisite to 
expungement). 
 280. E.g., April D. Fernandes, Michele Cadigan, Frank Edwards & Alexes Harris, Mone-
tary Sanctions: A Review of Revenue Generation, Legal Challenges, and Reform, 15 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 397, 407 (2019) (describing Johnson v. Jessup, 381 F. Supp. 3d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2019), 
in which Johnson’s license was reinstated only after plaintiff paid outstanding fees associated 
with traffic tickets); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-395 (2017) (stating that a license shall re-
main suspended until all fines and fees are paid in full, or installment payment plan approved). 
 281. E.g., Torie Atkinson, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in 
the Shadow of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R–C.L. L. REV. 189, 224 (2016) (“Felons 
who have failed to pay fines, fees, restitution, and court costs in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, 
Connecticut, and Delaware cannot be re-enfranchised until their [legal financial obligations] 
are paid.”). 
 282. See LEADERSHIP CONF. ON CIV. & HUM. RTS.,, supra note 278. 
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rationale.283 For example, a defendant may get a speeding ticket and be is-
sued a fine.284 Or if they are found guilty of theft, they may be ordered to pay 
restitution in the amount of the stolen amount to the plaintiff.285 But increas-
ingly, defendants are also being charged by the court for fees associated with 
operating the legal system, even tangential aspects not directly related to the 
disposition of cases.286 In contrast to fines, which are usually limited in 
amount and intended to deter,287 and restitution, which is meant to compen-
sate victims in criminal cases,288 court and correction fees can apply to all 
cases and can quickly run into the thousands and outweigh fines and restitu-
tion.289 Saddling a defendant with “use costs,”290 fees can be motivated by a 
municipality’s desire to raise revenue.291 
For poor defendants, repayment requirements can present insurmount-
able structural barriers to second chances. Like the other burdens associated 
with records clearance, financial costs operate in a regressive manner, put-
ting expungement out of the reach of those who arguably need it the most. 
While current American Bar Association guidelines call for the courts to 
 
 283. Thomas Capretta, Highway Robbery: Due Process, Equal Protection, and Punishing 
Poverty with Driver’s License Suspensions, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1213, 1217 n.41 (2018) 
(describing the multiple purposes as articulated by the Virginia Supreme Court of the state’s 
statutory court-collection process including: “to facilitate the payment of fines, court costs, 
penalties . . . to collect the monies due . . . as a result of these convictions, and []to assure pay-
ment of court-ordered restitution to victims of crime”). 
 284. Fernandes et al., supra note 280, at 409. 
 285. Cf. id. 
 286. Edelman, supra note 43, at 215 (“Governments jacked up fines and added moun-
tainous fees that had no connection with the violation—for example, a portion of a $500 fee 
went toward the cost of running the courthouse gym in one county in Michigan.”(footnote 
omitted)). 
 287. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Wealth, Equal Protection, and Due Process, 61 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 397, 418 (2019) (describing how “a reduced fine or public service can adequately 
serve the state’s interest in accomplishing deterrence and punishment” (footnote omitted)). 
 288. Atkinson, supra note 281, at 190 n.4 (“Restitution is payment from an offender to a 
victim for losses suffered as a result of the crime. It is authorized in every state.”). 
 289. WHITELEMONS, supra note 43, at 8, 12–13 (describing former inmates returning to 
society with debts totaling in the thousands of dollars and listing examples of common fees 
that add up to over $1,200). 
 290. Atkinson, supra note 281, at 190–91 (“Defendants in criminal cases began having to 
pay restitution, court costs, room and board, and even public defender fees. As time went on, 
fees spiraled into new areas: DNA testing, medical examinations, even jury selection.” (foot-
notes omitted)). 
 291. Note, State Bans on Debtors’ Prisons and Criminal Justice Debt, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
1024 (2016) (describing the municipal budgetary constraints, including following the Great 
Recession, that have led city criminal justice municipalities to impose fines, fees, court costs, 
and interest); see also Edelman, supra note 43, at 215 (describing the diversion of “court fees” 
in one county of Michigan being collected and applied to finance a county-employee fitness 
gym). 
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have the ability to waive fines and fees after individualized assessments,292 
and some jurisdictions have moved in this direction,293 this trend is not uni-
versal and waiver is often only available after years of timely payments.294 
Those who can’t pay may find themselves barred from the employment that 
they need to become able to do so. As it has in debtor’s prison and related 
contexts,295 this aspect of the criminal justice system punishes the poor,296 
potentially long after their time has been served. 
Another “second second chance gap” in expungement has been created 
by the poor quality of criminal justice data and, in particular, ambiguous 
dispositions (described below in Section IV.C) and charge-grade (e.g., “felo-
ny B,” “misdemeanor 2”) information. The lack of grade or severity data is 
problematic because many states’ eligibility criteria use charge grades as a 
way to distinguish between clearable and nonclearable offenses.297 In the first 
year of implementation of the Pennsylvania Clean Slate Act, many people 
 
 292. Malia Brink, ABA Guidelines on Fines and Fees Used to Promote Critical Reforms, 
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2019, at 54, 54 (“Further the Guidelines state that neither a fine nor a fee 
should ever ‘be greater than an individual’s ability to pay,’ noting that judges must have the 
‘ability to waive or reduce’ any fine or fee (Guidelines 1 and 2). The Guidelines further state 
that a hearing on ability to pay should be held before the imposition of any fine or fee (Guide-
line 4).” (quoting ABA PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON BUILDING TR. IN THE AM. JUST. SYS., 
TEN GUIDELINES ON COURT FINES AND FEES 1–2 (2018))), https://www.americanbar.org
/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_ind_10_guidelines
_court_fines.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MUZ-ZEQM]). 
 293. See, e.g., Fernandes et al., supra note 280, at 409 (describing Washington state’s new 
policy allowing for waiver of multiple forms of legal financial obligations upon a finding of 
indigency). 
 294. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 983a (2003 & Supp. 2019) (“On or after No-
vember 1, 2016, the court shall have the authority to waive all outstanding fines, court costs 
and fees in a criminal case for any person who . . . [h]as made installment payments on out-
standing fines, court costs, fees and restitution ordered by the court on a timely basis every 
month for the previous twenty-four (24) months following release from the custody of the De-
partment of Corrections.”). 
 295. Fernandes et al., supra note 280, at 405 (describing the practice of “pay or stay, or 
incarcerating people for inability to pay fines and fees” that commonly arises in the context of 
“those who have outstanding debt owing to traffic violations or misdemeanor offenses [and] 
are threatened with jail because they do not have the means to pay at the time of assessment. 
Courts generally specify a per-day amount that is compensated toward the remaining debt, 
usually between $10 and $30 per day in jail. The widespread use of this practice to compel 
payment of outstanding legal debt has prompted scholars, civil rights attorneys, and advocates 
to declare these modern-day debtors’ prisons”). 
 296. See generally LOÏC WACQUANT, PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL 
GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY (2009) (arguing that, in the post-civil rights era, the 
criminal justice system has been used as a tool to curb social insecurity by penalizing poverty). 
 297. See, e.g., infra Table 5: Clearance Criteria Examples and Challenges; accord Michael 
Hollander, Dir. of Analytics, DATA Lab, Phila. Dist. Att’y’s Off., Presentation: The Hidden 
Problems Behind Clean Slate: Legacy Data Problems in Automated Record Clearing (Nov. 14, 
2019) (discussing the issue of missing grades in the application of Pennsylvania state law to 
Pennsylvania criminal records). 
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with convictions have been unable to get relief due to missing grade data, 
falling into the “second second chance gap.”298 In drafting California’s 
AB1076, which was passed in the fall of 2019 and provides for automated 
clearance of some convictions, lawmakers punted on data issues, stating that 
relief would only be granted if “relevant information is present.”299 While 
this makes the law implementable without huge costs, it also means that 
many who likely deserve relief won’t get it. 
In addition to grade data, personal information pertaining, for example, 
to the individual’s military status, age, sexual trafficking-victim status, or to 
the amount of money at stake, or that implicates discretion or other out-of-
record criteria is also nearly impossible to implement at scale.300 Criteria 
based on the date of sentence completion are also surprisingly difficult to 
implement, due to indeterminate sentencing and the complexities of what 
can happen after a person is sentenced,301 and because it is much harder to 
pinpoint a completion date than, for example, disposition date. The good 
news is that policy interventions can be used to address each such issue ex 
ante by, for example, blessing the use of standard commercial name-
matching techniques; pegging waiting times to disposition dates, rather than 
sentence completion date;302 and more generally taking into account imple-
mentation in policy development. Table 5 lists problematic phrases and 
drafting alternatives, but perfection on the first try should not be expected; 
rather, ruthless iteration as discussed in Part III is required. 
B. The Impossibility of Forgetting 
In the vein of thinking about reentry more broadly, even if an individual 
clears her official criminal record, the growth in the number and accessibility 
of electronic criminal records303 increases the risk that expunged information 
 
 298. Hollander, supra note 297. 
 299. Assemb. B. 1076, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
 300. For example, one aspect of California Prop 47, its $950 ceiling with respect to prop-
erty crimes, has been relatively hard to implement at scale because it requires analysis of the 
police record. See supra note 261 and accompanying text. Conversely, two of the factors that 
made computational determination of the expungable population in Maryland possible were 
that the laws were very objective and that all the information needed to determine eligibility 
was on the state website. Email from Matthew Stubenberg, IT Dir. & Staff Att’y, Md. Volunteer 
Laws. Serv., to author (Mar. 2, 2018, 6:25 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 301. An example might be, “probation: 5 YEARS; restitution: 1760; other: 90 DAYS 
WORK; RELEASE ** 11/05/2014 SENTENCE MODIFICATION-PROBATION REVOKED; 6 
YEARS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 241 DAYS CREDIT FOR TIME SERVED, 
$1906.08 RESTITUTION.” 
 302. For a list of problematic phrases and drafting alternatives, see Table 5: Clearance 
Criteria Examples and Challenges. 
 303. Blumstein & Nakamura, supra note 164, at 328. 
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will remain accessible to employers and others.304 Although credit-reporting 
agencies that are subject to the Fair Credit and Reporting Act (FCRA) have a 
duty to report accurate information and to provide means of redress when 
errors are made, unofficial “people search” websites are not bound by these 
requirements.305 
Audits of commercial-screening companies have revealed that they are 
at risk of reporting sealed records, misclassification (for example, reporting a 
misdemeanor as a felony), or inappropriately disclosing information pro-
tected by consumer and privacy laws.306 When records providers don’t have 
in place protocols for updating data or do not receive updated data in an eas-
ily ingestible fashion, the risk of outdated, inaccurate information is high.307 
The “futility of expungement,”308 or impossibility of erasure, not to mention 
its fundamental conflict with the First Amendment and tradition of govern-
ment-records transparency and accessibility, has led a number of prominent 
advocates to oppose expungement as a priority strategy.309 
Individuals can take several steps to protect themselves from outdated 
criminal-profile data,310 but at a systemic level, laws that effectively regulate 
background screening and “mugshot” services,311 and that make it easy (for 
example, by requiring regular publication of the “change file”) to update da-
tabases of information, and that comply with and punish the dissemination 
of outdated information, can help.312 In Europe, the “right to be forgotten” 
has been used to require Google to delist references to a businessman’s crim-
inal history,313 and the novel idea of using the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) to require commercial providers to “take down” mugshots has 
 
 304. Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten 
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 1705, 1725–26 (2003). 
 305. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a, 1681i, 1681k. 
 306. PERSIS S. YU & SHARON M. DIETRICH, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., BROKEN RECORDS: 
HOW ERRORS BY CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKING COMPANIES HARM WORKERS AND 
BUSINESSES 3–4 (2012), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/broken-records-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ6V-487F]. 
 307. Roberts, supra note 165, at 345–46. 
 308. E.g., JACOBS, supra note 95, at 308 (describing clearing remedies as “largely futile”). 
 309. See, e.g., id. at 130 (describing former Pardon Attorney Margaret Love’s opposition 
to expungement); id. at 121–23 (describing the “insurmountable” obstacles the First Amend-
ment places on prohibiting media disclosure of expunged information). 
 310. Sharon M. Dietrich, Ants Under the Refrigerator? Removing Expunged Cases from 
Commercial Background Checks, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2016, at 26, 28–29. 
 311. Roberts, supra note 165, at 345–46. 
 312. Dietrich, supra note 310, at 29. 
 313. Jason Tashea, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Can Apply to Criminals: UK High Court Rules 
Against Google, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 16, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article
/right_to_be_forgotten_can_apply_to_criminal_records_rules [https://perma.cc/F6QD-JSZT]. 
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also been suggested314—at some cost, it must be acknowledged, to the First 
Amendment. The exercise of such rights would supplement the authority of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC), and Fair Credit Reporting Act to police the accuracy of criminal 
background checks prepared by commercial screeners.315 
The redaction of records also raises significant challenges for research-
ers, criminal defense attorneys, journalists, and others seeking complete rec-
ords with which to, inter alia, hold the prosecutor and the judiciary 
accountable for their decisions. In addition, given that many expungement 
laws contemplate that records will remain available to law enforcement,316 
chances that one can get completely away from one’s past record seems van-
ishingly small. These realities raise questions about the relative costs and 
benefits of closing second chance gaps as opposed to enacting other types of 
reform, including “forgiving” remedies. Licensure reform317 and Ban the Box 
policies, 318 for example, are less burdened by the tradeoff between records 
expungement and access to complete and full government records raised by 
Clean Slate policies. 
C. Punishing Innocence with Dirty Data 
A collateral finding of this research is that criminal justice data infor-
mation about nonconvictions—arrests or charges that have been dropped, 
acquitted, or diverted or are pending or otherwise not accompanied by a de-
termination of guilt—is widely available through background checks. A per-
son with a severe felony charge—even if the charge is dropped—will still be 
harmed by it. Among the over half a million charges reviewed in the analysis 
of background checks reported in Part III, only about 40 percent included a 
definitive record of conviction (Table A-2)—the sort of information that an 
employer should care most about. 
What’s worse, the disposition was often unclear. As described in Ap-
pendix M, for the analysis reported in Part III, our team of law and tech stu-
 
 314. Jason Tashea, Use Copyright Law to Battle Mugshot Extortion, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 27, 
2018, 9:23 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/lawscribbler/article/use_copyright_law_to_battle
_against_mugshot_extortion [https://perma.cc/PFT4-HUTZ]. 
 315. Dietrich, supra note 310, at 28 (“[T]he background screening industry is regulated 
by two federal agencies, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the relatively new Consum-
er Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).”); May Background Screeners Lawfully Report Ex-
punged Records?, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/2018/02/06/may-background-screeners-lawfully-report-expunged
-records/ [https://perma.cc/HXQ3-J8NY]. 
 316. Love, supra note 19. 
 317. E.g., Collateral Consequences in Occupational Licensing Act, INST. FOR JUST., 
https://ij.org/activism/legislation/model-legislation/model-collateral-consequences-reduction-
act/ [https://perma.cc/G96S-9MRC]. 
 318. See infra notes 335–336 and accompanying text. 
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dents spent hundreds of hours cleaning ambiguous disposition data. A large 
share of the records included terms like “nolle pro sequi” and “nolo conten-
dere” (legalese for “dismissed” and “guilty (no contest)”), which mean little 
to the average prospective landlord, employer, or person evaluating a candi-
date, but also terms like “no true bill,” “forfeit,” and “adjudication withheld,” 
which were difficult even for seasoned attorneys to place into “guilty” or “not 
guilty” categories. If you were an employer, a job applicant’s aggravated as-
sault charge from a previous year might give pause, even if the disposition 
didn’t indicate that person was guilty. Out of the over half a million disposi-
tions we initially considered, many had to be discarded because of ambigui-
ties in the data, and only 59 percent, we estimate, included a “plain English” 
disposition.319 
Fine distinctions risk meaning even less to the computers that are in-
gesting criminal data en masse, often with little oversight, to make decisions 
on a wide range of official and civil contexts.320 Criminal background checks 
purport to protect the workplace and other environments from convicted 
criminals. But civil punishments based on nonconvictions, in areas as di-
verse as housing, 321 employment,322 and immigration,323 are being meted out. 
Crucially, the criminalization of innocence risks disproportionate impact on 
the nearly 50 percent of African American men and more than 40 percent of 
Latino men arrested by the age of twenty-three, as compared to about 22 
percent among white males. 324 
The Model Law on Non-Conviction Records developed by the Collateral 
Consequences Resource Center and a team of advisors including myself rec-
ommends automatic expungement of most arrests and charges that do not 
result in conviction, a laudable goal consistent with the foundational pre-
 
 319. Disposition includes “dismiss,” “not guilty,” “acquit,” “guilty,” “convicted,” “admit,” 
“admission”; not, for example, “nolle.” See infra Appendix M. 
 320. See Goggins, supra note 162. 
 321. MARIE CLAIRE TRAN-LEUNG, SARGENT SHRIVER NAT’L CTR. ON POVERTY L., WHEN 
DISCRETION MEANS DENIAL: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CRIMINAL RECORDS BARRIERS TO 
FEDERALLY SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 16–20 (2015), https://www.povertylaw.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D7J-5AWZ]; Colin Lecher, 
Automated Background Checks Are Deciding Who’s Fit for a Home, VERGE (Feb. 1, 2019, 8:00 
AM), https://www.theverge.com/platform/amp/2019/2/1/18205174/automation-background-
check-criminal-records-corelogic [https://perma.cc/W9DT-Q93N]. 
 322. See Goggins, supra note 162. 
 323. Christie Thompson, How ICE Uses Secret Police Databases to Arrest Immigrants, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Aug. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2017/08/28
/how-ice-uses-secret-police-databases-to-arrest-immigrants [https://perma.cc/578E-KBPB]. 
 324. Robert Brame, Shawn D. Bushway, Ray Paternoster & Michael G. Turner, Demo-
graphic Patterns of Cumulative Arrest Prevalence by Ages 18 and 23, 60 CRIME & DELINQ. 471, 
478 (2014). 
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sumption of innocence.325 But to even determine whether the many charges 
with ambiguous dispositions should be considered nonconvicted or not will 
often require judgement calls, a way to resolve stale charges, and a number of 
other data-compensation steps. 
D. Understanding the Impact of Second Chance Relief 
Unlocking better outcomes and removing unfair barriers, not just me-
chanically delivering second chances, should be viewed as the ultimate goal 
and yardstick of second chance relief. In this regard, it is important to 
acknowledge that there may be tradeoffs between the quantity and quality of 
second chance relief. What is easy (e.g., clearing recent nonconvictions with-
out notice) is not necessarily what is meaningful (e.g., destruction of old fel-
ony conviction records with the knowledge and redemption of the person). 
Currently, little is known about how records clearing can be carried out 
at scale and with the greatest social benefit. That is because existing studies 
documenting the positive impact of clearing have been of petition-based 
clearing, which introduces significant selection bias and implicates a qualita-
tively different process than automated clearing. Completing the clearance 
process provides an individual with increased confidence,326 the knowledge 
of how to characterize one’s newly cleared past, and in some cases, wrapa-
round services,327 each of which may contribute to improved outcomes. To 
that end, two factors are hypothesized to be required for an individual to 
benefit from records clearance: (1) that the clearance is effective at prevent-
ing background checks from discovering the information, and (2) that the 
individual has and exercises her right to be allowed to deny a record’s exist-
ence.328 But just as a person unaware of the restored right to vote probably 
won’t register or go to the polls, not knowing one’s past record has been 
cleared can lead to inadvertent and unnecessary disclosures of past history.329 
The experience of automated felony reenfranchisement holds a number of 
cautionary tales for automated expungement. In the reenfranchisement con-
text, researchers have found that “a high percentage of individuals with past 
criminal involvement hold uncertain or incorrect beliefs about their right to 
vote” and that this “reduce[s] voter turnout.”330 The hypothesized mecha-
 
 325. Model Law on Non-Conviction Records, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/model-law-on-non-conviction-records-3/ [https://perma.cc
/4WND-FKC5]. 
 326. Adams et al., supra note 92, at 27, 43. 
 327. As recommended by, for example, CALIFORNIANS FOR SAFETY & JUST., supra note 
255, at 57. 
 328. I thank Serena Holthe for making this point to me. 
 329. Kelman & Carlson, supra note 137. 
 330. Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, The Politics of the Restoration of Ex-Felon Voting 
Rights: The Case of Iowa, 10 Q.J. POL. SCI. 41, 43 (2015). 
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nisms are important and turn on several factors that are likely to operate, po-
tentially even on a heightened scale, to automated expungements. 
First, misinformation and uncertainty about one’s rights are present be-
cause policies are set at the state level and vary widely by state, making it dif-
ficult to determine which specific policies apply to a particular ex-felon, who 
also may have charges across states. The policies differ in subtle ways, “with 
distinctions based on the specific crime or the length of time since dis-
charge,” and they are also “particularly fluid” with frequent changes and up-
dates.331 Second, when the cost of mistakenly asserting a second chance that 
one doesn’t have is high—casting a vote when ineligible is a felony,332 and 
not disclosing a prior criminal record can also have significant consequenc-
es—the uncertainty about whether one has a second chance is even more 
likely to chill its use. In this regard, it is notable that Pennsylvania’s Clean 
Slate Act, which automatically seals nonconviction records—records associ-
ated with summary convictions and misdemeanors within ten years, as long 
as the individual’s record is clear—does not require notification.333 Neither 
does California’s AB1793, which significantly automates the process of clear-
ing marijuana convictions.334 
Beyond the notification question, however, the impact of records clear-
ing more broadly, particularly on those with and without records, deserves 
attention. Studies have found that Ban the Box strategies that prohibit em-
ployers from asking job applicants about their criminal histories or perform-
ing background checks until the point of hiring, on the theory that delaying 
criminal history information will diminish its importance, have inadvertent-
ly led to statistical discrimination against low-skilled Black men without a 
record while not necessarily improving outcomes for young, low-skilled 
Black men with records.335 Records clearing at scale could have similar unin-
tended consequences. 
In her review of studies of the impact of Ban the Box, Jennifer Doleac, 
the author of several of the studies, concluded that because Ban the Box re-
moves the ability of young, low-skilled Black male applicants without rec-
ords to signal their clean records, employers rely on their own judgments 
and “assume there is a high likelihood that they have a record and do not in-
 
 331. Id. at 47. 
 332. Id. at 43. 
 333. H.B. 1419, 2017 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2018). 
 334. FISCAL SUMMARY OF A.B. 1793, supra note 140. 
 335. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Doleac & Benjamin Hansen, Does “Ban the Box” Help or Hurt 
Low-Skilled Workers? Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal 
Histories Are Hidden 24–25 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 22469, 2016), 
https://www.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w22469/w22469.pdf [https://perma.cc
/GD8N-2XQP] (finding that “Ban the Box” strategy reduces the probability of employment for 
young Black and Hispanic men without a college degree by 3.4 and 2.3 percentage points re-
spectively). 
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terview them.”336 However, Clean Slate is distinguishable from Ban the Box 
in at least three ways. First, because information will be removed selectively 
from qualifying records, employers won’t necessarily be aware that any in-
formation they were previously able to access is missing from a particular 
record. Nor will employers, as in Ban the Box, be specifically prohibited 
from accessing information in a way that plausibly prompts an awareness of 
the absence of criminal information and the need to address it through spec-
ulation. If employers “don’t know what they are missing” under Clean Slate, 
they are less likely to replace individualized judgments with general statisti-
cal discrimination. Second, Clean Slate rehabilitates only the subset of rec-
ords that meet the eligibility criteria, as compared to Ban the Box, which 
applies to all criminal histories. Third, it can be implemented in multiple 
ways—for example, by removing expunged information entirely from the 
system or by retaining it, but with an indicator that the information is no 
longer available. These factors belie facile conclusions about Clean Slate 
based on Ban the Box but do not undercut the need for data to address them. 
E. What About the (Women and) Children? 
Further research is also needed to understand the different experiences 
of particular subgroups and how policy attention can be prioritized, includ-
ing with respect to juveniles. Clean Slate efforts to date have been focused on 
adults, but catching individuals earlier in their lives may have a greater im-
pact on not only the individual but also society.337 Though sealing remedies 
were originally “pioneered in the juvenile justice system,”338 and separate ju-
venile courts developed to protect the privacy of minors, the spectre of juve-
nile “super predators” and related developments led to a gradual loosening 
of restrictions.339 But while more attention has been paid recently to the ex-
pansion of access to juvenile records, little of it has focused on the methods 
available to shrink this access, whether automated or petition based. But ju-
venile sealing rates, as reported in Table 4-1, also reflect a low (less than 10 
 
 336. The Fair Chance to Compete for Jobs Act: Hearing on H.R. 1076 Before the Subcomm. 
C.R. & C.L. of the H. Comm. on Oversight & Reform, 116th Cong., at III, 10 (2019) (written 
statement of Jennifer Doleac, Professor of Economics, Texas A&M University, submitted by 
Rep. Roy). 
 337. This is consistent, for example, with the Heckman curve, which hypothesizes that 
“[s]kill remediation programs . . . are much less efficient compared to early intervention pro-
grams” for individuals with educational disadvantages, indicating diminishing returns to in-
vestments in human capital over an individual’s lifetime. James J. Heckman, Policies to Foster 
Human Capital 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 7288, 1999), https://www
.nber.org/system/files/working_papers/w7288/w7288.pdf [https://perma.cc/X36M-J2AP]. 
 338. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 114. 
 339. Joy Radice, The Juvenile Record Myth, 106 GEO. L.J. 365, 382, 418 (2018). 
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percent) uptake gap.340 Yet given the potentially significant consequences on 
a young adult’s trajectory from their criminal record, the uptake gap among 
juveniles may be as much if not more of a critical policy priority than the 
adult second chance gap, and it has started to receive policy attention.341 
The disparate impacts of records and records clearance on other popula-
tions is also notable. For example, several studies have found that women 
represent almost 50 percent of those seeking records clearance,342 as com-
pared to approximately 25 percent of those arrested,343 due potentially in 
part to the desire of women to enter “caregiving” fields such as nursing and 
geriatric care, whose licensing requirements often bar individuals with crim-
inal records.344 This suggests that criminal records act as a particular imped-
iment to women, with implications for how expungement awareness 
campaigns are targeted and the urgency of licensure reforms. Likewise, the 
immigration consequences for noncitizens of clearable criminal records, 
which in the case of deportation345 arguably dwarf other collateral conse-
quences, also deserve further attention. Understanding the particular ways in 
which criminal records impact distinct populations can support tailored so-
lutions to providing appropriate relief from a criminal history. 
F. The First Chance Gap 
Finally, a focus on the second chance gap should not draw attention 
away from another, perhaps more important gap: the gap between the Unit-
ed States and other Western countries in what is taken away, and therefore 
requires restoration in the first place, when an individual becomes system 
involved. In the same way that the U.S. Constitution, open government tra-
dition, and data industry conspire in the United States to make forgetting 
impossible, in Europe, prohibitions on disclosure, judicial anonymization of 
 
 340. Calero, supra note 26, at 37 (finding that more than 90 percent of juveniles qualified 
for but had not taken advantage of available remedies). 
 341. See, e.g., Biden-Sanders Unity Task Force Recommendations, BIDEN HARRIS 8, 61, 
https://joebiden.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/UNITY-TASK-FORCE-RECOMMEND
ATIONS.pdf [https://perma.cc/34S9-KWV8] (stating that “children who do enter the juvenile 
justice system should be given a true second chance, including by automatically sealing and 
expunging juvenile records” and specifying that the receipt of federal funds be conditioned on 
“the automatic expungement and sealing of juvenile records”). 
 342. See, e.g., TANSEY & CARLIN, supra note 221, at 12 (finding that 48 percent of rec-
ords-clearance applicants were female); Prescott & Starr, supra note 26 (finding 46 percent of 
studied set-aside recipients to be female). 
 343. Ten-Year Arrest Trends, supra note 65 (showing that female arrests comprised 23 to 
27 percent of all arrests from 2006 to 2015). 
 344. Elsa Y. Chen & Ericka B. Adams, “I’ve Risen Up from the Ashes that I Created”: Rec-
ord Clearance and Gendered Narratives of Self-Reinvention and Reintegration, 14 FEMINIST 
CRIMINOLOGY 143, 150–54 (2019). 
 345. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 360–64 (2010) (describing the deporta-
tion risks that accompany criminal pleas). 
588 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 119:519  
 
defendant names, and a strong tradition of privacy as well as various conti-
nent-wide regulations and courts work to make finding an individual’s crim-
inal history in the first place difficult.346 Likewise, felon reenfranchisement is 
unnecessary in the large number of European countries that don’t take away 
the rights of incarcerated individuals to vote in the first place.347 In this con-
text, closing the second chance gap feels more like a last resort than a first-
order option for ensuring that everyone has a fair shot from the start. 
Prosecutors play crucial roles in the creation of the need for second 
chances. In the regression models described earlier, among the three policy 
factors, choice of clearance method explained some of the variance: counties 
that had adopted to some degree an “automatic” clearance approach had a 
4.1 percent lower second chance current gap.348 Also highly relevant to the 
size of the gap was, naturally, the generosity of the state’s policy (did the state 
allow for clearance of any nonconvictions or all nonconvictions?)—as this 
difference in policy defines whether and to what degree nonconvictions 
charges can be cleared. But also, perhaps less expected, the convictions rate, 
or how many charges turned into convictions, were highly relevant: a 10 per-
cent increase in the share of charges that were never convicted was associat-
ed with a 10 percent increase in the second chance gap. The share of charges 
in the sample that were actually convictions ranged dramatically state by 
state, as shown in Table-A2. 
Yet uncharged and unconvicted arrests and charges, when not cleared, 
stay on people’s records and in criminal-records databases that are used by 
employers, lenders, licensing agencies, and social-service agencies to feed in-
to algorithmic and other determinations.349 In this vein, efforts to support 
contact with the system without creating a record, as pursued by the pro-
gressive D.A. movement, are worthy of further piloting, evaluation, and 
adoption. 
 
 346. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 159–61. 
 347. Id. at 250. 
 348. One might ask, why doesn’t introducing automated methods of clearance account 
for more of the difference in gap sizes? There are several possible explanations. First, methods 
that appear automated on the books do not always result in effective clearance in implementa-
tion, as in the case of Alaska. States that likewise do not have policies of automation can none-
theless, because of policy choices, be more effective at shielding records due to a variety of 
factors. In addition, our model currently has the flaw that it does not account for time effects, 
in part because of the uncertainty around the retroactivity of clearance efforts, which distorts 
the analysis pertaining to states that adopted automatic clearance provisions only. Finally, be-
cause so few states have adopted automatic clearing, and they do so in such different ways, the 
explanatory power of this variable, relative to the others where there is a greater range of val-
ues, is small. 
 349. JACOBS, supra note 95, at 4; Jain, Arrests as Regulation, supra note 169, at 824–25; see 
also James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Criminal Records, 3 U. ST. 
THOMAS L.J. 387, 395 (2006). 
December 2020] The Second Chance Gap 589 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has introduced the concept of the second chance gap as an 
important metric for measuring the effectiveness of the growing wave of sec-
ond chance laws. Though automating second chances in the ways discussed 
in this Article may be viewed as in tension with a justice system that requires 
individualized attention, it provides a way to scale relief in a way that tradi-
tional models cannot. Regardless of the specific implementations jurisdic-
tions choose, only by attending to the details of administration and 
measurement will the potential of second chance opportunities to save tax-
payer money, restore dignity, and further economic integration, to break the 
cycle of mass criminalization, be fulfilled. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A-1: BASIC STATISTICS 
Average age range at time of charge 
29.6 
(mode = 21) 
Number of states represented 50 
Average number of checks per state* 1,395 
Unique individuals studied 61,658 
Incidents studied 204197 
Charge Types Count Share 
Misdemeanor 310,802 66.99% 
Not classified 1,785 0.38% 
Felony 97053 20.92% 
Minor 54,334 11.71% 
Total charges 463,974 
Total misdemeanor + felony charges 407,855 
Charge Disposition Count Share 
Nonconvicted: acquitted, dismissed or other 179,655 38.72% 
Diversion or deferral 5,443 1.17% 
Conviction 246043 53.03% 
Pending/ transferred 23,699 5.11% 
Unknown 9,134 1.97% 
Total charge dispositions 463,974 100% 
Total diversion or deferral + pending/ transferred 29,142 
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Total 463,974 66.99% 20.92% 11.71% 0.38% 53.03% 38.72% 1.17% 5.11% 1.97% 
AK 3322 70.59% 14.18% 15.23% 0.00% 82.27% 16.98% 0.12% 0.57% 0.06% 
AL 4386 55.38% 35.64% 8.98% 0.00% 57.82% 37.25% 1.07% 3.85% 0.00% 
AR 5240 75.27% 19.50% 5.17% 0.06% 68.80% 23.45% 1.34% 4.39% 2.02% 
AZ 12865 44.89% 29.00% 21.27% 4.84% 53.74% 42.09% 0.18% 2.17% 1.82% 
CA 7219 64.86% 26.96% 8.19% 0.00% 74.35% 23.59% 0.39% 0.80% 0.87% 
CO 15343 47.94% 16.33% 35.50% 0.23% 41.05% 57.60% 0.34% 0.04% 0.97% 
CT 3411 72.59% 27.00% 0.41% 0.00% 82.35% 17.38% 0.06% 0.03% 0.18% 
DE 6896 73.36% 22.32% 4.31% 0.01% 31.28% 66.84% 0.46% 0.44% 0.99% 
FL 29906 54.17% 17.80% 27.90% 0.13% 40.50% 50.22% 1.14% 2.21% 5.92% 
GA 8787 70.73% 29.11% 0.14% 0.02% 48.50% 36.11% 0.08% 10.70% 4.61% 
HI 2968 66.41% 25.00% 8.52% 0.07% 58.93% 38.11% 2.63% 0.17% 0.17% 
IA 12822 93.60% 5.20% 1.18% 0.02% 74.33% 23.53% 1.41% 0.19% 0.55% 
ID 14895 48.66% 7.87% 43.47% 0.00% 69.71% 24.95% 1.26% 3.29% 0.79% 
IL 8286 52.82% 25.34% 21.61% 0.22% 40.08% 47.61% 0.49% 8.18% 3.63% 
IN 10530 62.73% 14.30% 22.85% 0.12% 61.86% 36.57% 0.72% 0.44% 0.41% 
KS 2150 67.95% 30.70% 1.35% 0.00% 54.56% 41.35% 3.53% 0.23% 0.33% 
KY 5500 69.35% 17.02% 13.64% 0.00% 60.44% 30.42% 1.91% 5.78% 1.45% 
LA 3975 55.57% 34.04% 10.39% 0.00% 58.74% 38.99% 0.40% 1.38% 0.48% 
MA 3971 60.72% 35.58% 3.65% 0.05% 25.99% 70.39% 0.98% 2.29% 0.35% 
MD 21218 72.74% 15.87% 10.84% 0.55% 16.73% 62.57% 0.00% 20.14% 0.56% 
ME 3568 80.41% 19.06% 0.53% 0.00% 74.83% 23.49% 0.25% 0.64% 0.78% 
MI 3524 62.32% 36.92% 0.77% 0.00% 60.98% 34.36% 0.06% 4.20% 0.40% 
MN 11107 94.63% 5.07% 0.19% 0.12% 84.18% 14.49% 0.14% 0.98% 0.21% 
MO 6231 63.06% 32.47% 3.90% 0.58% 92.20% 3.61% 0.00% 0.08% 4.11% 
MS 2509 61.62% 38.10% 0.28% 0.00% 63.45% 25.11% 0.36% 9.29% 1.79% 
MT 3142 71.23% 28.71% 0.06% 0.00% 62.57% 28.80% 4.77% 3.25% 0.60% 
NC 26191 39.83% 17.86% 42.30% 0.00% 38.09% 59.28% 0.00% 1.73% 0.91% 
ND 5428 86.31% 9.86% 3.70% 0.13% 88.84% 5.27% 0.09% 0.35% 5.45% 
NE 5553 80.82% 10.39% 8.77% 0.02% 69.98% 27.07% 0.11% 2.76% 0.09% 
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NH 4033 29.78% 69.40% 0.72% 0.10% 60.97% 37.86% 0.00% 1.12% 0.05% 
NJ 5085 20.04% 57.09% 16.89% 5.98% 42.05% 50.97% 0.53% 5.57% 0.88% 
NM 11361 76.03% 23.15% 0.44% 0.38% 27.02% 60.74% 5.62% 6.57% 0.04% 
NV 54305 76.22% 23.70% 0.06% 0.01% 51.99% 38.70% 0.71% 7.24% 1.36% 
NY 2909 42.52% 53.28% 4.16% 0.03% 71.47% 7.29% 0.00% 19.35% 1.89% 
OH 9575 86.91% 12.68% 0.34% 0.06% 62.83% 27.89% 0.15% 3.57% 5.57% 
OK 7358 80.39% 17.74% 1.77% 0.11% 60.34% 23.10% 16.24% 0.03% 0.29% 
OR 7556 40.85% 25.94% 33.07% 0.13% 61.39% 36.83% 0.79% 0.94% 0.04% 
PA 27164 71.23% 26.23% 1.78% 0.76% 34.38% 37.94% 0.03% 22.18% 5.47% 
RI 3908 72.85% 26.43% 0.69% 0.03% 60.67% 34.34% 0.15% 4.20% 0.64% 
SC 14781 87.71% 11.91% 0.31% 0.07% 76.97% 21.11% 0.00% 1.79% 0.13% 
SD 4286 86.79% 10.43% 2.75% 0.02% 59.50% 38.71% 0.02% 1.00% 0.77% 
TN 9399 77.06% 18.30% 3.71% 0.93% 39.59% 45.72% 2.32% 8.25% 4.13% 
TX 11638 73.90% 20.63% 4.45% 1.01% 47.59% 36.04% 7.97% 1.03% 7.38% 
UT 6570 90.14% 6.83% 3.03% 0.00% 64.28% 34.79% 0.03% 0.88% 0.02% 
VA 10668 57.80% 23.03% 18.94% 0.23% 58.08% 36.50% 0.25% 3.08% 2.08% 
VT 1045 87.66% 12.34% 0.00% 0.00% 98.37% 0.19% 1.24% 0.10% 0.10% 
WA 4643 80.10% 19.71% 0.19% 0.00% 59.27% 37.86% 2.33% 0.13% 0.41% 
WI 9483 63.07% 22.07% 14.45% 0.41% 67.08% 30.55% 0.75% 0.32% 1.31% 
WV 4098 72.79% 26.74% 0.46% 0.00% 41.51% 51.42% 0.98% 5.81% 0.29% 
WY 3166 84.43% 15.29% 0.28% 0.00% 61.75% 32.79% 3.00% 1.30% 1.17% 
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- 37.6% 9.2% 12.1% 34.6% 1.3% 3.7% 1.5% 
AK 3322 2,030 293 410 564 4 19 2 
AL 4386 1,549 763 224 1,634 47 169 0 
AR 5240 2,774 666 165 1,229 70 230 106 
AZ 12865 3,317 1,544 2,053 5,415 23 279 234 
CA 7219 3,669 1,369 329 1,703 28 58 63 
CO 15343 3,025 927 2,346 8,838 52 6 149 
CT 3411 1,931 868 10 593 2 1 6 
DE 6896 1,598 514 44 4,609 32 30 68 
FL 29906 7,042 1,910 3,163 15,019 341 661 1,770 
GA 8787 3,102 1,156 4 3,173 7 940 405 
HI 2968 1,047 507 195 1,131 78 5 5 
IA 12822 9,088 326 115 3,017 181 24 71 
ID 14895 4,902 475 5,006 3,716 188 490 118 
IL 8286 1,292 1,029 1,001 3,945 41 678 301 
IN 10530 3,907 760 1,847 3,851 76 46 43 
KS 2150 794 372 7 889 76 5 7 
KY 5500 2,508 429 387 1,673 105 318 80 
LA 3975 1,291 851 193 1,550 16 55 19 
MA 3971 431 501 100 2,795 39 91 14 
MD 21218 2,743 541 266 13,276 0 4,273 119 
ME 3568 2,221 438 11 838 9 23 28 
MI 3524 1,394 741 14 1,211 2 148 14 
MN 11107 8,942 384 24 1,609 16 109 23 
MO 6231 3,764 1,713 268 225 0 5 256 
MS 2509 1,013 572 7 630 9 233 45 
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MT 3142 1,527 439 0 905 150 102 19 
NC 26191 4,300 1,752 3,922 15,526 0 453 238 
ND 5428 4,231 399 192 286 5 19 296 
NE 5553 3,314 215 356 1,503 6 153 5 
NH 4033 849 1,592 18 1,527 0 45 2 
NJ 5085 474 1,069 595 2,592 27 283 45 
NM 11361 2,406 599 66 6,901 638 746 5 
NV 54305 24,122 4,107 4 21,016 386 3,932 739 
NY 2909 901 1,140 38 212 0 563 55 
OH 9575 5,401 601 13 2,670 14 342 533 
OK 7358 3,639 711 90 1,700 1,195 2 21 
OR 7556 1,617 1,076 1,946 2,783 60 71 3 
PA 27164 7,059 1,964 316 10,306 8 6,025 1,486 
RI 3908 1,843 513 15 1,342 6 164 25 
SC 14781 10,509 831 37 3,120 0 265 19 
SD 4286 2,300 171 79 1,659 1 43 33 
TN 9399 2,824 771 125 4,297 218 775 388 
TX 11638 4,230 1,044 263 4,194 928 120 859 
UT 6570 3,846 254 123 2,286 2 58 1 
VA 10668 3,632 1,190 1,375 3,894 27 329 222 
VT 1045 903 125 0 2 13 1 1 
WA 4643 2,085 659 8 1,758 108 6 19 
WI 9483 3,876 1,215 1,269 2,897 71 30 124 
WV 4098 1,451 236 14 2,107 40 238 12 
WY 3166 1,718 230 7 1,038 95 41 37 
 
  














































Total 204,197 372,673 61,658 80% - 26,826 39% 22% 
AK 1,998 2,803 1,169 95% Strict 60 70 6% 5% 
AL 2,180 3,789 1,199 70% Lenient 730 482 40% 24% 
AR 2,876 4,582 1,245 89% Strict 384 31% 26% 
AZ 4,609 9,112 1,682 85% 
Super-
strict  
0 0% 0% 
CA 4,210 6,497 2,032 94% Strict 365 18% 15% 
CO 4,198 9,678 1,566 73% Strict 962 61% 40% 
CT 2,380 3,392 1,221 91% Lenient 395 291 24% 18% 
DE 2,796 6,473 1,243 62% Strict 800 64% 51% 
FL 10,511 19,681 2,685 55% 
Super-
strict 
0 0% 0% 
GA 3,486 7,423 1,748 77% Strict 1460 368 21% 15% 
HI 1,696 2,625 1,054 66% Lenient 547 52% 42% 
IA 8,221 12,411 1,581 95% Strict 180 636 40% 27% 
ID 4,829 8,011 1,288 86% Strict 365 568 44% 32% 
IL 3,776 5,697 1,679 60% Strict 1,080 64% 56% 
IN 3,866 7,973 1,408 81% Lenient 365 815 58% 30% 
KS 1,194 2,034 754 75% Strict 297 39% 34% 
KY 2,863 4,297 1,256 86% Lenient 565 45% 33% 
LA 2,278 3,485 1,280 75% Strict 529 41% 37% 
MA 1,998 3,681 1,249 22% Lenient 1825 340 27% 11% 
MD 5,586 14,957 1,645 58% Strict 1095 952 58% 33% 
ME 2,175 3,492 1,266 90% Strict 252 20% 17% 
MI 2,376 3,335 1,334 81% Strict 470 35% 30% 
MN 7,669 10,925 1,861 97% Strict 276 15% 10% 
MO 3,053 5,695 1,498 97% Strict 1095 0 0% 0% 
MS 1,768 2,215 1,210 80% Strict 305 25% 25% 
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MT 1,821 2,871 1,162 84% Strict 356 31% 27% 
NC 6,373 14,441 1,848 65% Lenient 1,406 76% 53% 
ND 3,374 4,909 1,366 99% Strict 98 7% 6% 
NE 3,211 4,913 1,346 89% Strict 395 29% 24% 
NH 1,827 3,955 1,192 85% Strict 416 35% 27% 
NJ 1,715 3,661 1,060 73% Strict 460 43% 38% 
NM 4,275 9,881 1,401 62% Strict 1,026 73% 58% 
NV 27,102 49,232 1,669 88% Strict 1,118 67% 38% 
NY 1,654 2,227 1,156 100% Strict 365 22 2% 2% 
OH 5,225 8,652 1,877 93% Strict 528 28% 19% 
OK 2,964 6,019 1,214 84% Lenient 365 510 42% 26% 
OR 2,524 4,918 1,252 80% Lenient 726 58% 37% 
PA 5,796 19,050 1,905 87% Lenient 1,133 59% 29% 
RI 2,474 3,685 1,273 77% Strict 536 42% 36% 
SC 7,931 14,444 1,658 95% Lenient 687 41% 27% 
SD 2,628 4,100 1,259 90% Strict 350 28% 20% 
TN 3,931 7,667 1,482 68% Lenient 1,062 72% 49% 
TX 6,562 9,183 2,121 71% Strict 365 1,095 52% 43% 
UT 3,723 6,310 1,416 85% Strict 180 588 42% 31% 
VA 4,663 8,132 2,098 81% Strict 955 46% 37% 
VT 747 1,030 473 100% Lenient 365 1 0% 0% 
WA 3,200 4,502 1,549 67% Strict 730 601 39% 31% 
WI 3,369 7,853 1,391 93% Strict 303 22% 14% 
WV 2,280 3,789 1,243 72% Strict 60 638 51% 40% 































































































































Total 39% 13,689 22% 23,200 7,476 32% 100.0% 35.4% 25.50 13.92 
AK 6% 54 5% 242 28 12% 0.3% 0.0% 0.01 0.006 
AL 40% 290 24% 553 142 26% 2.1% 0.8% 0.61 0.297 
AR 31% 323 26% 332 90 27% 0.7% 0.2% 0.15 0.043 
AZ 0% 0 0% 801 0 0% 1.7% 0.0% 0.00 0.000 
CA 18% 310 15% 630 121 19% 9.8% 1.8% 1.27 0.497 
CO 61% 619 40% 545 209 38% 1.6% 1.0% 0.71 0.239 
CT 24% 215 18% 494 34 7% 1.1% 0.3% 0.19 0.029 
DE 64% 633 51% 428 183 43% 2.2% 1.4% 1.04 0.301 
FL 0% 0 0% 1,067 0 0% 5.9% 0.0% 0.00 0.000 
GA 21% 257 15% 651 121 19% 3.8% 0.8% 0.57 0.271 
HI 52% 447 42% 245 90 37% 0.5% 0.3% 0.19 0.038 
IA 40% 422 27% 223 80 36% 0.7% 0.3% 0.20 0.038 
ID 44% 407 32% 252 116 46% 0.4% 0.2% 0.12 0.034 
IL 64% 942 56% 677 252 37% 6.5% 4.2% 2.99 0.800 
IN 58% 425 30% 444 213 48% 1.6% 0.9% 0.68 0.340 
KS 39% 256 34% 280 91 33% 1.4% 0.5% 0.39 0.140 
KY 45% 420 33% 282 140 50% 1.3% 0.6% 0.42 0.141 
LA 41% 478 37% 575 201 35% 1.5% 0.6% 0.46 0.193 
MA 27% 139 11% 502 9 2% 1.4% 0.4% 0.28 0.018 
MD 58% 546 33% 620 328 53% 1.5% 0.9% 0.62 0.371 
ME 20% 214 17% 311 65 21% 0.5% 0.1% 0.07 0.023 
MI 35% 400 30% 489 103 21% 2.9% 1.0% 0.72 0.187 
MN 15% 180 10% 201 31 15% 1.0% 0.2% 0.11 0.019 
MO 0% 0 0% 530 0 0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.00 0.000 
MS 25% 300 25% 508 68 13% 0.9% 0.2% 0.17 0.039 
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MT 31% 319 27% 363 142 39% 0.2% 0.1% 0.05 0.022 
NC 76% 981 53% 495 402 81% 1.6% 1.2% 0.86 0.354 
ND 7% 83 6% 175 16 9% 0.2% 0.0% 0.01 0.002 
NE 29% 326 24% 211 95 45% 0.4% 0.1% 0.08 0.024 
NH 35% 322 27% 1,012 361 36% 0.4% 0.1% 0.11 0.121 
NJ 43% 398 38% 767 338 44% 2.1% 0.9% 0.66 0.564 
NM 73% 807 58% 392 266 68% 0.6% 0.4% 0.30 0.100 
NV 67% 639 38% 621 424 68% 0.8% 0.5% 0.39 0.256 
NY 2% 21 2% 805 15 2% 9.0% 0.2% 0.12 0.089 
OH 28% 361 19% 352 145 41% 2.2% 0.6% 0.45 0.182 
OK 42% 319 26% 409 28 7% 0.9% 0.4% 0.29 0.025 
OR 58% 463 37% 557 299 54% 1.2% 0.7% 0.48 0.311 
PA 59% 559 29% 682 453 66% 2.6% 1.5% 1.10 0.894 
RI 42% 460 36% 355 146 41% 0.9% 0.4% 0.28 0.087 
SC 41% 452 27% 535 359 67% 1.6% 0.7% 0.47 0.373 
SD 28% 246 20% 202 73 36% 0.3% 0.1% 0.06 0.016 
TN 72% 731 49% 398 246 62% 2.1% 1.5% 1.09 0.367 
TX 52% 905 43% 620 213 34% 13.0% 6.7% 4.83 1.138 
UT 42% 446 31% 161 51 32% 0.7% 0.3% 0.21 0.024 
VA 46% 786 37% 542 260 48% 2.1% 1.0% 0.70 0.231 
VT 0% 0 0% 74 0 0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.00 0.025 
WA 39% 480 31% 392 70 18% 1.6% 0.6% 0.46 0.067 
WI 22% 192 14% 608 93 15% 1.4% 0.3% 0.22 0.104 
WV 51% 492 40% 376 193 51% 0.6% 0.3% 0.24 0.093 
WY 37% 397 32% 214 73 34% 0.2% 0.1% 0.05 0.009 
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APPENDIX C: MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS  
 
Step Variables Model 1 Model 2 R2 
Step 1 Automatic clearance -0.294** -0.041** 0.12 
Step 2 Generosity 0.181** 0.112** 0.20 
Step 3 Conviction rate -1.02** -1.022** 0.75 
Step 4 RUCC_2013 [T.2.0]  0.015 0.76 
 RUCC_2013 [T.3.0]  0.018  
 RUCC_2013 [T.4.0]  0.021  
 RUCC_2013 [T.5.0]  0.021  
 RUCC_2013 [T.6.0]  0.058**  
 RUCC_2013 [T.7.0]  0.028  
 RUCC_2013 [T.8.0]  0.026  
 RUCC_2013 [T.9.0]  0.051*  
 Average age  -0.002**  
 lnpopulation  0.017*  
N= 2253, **=p<.001, *=p<.01 
 
I worked with a research assistant to conduct a hierarchical multiple lin-
ear regression to predict the current records-clearing gap based on state and 
local policies and the demographics characteristics of the target population. 
The current record clearing gap was calculated as the percentage of cases eli-
gible for clearance at the county level. Relevant policies included the gener-
osity of the state’s clearance rules (lenient or strict, with superstrict counties 
omitted due to the lack of any clearance), the presence of any “automatic” 
clearing provisions in state law,350 and the county’s conviction rate (percent-
age of charges that led to convictions). 
 
 
 350. The range in provisions was considerable. Compare, for example, Maine’s provision, 
under which records of an arrest or court proceeding that did not lead to a conviction become 
confidential immediately, 16 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 703(2) (2020), and Connecticut’s 
more restricted rule, under which records from the police, court, and state’s attorney that relate 
to a case for which a nolle prosequi was entered are erased within thirteen months. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 54-142a(c) (2019). 
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Model 1: Gap size = Auto-Clearance + Generosity + ConvictionRate 
 
Model 2: Gap size = Auto-Clearance + Generosity + ConvictionRate + 
Age + Lnpopulation + Rural-Urban Code 
 
These three variables were included in the initial regression (r2=0.753, 
all ps < 0.001). Each successive variable explained additional variance (all Fs 
> 4.2, all ps < 0.01). A second regression model was then run to add demo-
graphic variables: the average age of people charged, the rural/urban classifi-
cation351 and ln(population) of the county (r2=0.757, all ps except 
ln(population) < 0.001). 
  
 
 351. 2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria, supra note 
218. 
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APPENDIX M 
This Appendix contains two Sections. Section 1 describes the data col-
lected and the methods and assumptions used to develop an estimate of the 
second chance nonconvictions-expungements gap, at the state and national 
levels. Section 2 describes the robustness checks carried out, to test the 
strength of one key assumption in the development of a national estimated 
second chance gap: that the eligibility of gig workers for nonconvictions-
expungement relief was similar enough to the eligibility of people with rec-
ords in general that it could serve as the basis for a national estimate. The da-
ta reported is provided in Appendices A and B. 
SECTION 1 
Step 1: Estimating the Second Chance Nonconvictions Expungement Gap 
To approximately size the national second chance nonconvictions-
expungement gap, I worked with the background check company Checkr, 
which generously shared data with this project, to develop fifty state-level 
samples of background checks, collectively the “National Gig Jobseeker Da-
tabase” (or “gig-jobseeker sample”). Checkr in turn obtained the raw data 
primarily from court sources. The state samples comprised the checks of in-
dividuals seeking primarily on-demand jobs between January 2017 and Oc-
tober 2018,352 and, as shown in Table A-1, numbered about 1,400 per state 
and, as shown in Table B-1, included over 1,000 checks in all states except 
Vermont and Kansas. Collectively the total number of checks was around 
60,000.353 
People seeking gig-economy jobs are not necessarily representative of 
people with background checks in general. To apply for a gig-economy job 
requires, for example, that the person not be incarcerated, live in an area 
where gig-economy jobs are available, and be capable of doing gig-economy 
jobs such as driving or delivery. For these reasons we might expect the gig-
jobseeker sample to skew younger and more urban but also to exclude incar-
cerated people with longer sentences. In order to compare our results based 
on our gig-jobseeker sample with the results of the same analysis carried out 
on a representative sample, we collected representative data from several 
states, as shown in Table M-3, and used it to carry out parallel eligibility 
analyses, as described in Section 2. 
 
 352. See supra note 207. 
 353. See supra Table A-1. 
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Step 2: Data Cleaning and Processing 
In the Section that follows, we describe the steps undertaken to reduce 
the share of unknown dispositions and charge types, remove outliers, and 
group the charges into incidents. 
1. Dispositions Cleaning 
 When a person is charged of a crime, that charge can resolve in any of a 
number of ways, including through a determination of guilt or innocence, a 
dismissal, or a transfer, and the expungability of the charge depends on its 
disposition. To prepare our data for analysis, we developed a taxonomy, in 
consultation with two criminal law attorneys and one criminal law profes-
sor,354 to classify each disposition into one of four major categories (noncon-
viction, conviction, pending/transferred, and unknown) as shown in the 
table below. 
TABLE M-1: DISPOSITION CATEGORIES 
Major Category Subcategory 
Nonconviction Acquit, not guilty 
Nonconviction Dismiss with prejudice 
Nonconviction Dismiss without prejudice 
Nonconviction Nonconviction withheld 
Nonconviction Nonconviction first offender 
Nonconviction Nonconviction other 
Nonconviction Prejudgment probation 
Conviction Plea 
Conviction Probation 
Conviction Guilty other 
Conviction Adjudication 
Pending/ transferred Pending 
 
 354. I am deeply indebted to Professor Ellen Kreitzberg and legal services attorneys Mi-
chael Hollander and Matthew Stubenberg for their help in developing rules to clean and nor-
malize case dispositions into guilty, nonguilty/dismissed, pending, transferred, and diversion/ 
deferred categories. 
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Pending/ transferred Transferred 
 Unknown  Not classified 




States vary in how they view, treat, and characterize certain dispositions, 
and so in cases of ambiguity, we relied upon state-specific internet research 
to try to classify major categories of dispositions. Doing so necessarily intro-
duced imprecision, however, given the varied bases of disposition, so to ap-
proximate the extent of this imprecision we asked a third criminal law 
attorney to independently review the labels. This exercise resulted in an ini-
tial agreement rate of 94%, which we then resolved through iteration.355 Af-
ter the dispositions were implemented, a subsequent manual review of about 
50 thousand codings took place, finding ambiguity with about 584 codings, 
or about 1.2%.356 
Based on the efforts outlined above, we placed 96.9% of dispositions 
overall into one of the three definitive categories of conviction, nonconvic-
tion, and pending/transferred, with the distribution shown in Table A-1. The 
“unknown” disposition rate was below 10% for all states and below 5% for all 
but five states.357 
2. Charge-Type Cleaning 
In many cases, the eligibility of a record for clearance depended on the 
severity of the underlying charge, meaning whether a charge is a felony, mis-
demeanor, or a minor (traffic, infraction, or summary) charge.358 To prepare 
the data for processing, missing values for charge-severity labels were in-
ferred from (1) exact matches and (2) fuzzy matches (i.e., where the same 
charge or offending statute was identified). These two steps yielded a label-
ing rate of 92% across all states. We further improved upon these results by 
using general keyword classification (e.g., that “murder” is a felony) based on 
 
 355. An example of an ambiguous disposition was “appealed,” which could be character-
ized as “pending” or “guilty,” as most appeals follow guilty verdicts. We coded such terms as 
indicating that the charge was “pending.” 
 356. Some of these included “no action,” “warrant quashed,” and “adjournment in con-
templation of dismissal,” which we coded as a nonguilty disposition, but which could also indi-
cate that the case was still pending; when a case was indicated as “retired” we indicated it was 
“pending,” but it could also be closed without a guilty resolution. 
 357. See supra Table A-2. 
 358. For example, in Texas, misdemeanors can be expunged after one year, while felonies 
have a three-year waiting period. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 55.01(a) (West 2019). 
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trends in the data and internet research. As shown in Table A-2, these efforts 
resulted in known-charge-severity labels for about 99% of charges, and 
above 94% across states. 
3. Data Processing 
From the sample, we marked unresolved charges for exclusion (charges 
with pending/transferred or unknown dispositions, about 3% of the total); 
we also excluded minor charges and records of individuals whose age was 
under 16 or over 80, records from Washington D.C., records where the years 
since charge was less than 0, records that were missing a key data element 
(ID, disposition date, disposition, or state), and records where the disposi-
tion date was not between 1992 and 2018 (inclusive). We confirmed that the 
exclusion of minor charges (e.g., parking tickets) did not cause attrition 
among people in the sample. 
From the charge-level data, we grouped each charge involving the same 
person, on the same day, and in the same jurisdiction into an incident, leav-
ing approximately 373 thousand charges over 204 thousand incidents.359 
Step 3: Ascertaining the Scope of Relief Offered by Each State’s Nonconvictions 
Laws 
The next step was to ascertain the nonconviction-clearance laws of all 
fifty states in force during the time of the sample. To determine the rules of 
each state, we took the following steps. As described below, we relied heavily 
on and owe an enormous debt to the meticulous work of the Collateral Con-
sequences Resources Center’s (CCRC) Restoration of Rights Project (RRP) 
headed by Margaret Love,360 as well as to the Council of State Government’s 
(CSG) Clean Slate Clearinghouse Project, for putting us in touch with many 
in-state attorneys when aspects of the law could not be determined from 
reading and researching the statute. Because records-relief criteria are often 
extremely complex and intricate, we consulted and compared closely the 
summaries provided by the RRP and CSG and consulted practicing attor-
neys where possible. However, to the extent that these summaries and the 
practice experience of the attorneys we consulted were in error, those errors 
are also reflected in our analysis. 
 
 359. See Table B-1. 
 360. RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT, https://ccresourcecenter.org/restoration [https://
perma.cc/4TKQ-U3UD]. 
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1. Internet Research of the Scope of State Nonconvictions-Clearance 
Laws 
To ascertain the scope of records relief for nonconvicted charges, we 
worked with a criminal law professor and several teams of students to review 
the detailed summaries of the law governing the records remediation of 
adult nonconvictions as of around 2018, the time of our sample, provided by 
the RRP,361 and where there was ambiguity, state statutes. In 2018 and again 
in 2019, I worked with a team of students to review the CSG’s Clean Slate 
Clearinghouse 2017 summary of the laws.362 We did a final independent 
check based on the sources described above in the summer of 2020. 
Based on these sources, we coded each state’s laws along several major 
dimensions for inclusion in our eligibility model. 
 Coverage: We coded whether the statute appeared to make relief 
available for (1) unconvicted arrest records only, or (2) noncon-
victed court records, in particular acquitted and dismissed charg-
es.363 When a state’s law specified that nonconvicted records were 
to be made confidential automatically or otherwise not disclosed 
without the need for a petition, we did not exclude the state from 
our analysis, on the assumption that charges that were not effec-
tively cleared through the specified mechanism were still eligible 
for relief. When relief was available for nonconvicted court rec-
ords, we further researched whether nonconvicted charges in in-
cidents that had convictions (“partial nonconvictions”) could be 
cleared, as described below. We also noted (but did not model) 
when other kinds of nonconvictions besides acquittals and dis-
missals (e.g., diversions or deferrals) were eligible for relief. 
 Waiting Period: From the statute, we noted waiting periods that 
were associated with relief for nonconvicted court charges as well 
as with pending or transferred cases that lacked a definitive con-
viction or nonconviction disposition. To reduce complexity, in 
 
 361. We accessed summaries of the law from previous years using the Internet Archive 
Wayback Machine. Wayback Machine, INTERNET ARCHIVE, https://archive.org/web/ [https://
perma.cc/2CHQ-WG5D]. 
 362. Learn About Your State, CLEAN SLATE CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://cleanslateclearinghouse.org/states/. 
 363. We noted states that restricted relief for dismissals—for example, California, which, 
under SB393, made dismissed unconvicted charges sealable only if dismissed with prejudice. 
S.B. 393, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). In Arizona, for example, the law allows individuals 
to petition for relief when they have been “wrongfully arrested, indicted or otherwise charged 
for any crime,” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4051(A) (2012), which we interpreted as allowing 
for relief from acquitted and dismissed charges. In Mississippi, “[a]ny person who is arrested, 
issued a citation, or held for any misdemeanor and not formally charged . . . or upon dismissal 
of the charge, may apply to the court . . . for the charges to be expunged.” MISS. CODE ANN. 
§§ 99-15-59 (2019). We assumed that in this case dismissals due to acquittals were also ex-
pungable. 
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cases where there were different waiting periods for different 
types of nonconvictions, we defaulted to the longer waiting period 
where we could not model the two periods. For example, in Ar-
kansas over the time studied, nolle dismissals entered by the pros-
ecutor have a one-year waiting period whereas all other 
nonconvictions are eligible at the time of disposition with no 
waiting period. In such a case, we assumed that all nonconvictions 
had to wait for one year. Likewise, Texas imposes waiting periods 
of between one and three years depending on the charge type (one 
year for misdemeanors and up to three for felonies and misde-
meanors charged in felony cases); we applied the three-years peri-
od for all clearable nonconvictions. 
 Waiting Period Trigger: When there was a waiting period, we 
tracked its trigger—for example, disposition or arrest. Because we 
did not have the date of arrest in our data, in all cases, we started 
the waiting period at the date of disposition. 
 Other Eligibility-Narrowing Conditions: We tracked and modeled 
conditions that narrowed eligibility, including having a pending 
charge in the same case or a previous conviction, or where relief 
varied based on charge type (e.g., excluding felony nonconvic-
tions). 
 Unmodeled Criteria: We noted but, because of data limitations or 
because the criteria only impacted a small number of states, did 
not model several criteria that operate to both expand and reduce 
eligibility. 
 Leading to overcounting: We left out of our model the following eligibil-
ity criteria that would limit relief: consent of the prosecuting attorney,364 out-
standing legal debt,365 the running of the statute of limitations,366 not having 
certain specific charges (e.g., DUIs), and discretion.367 If these criteria were 
left in the model, it could lead to overcounting. 
Leading to undercounting: We also left out of our model eligibility crite-
ria that would have extended relief to, for example, acquitted and dismissed 
 
 364. E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-3-27 (2020) (allowing for expungement of court 
records “[a]fter one year from the date the prosecuting attorney formally dismisses the entire 
criminal case on the record”). 
 365. IOWA CODE § 901C.2(a)(2) (2020) (requiring as a prerequisite to relief that “court 
costs, fees, and other financial obligations ordered by the court or assessed by the clerk” in par-
ticular criminal cases sought to be expunged must be paid, including the cost of indigent coun-
sel). 
 366. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 179.255 (2020) (requiring, for cases where prosecution 
was declined, that “the applicable statute of limitations has run”). 
 367. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100C (2020) (stating that sealing is available if 
“it appears to the court that substantial justice would best be served”). 
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charges levied against individuals who otherwise did not have a record,368 
deferred or diverted charges,369 charges where the disposition was with-
held,370 first-time-offender charges,371 charges where the disposition was 
probation before adjudication,372 and stale charges (where a waiting period 
had passed).373 
These omissions led to underestimating eligibility. 
2. Research on Partial Nonconvictions 
Within a given criminal incident, a person can be accused of multiple 
charges but convicted of less than all of them. One important dimension of 
relief pertains to the extent to which a state allows for clearance of uncon-
victed charges even if other charges in the incident were convicted. 
To make the determination of this aspect of the scope of relief, we read 
the RRP and CSG summaries of the law in order to classify the charges, 
roughly, into one of three main buckets: “strict” (only allowing for clearance 
of nonconvictions if no charges associated with an incident resulted in a 
guilty outcome), “lenient” (allowing for clearance of court records associated 
with any charge that did not lead to a conviction), or “superstrict” (including 
no provisions for the clearance of court records).374 
In a number of cases, the law appeared to make plain whether or not re-
lief was possible. For example, New Jersey Stat. Ann. § 2C:52-6(a)(3) states 
that “[a]n expungement . . . shall not be ordered where the dismissal, acquit-
tal, or discharge resulted from a plea bargaining agreement involving the 
 
 368. We modeled Florida as “superstrict” because although sealing and expunction were 
technically available, they were available only to individuals that had no prior record. Florida 
Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, RESTORATION RTS. PROJECT (June 28, 2020), 
https://ccresourcecenter.org/state-restoration-profiles/florida-restoration-of-rights-pardon-
expungement-sealing [https://perma.cc/5R67-RYYD]. 
 369. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-3.2(a)(5) (2020) (stating that expungement is avail-
able in deferred adjudication cases after a one-year waiting period). 
 370. For example, in Florida, “[w]here adjudication has been withheld, there is no con-
viction for purposes of impeachment, but the record may be sealed only if all other eligibility 
requirements for sealing are met.” Florida Restoration of Rights & Record Relief, supra note 368. 
 371. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 4373-74 (2020) (stating expungement is manda-
tory where charges involve first-time misdemeanor, but discretionary in other cases). 
 372. For example, “[u]nder Fla. Stat. § 948.01(2), trial courts may withhold adjudication 
of guilt after a plea has been accepted or after a verdict of guilty has been rendered and place 
the defendant on probation . . . . Upon successful completion of probation, charges may be 
dismissed . . . . Records . . . may be expunged after ten years.” Florida Restoration of Rights & 
Record Relief, supra note 368. 
 373. Because we could not discern when action had last been taken in the case. 
 374. During the relevant period, for example, under Wisconsin law, expungement was 
not available for nonconvicted court records, DIR. OF STATE CTS. OFF., EXPUNGING COURT 
RECORDS: HELPFUL INFORMATION AND FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Apr. 2015), www
.co.kenosha.wi.us/DocumentCenter/View/1108 [https://perma.cc/HXX6-Z9SV], leading us to 
code the state as “superstrict.” 
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conviction of other charges,”375 implying that nonconvicted charges could 
not be expunged if other charges in the incident were convicted, or that New 
Jersey was a “strict” jurisdiction. 
In other cases, however, whether or not the partial nonconvictions could 
be cleared could not be ascertained readily based on the record. To deter-
mine the laws in these cases, we worked with an attorney at the CSG’s Clean 
Slate Clearinghouse Project to consult over email with in-state expungement 
attorneys knowledgeable of each state’s laws during the relevant period.376 
This information sometimes required judgment calls on the part of the at-
torneys we consulted; for example, in the case of two states, Ohio and South 
Dakota, the law could not be determined with certainty (in the case of South 
Dakota, the assistant attorney general stated that the clearability of partial 
nonconvictions raised an “unanswered question”),377 leading us to assume, 
conservatively, that each state followed a “strict” records-clearance policy. In 
some cases we could not get a definitive answer. When in doubt, we default-
ed to the more conservative version of the rule (superstrict over strict over 
lenient).378 Because of our heavy reliance on the RPP, we did a final review of 
the superstrict categories with the RPP and conformed our assumptions ac-
cordingly. 
The assumptions we used, and the sources we relied upon to reach them, 
are shown in Appendix B-3 (Strict-Superstrict-Lenient coding notes),379 as is 
the source we relied upon to make up to two determinations for each state: 
first, did the state offer records relief for nonconvicted court records under 
the law (if not, it was “superstrict”), and second, when the state offered relief, 
did it allow for the clearance of nonconvicted charges in an incident where 
other charges were convicted (was it “lenient” or “strict” in its treatment of 
nonconvicted charges?). The table below contains the assumptions we ap-
plied to model waiting periods and charge severity restrictions. 
  
 
 375. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-6(a)(3) (2020). 
 376. See, e.g., Email from Alex Lesman, Pol’y Analyst, Council of State Govs. Just. Ctr., to 
author (Feb. 25, 2019, 11:00 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). More correspond-
ence between the author and Alex Lesman on a state-by-state basis is on file with the Michigan 
Law Review. 
 377. Id.; see also Email from Alex Lesman, Pol’y Analyst, Council of State Govs. Just. Ctr., 
to author (Nov. 12, 2018, 6:22 AM) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
 378. For example, though Georgia and Louisiana both offer partial redaction in certain 
limited cases, making them “lenient,” we conservatively coded each state as “strict.” 
 379. For the specific statute or source we relied upon to make these assumptions, see Ap-
pendix B-3 (on file with author) (“Strict-Superstrict-Lenient coding notes” Column F). 
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TABLE M-2: WAITING PERIOD ASSUMPTIONS 
State 
Abbreviation 
If Any, Waiting 





If Any, Waiting Period 




_Prejudice) of Felonies 









MA 3650 3650 1825  
OK 3650 3650 365  
AL 1825 1825 730  
GA 1460 1460 1460  
MD 1095 1095 1095  
MO 1095 1095 1095  
TX 1095 1095 365  
WA 730 730 730  
CT  395 395  
ID 365 365 365  
IN 365 365 365  
NY 365 365 365  
VT 365 365 365  
IA 180 180 180  
UT 180 180 180  
WY 180 180 180  
AK 60 60 60  
WV 60 60 60 1 
 
Step 4: Calculating the Share of Charges by State Eligible for Clearance 
To the gig-jobseeker background check database obtained in Step 1 and 
processed in Step 2, we applied the nonconviction-clearance laws as ascer-
tained in Step 3 in order to get an estimate of the share of individuals in the 
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sample, per state, with criminal records eligible for nonconviction relief, par-
tially or fully. The results are shown in Table B-1. About 40% of individuals 
in our sample had records that could be cleared partially or fully. 
Step 5: Developing a National Estimate Based on State Eligibility Shares 
To develop a national nonconvictions-eligibility estimate based on the 
state eligibility shares derived in Step 4, we took several steps. First, we as-
sumed that state eligibility shares from nonconvictions from the Checkr 
sample were comparable enough to state eligibility shares from convictions 
estimated from representative criminal history repositories that we could use 
them as the basis for a national estimate. Section 2 presents several checks we 
used to test this assumption. Next, to generate a cumulative estimated na-
tional eligibility share based on state shares, we created weights using people 
who appear in state repositories, as reported by SEARCH, the National Con-
sortium for Justice Information and Statistics, in 2016.380 This yielded a na-
tional eligibility share, weighted by the record-holding population by state, 
of about 35% of people nationally with records who could clear them partial-
ly or fully. To convert this share to a numerical national total, our next step 
was to multiply these weights by the population of people with records, 
around 80 million, yielding a total of about 28 million individuals. 
 
35% clearance rate * 80 million with records = 28 million 
 
This 80 million figure includes people who have been arrested but never 
charged, which, based on an analysis prepared for this report based on the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, comprise about 20% of the total.381 
Like unconvicted charges, uncharged arrests are generally clearable under 
state law382 with a petition, but unlike unconvicted charges, there are usually 
few constraints on their clearance. The application of the eligibility rate de-
rived based on nonconvicted court records may therefore depress the re-
ported total of 28 million individuals. 
 
 380. BECKI R. GOGGINS & DENNIS A. DEBACCO, SEARCH, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. 
INFO. & STAT., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2016: A 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION POLICY REPORT tbl.2 (2018), https://www.ncjrs.gov
/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/251516.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ4U-4NZJ]. 
 381. This analysis was prepared by Robert Apel of Rutgers University for this study, 
based on the NLSY97, an ongoing U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics survey tracking 8,984 people 
starting in their teens. He found that approximately 20 percent of people arrested are never 
charged. See Memorandum from Robert Apel, Professor, Rutgers Sch. of Crim. Just., to author 
(June 5, 2020) (on file with the Michigan Law Review); National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1997, NAT’L LONGITUDINAL SURVEYS, https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/cohorts/nlsy97 
[https://perma.cc/6P5Y-EBE9]. 
 382. Including Alaska, North Dakota, and Iowa. I developed this analysis in consultation 
with in-state attorneys in collaboration with the Council of State Governments. See Appendix 
B-3 (on file with author). 
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SECTION 2: ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To test the strength of one key assumption in our development of a na-
tional estimated second chance gap, that the eligibility of gig workers for 
nonconvictions-expungement relief was similar enough to the eligibility of 
people with records in general for nonconvictions-expungement relief that it 
could serve as the basis for a national estimate, we obtained representative 
data from several states. To each of the representative sources shown below, 
we applied the relevant eligibility criteria to get an eligible share, and also 
generated a comparable eligible share based on Checkr data matched to the 
representative data. In the case of Maryland383 and Pennsylvania384 we relied 
upon analyses carried out by legal services attorneys and expungement ex-
perts. The results are shown below. 
Comparing state-level “actuals” gaps as reflected in these records with 
the gaps observed within the gig-jobseeker sample (matching for geography 
and time period), we found gig jobseekers to have roughly comparable eligi-
bility rates to those in more representative data. If anything, the Checkr 
sample appears to slightly underestimate eligibility. These findings suggest 
 
 383. To identify cases eligible for expungement, in connection with developing a tool to 
aid in the provision of legal services, Matthew Stubenberg analyzed court records from the 
years 1995–2015 from four Maryland jurisdictions: Baltimore City, Baltimore County, Anne 
Arundel County, and Frederick County. See Email from Matthew Stubenberg, supra note 300; 
MDEXPUNGEMENT, https://www.mdexpungement.com [https://perma.cc/C4V9-DPDD]. At 
the time, Maryland allowed nonconviction records and records associated with a few convic-
tions to be expunged from court records upon petition. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-105 
(West 2015). The share of cases identified as expungable but not expunged in each jurisdiction 
varied, but across the four jurisdictions, out of 1.41 million cases with final dispositions, 
around 997 thousand were identified as including expungable offenses that were not expunged, 
for a gap of about 71 percent. Email from Matthew Stubenberg, supra (documenting collabora-
tion with author). 
 384. Former Pennsylvania Community Legal Services staff attorney Michael Hollander, 
in the fall of 2018, undertook an analysis of court records and cases in the Pennsylvania Com-
mon Pleas and Municipal Courts, which process the bulk of felony and misdemeanor criminal 
cases in Pennsylvania, using a tool created to make it easier to expunge criminal records in 
Pennsylvania. Excluded from the analysis were summary cases in Philadelphia (submisde-
meanor), cases from minor courts outside of Philadelphia, and MDJ cases. See Email from Mi-
chael Hollander, Dir. of Analytics, Off. of Dist. Att’y, to Rebecca Vallas, Vice President, 
Poverty to Prosperity Program, Ctr. for Am. Progress, and author (Nov. 9, 2018, 6:12 AM) (on 
file with the Michigan Law Review); see also Rana Fayez, Meet the Disruptor: Michael Holland-
er, PHILA. CITIZEN (May 3, 2016), https://www.thephiladelphiacitizen.org/disruptor-michael-
hollander-expungement-generator/ [https://perma.cc/M9PA-2STG]. Hollander applied a 
slightly simplified version of the eligibility criteria based on the law at the time and assumed 
that diversionary programs had been completed and excluded other eligibility criteria (for ex-
ample, that anyone who turns 70 and has been arrest free for 10 years can have all of their cases 
expunged). Email from Michael Hollander, supra. Based on applying the criteria to court rec-
ords, Hollander found that out of 2,030,595 people with disposed criminal records from 2003–
2017, 1,570,694, or 77.3% of them, were eligible for clearing. Id. Approximately 91%–94% of 
the eligible but not expunged cases were based on nonconvictions, rather diversionary charges, 
making for an approximate total nonconvictions current gap rate of 73% (77% ∙ 94%). 
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that the gig-jobseeker shares of this study can be used to provide rough esti-
mates. 
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 385. Email from Matthew Stubenberg, supra note 300. The overwhelming majority of 
these potential expungements were based on nonconvictions. Id. 
 386. Id. 
